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ABSTRACT
Every year, millions of people in Australia receive support from a range of human, 
social and community service organisations -  government and non-government, 
large and small, formal and informal, for-profit and non-profit. This support is an 
example of social policy implementation and it is rarely spontaneous, but instead 
has travelled a long and complex path from conception to delivery. The 
relationship between governments and community service non-profit organisations 
(NPOs) forms one critical nexus through which social policy passes in the process of 
implementation. It is part of a vast puzzle regarding the private delivery of public 
services and is significant in many ways.
This thesis reports on an ethnographic study exploring the day-to-day experiences 
in three NPOs involved in social policy, in response to the question "how do NPO 
leaders understand and manage their relationships with governments in the 
process of social policy implementation?" The findings are applied to a predictive 
typology of organisational response developed by Oliver (1991) based on 
organisational and institutional theories. Using Oliver's structural-functional 
framework as a heuristic for explaining and exploring the qualitative fieldwork data 
demonstrates not only the utility and limitations of the framework itself, but also 
the benefits of using it to specifically to further deepen analysis and uncover 
unexpected themes. In this way, layers of findings and analysis thicken and deepen 
throughout this thesis. Such findings include, but are not limited to the active role 
the NPOs play in the process of social policy implementation -  even when simply 
complying with government requests or instructions -  and the important role
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played by the leader(s), particularly in interpreting the NPO's circumstances and
framing the options for response.
Insights developed from this "thick" ethnographic description are applied to the 
public administration and third sector literature. In doing so an underpinning 
theme in which the leaders in this study see their NPO as being "not just a tool" of 
government is identified. The theoretical framework of organisations as 
institutions, as developed by Selznick (1957) emerges as a suitable and revealing 
way of understanding the experiences of the NPO leaders. The act of applying this 
angle of institutional theory to the involvement of NPOs in the process of social 
policy implementation neatly complements, but critically deepens existing 
institutional understandings of this process. For example, it is suggested that, just 
as Lipskv's (1980) street level bureaucrat contributed a theoretically significant way 
of understanding the role of the front line individual worker in the process of social 
policy implementation, so too does a Selznickian institutionalised organisation 
understanding of NPOs involved in the same process -  at an organisational, instead 
of individual level.
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CHAPTER 1
MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
VIA "THIRD PARTIES"
1.1 From the passion to the project: A personal journey
Every year, millions of people in Australia, many of them marginalised and 
vulnerable, receive support from a range of organisations -  government and non­
government, large and small, formal and informal, faith based and non-faith based, 
for-profit and non-profit. This support is rarely spontaneous, but instead has 
travelled a long and complex path from its conception to its design and finally to 
the site of its delivery, what I call the process of social policy implementation. This 
thesis describes a different but related process -  that of my own research and 
investigation into just one part of this process of implementation: the relationship 
between governments and non-profit organisations (NPOs) in the community 
services sector. 1
Recently, I stumbled upon four pages of typed notes I had written several years ago 
while preparing for an "exit interview" with an organisation for which I had worked 
as an occupational therapist (OT) with people with disabilities. By the time I wrote 
these notes I had been working as an OT with a range of people in a range of 
organisations and countries for about eight years, and during this time I had 
developed a slow, creeping concern about what was called "the system" in which I 
was embedded. The notes I prepared for this exit interview were a cathartic 
venting of some of the frustrations I had developed along the way. I wondered
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often how the people at the "top" -  the decision makers, policy developers and 
service managers -  were choosing options that had inevitable and often negative 
consequences for the work I was performing and the services my clients were 
receiving. I was deeply concerned that organisations needed to work together in 
order for workers to work together, in order for service users (who typically were 
vulnerable and marginalised and in need of support with often the most basic 
functions of life) to receive the services they required.
The following is an excerpt from these exit interview notes : 2
Almost every aspect of the work that I do involves a number of stakeholders other 
than the client, including suppliers of equipment, the housing department, building 
contractors, teachers, paid carers, and the organisations that provide support to 
my clients.
However, the relationships between this organisation and the others that I am 
required to work with in my day-to-day practices are strained due to reasons 
including:
• Payment for recommendations made by people such as myself must 
typically be borne by other organisations. For example, often I am called in 
to provide expert consultative individualised advice to address problem 
situations -  typically safety related (i.e. a client is at risk of falling, or 
injuring themselves). I recommend housing modifications, equipment, 
staff practices or staffing levels that are an appropriate and necessary 
response to these risk-related situations. However, these 
recommendations may or may not be adhered to depending on the costs 
involved. It is professionally compromising to be required to alter these 
recommendations because of the cost involved, and yet this is a common 
occurrence.
• For example, recently a referral was made for emergency OT intervention 
to support a group of clients and staff where the clients [a group of young 
men with autism and intellectual disability] were entering the kitchen and 
dangerously accessing knives and hotplates during meal preparation. I 
worked closely and at great length with the house staff to explore a 
number of individualised solution options, and made a subsequent 
recommendation. However, management within the organisation which 
supported this group of men disregarded this recommendation to enact 
their own different recommendation, one which I had already considered 
with the house staff and disregarded because of its inappropriateness. This 
was done with no consultation with myself. I understand and support the
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need to work together across organisations in the development of 
recommendations for jointly supported clients, and I am committed to 
working in this way, however, this incident was highly disappointing. I am 
not sure why the other organisation disregarded the partnership process 
here, but I assume it must have been due to their unreasonable workloads 
and pressing timeframes which made it difficult for them to communicate 
these changes with me.
Reading the notes I had prepared for this exit interview I can vividly recall the 
passionate frustration I felt that "my clients" were at risk, simply because 
organisations could not work together.
My passion here was enhanced by my own family circumstances. My elder sister, 
Susan, has cerebral palsy and intellectual disability and is someone for whom labels 
of "vulnerable" and "marginalised" are appropriate -  despite her characteristics of 
charisma and great resilience, and regardless of my commitment to avoid the 
stigmatising effects of unnecessary labelling. My life experience journeying 
alongside her, with only 18 months separating us, witnessing the ways in which our 
two lives converge and diverge has been an illuminating experience in many ways. 
Living away from family in a government-run group home, Susan fully relies on a 
range of systems of support, formal and informal, government and non­
government, all of which have both positive and negative attributes.
As a result of my journey alongside Susan I have developed a keen interest in 
understanding the many and varied impacts of the "systems" which aim, but do not 
always succeed, to support marginalised and vulnerable people. I like to think that I 
am acutely and passionately aware of the importance of appropriate safety nets, 
but am not naive to both their advantages and drawbacks. In particular, I am
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continually surprised to see circumstances where people such as Susan are failed by 
the comprehensive systems created with the best intentions to provide support. 
Conversely, I despair to see support systems abandoned without adequate 
replacements when they are found to fail those they intend to support. I have long 
wondered about how to develop a perfect system of support or if, indeed, this is 
possible.
My experience here is particularly stained by my knowledge of "whole institutions" 
-  large residential facilities into which parents of people with disabilities were 
encouraged to place their children and forget about them (Westcott, 2003). 
Sometimes located on islands or other isolated locations, these places were the 
only model of care for most people with high support needs related to disability up 
until the 1980s, and some still exist even today (PWD, 2009). The caring practices 
of "benevolent professionals" who ran them were often life-threateningly 
damaging to those who were unfortunate enough to live in these facilities (Blatt & 
Kaplan, 1974). Yet, I too embarked on the career path of a "benevolent 
professional" -  an occupational therapist, policy officer and researcher -  and a 
personal path of an advocate and guardian for my sister. In doing so, I enacted a 
deeply held belief: that the solution to poorly designed social policy 
implementation was to continue to seek answers or to "speak truth to power"(Lea, 
2008; Wildavsky, 1979).
To this end, I worked in a broad range of settings and roles, including formative 
experiences volunteering for a year with a locally run non-government organisation
(NGO) on a small Pacific island and working as a researcher for a peak body. Having
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earlier completed honours research focused on developing best practice guidelines 
in a particular field of therapy services, and as a woman interested in systems, I 
regularly found myself involved in workplace-based processes for addressing 
systemic failure, such as organisational restructure working groups, policy review 
committees and staff representative forums. After nearly a decade of working 
"hands on" as an OT, I went to work "in social policy", where I learned, firsthand, 
about the difficulties of balancing well-informed policy development with the 
demands of short time frames and cabinet-in-confidence processes.
Through my experience as a policy officer I began to understand the need for the 
bureaucracy to be impartial and not "captured" by any one particular viewpoint 
over another, nor for implementation to be determined purely by "what we know 
how to implement well" (Linder & Peters, 1987, p.459). Yet I also felt it was 
important for policy to be intimately informed by the experiences of people who 
deliver and receive it. I also began to understand the role of policy advocates and 
the incremental but influential ways in which even low-level bureaucrats such as 
myself could impact on policy development (Goodin, Rein, & Moran, 2006). My 
curiosity continued to build and intensify about how the process of social policy 
implementation occurred and how institutional arrangements (the ever-nebulous 
"system") impacted on the people within it (and vice versa). Thus, when the 
opportunity to conduct research into the relationships between governments and 
"third party providers" arose, I leapt at it. The opportunity was as a part of an ARC 
project, Improving Decision Making in Government Service Delivery Using Third 
Party Providers.
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1.2 Improving Decision Making in Government Service Delivery Using Third 
Party Providers: The research context
This study is embedded within an Australian Research Council Linkage project 
involving the Australian National University, the Australian Government 
Departments of Finance and Administration; Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations; Housing, Families, Communities and Indigenous Affairs; 
Veterans Affairs; and the Victorian Government Department of Human Services. 
The project is entitled Improving Decision Making in Government Service Delivery 
Using Third Party Providers. It focuses on examining models used by government 
agencies to deliver services with an aim to inform and therefore improve decision 
making in government service delivery.
This focus will enable the project team to investigate how agencies can achieve and 
maintain an appropriate balance of interest amongst the various stakeholders... 
The project will... investigate how relationships with providers are managed and 
how these relations can be improved in the selected industries. An important 
dimension of this analysis will be the transmission between policy goal, policy 
instrument and delivery outcomes. For instance, how does the choice of policy 
instrument and form of delivery affect the nature of service provision sought by 
government (Australian Government Department of Families Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs, 2006, p.7)?
The core research questions of the linkage project are:
1. How can governments better choose among possible service delivery 
models to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, ambits of accountability 
and control and risk management and anticipate the likely consequences of 
their implementation choices?
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2. How can governments better manage the changing relationships between 
themselves and third party deliverers of services to enhance the quality of 
service care in relation to childcare, ageing and disability services?
There are many elements to the project, of which this thesis is one part. My 
colleagues involved in the project have, for example, collected case study data 
tracing the delivery of specific government programs through in-depth interviews 
with government officials. My study contributes to the overarching project by 
bringing in the voices and perspectives of those outside government involved in the 
process of social policy implementation -  specifically, non-government, NPOs. In 
doing so, I hope to address the project's key points of consideration including "how 
government agencies manage a change in provider relationships" and "how 
government agencies can strategically improve the implementation process of 
programs" (Australian Government Department of Families Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs, 2006, p.7). It is important to note that while this thesis 
describes my research as a part of the overarching ARC project, my findings are 
wholly my own and do not reflect in any way the position or opinion of any partner 
in this ARC project.
Academically, my study proposes to contribute to the bodies of knowledge about 
social policy implementation, public service delivery and NPOs. I do this through 
developing an explanation of the process of social policy implementation, 
reminiscent of the street level bureaucrat paradigm, at an inter-organisational level 
using a number of themes from institutional theory. Also, through using structural
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explanations as an analytic heuristic, I highlight the role of agency and contribute to 
the emerging contingent understanding of the role of NPO leaders in the process of 
social policy implementation.
My aim is to assist government actors to better understand one of the many sectors 
involved in the delivery of social policy. Rhodes (1997; 2003) argues that a key skill 
required by public administrators is the ability to put themselves in the shoes of 
those with whom they work. In this spirit, the study reported in this thesis 
contributes to understanding the process of government social policy 
implementation via third party providers by investigating and comparing the life 
worlds, beliefs and practices of leaders in three NPOs as they relate and respond to 
government in the process of negotiating social policy implementation.3
1.3 A vital but problematic nexus
The relationship between governments and NPOs is a critical nexus for the process 
of social policy implementation. It is part of a vast puzzle regarding the private 
delivery of public services and is significant in many ways (Parsons, 1995). Firstly, 
despite difficulties in measuring the size and impact of non-profit human and 
community services (Lyons, 2001; Productivity Commission, 2009), it involves a 
great deal of money: "during the 2006-07 financial year, not-for-profit social 
services organisations received $11.7b in income... The main source of income for 
these organisations was funding from federal, state and local government, which 
accounted for over half (54.6% or $6.4b)" (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, 
"Social Services: Sources of Income," para. 1).
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Secondly, how the nexus between governments and NPOs is organised and 
managed has the potential to impact on a large number of people. Of the 41,008 
NPOs in Australia at the end of June 2007 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, 
"Overview: Summary of Operations," para. 1), 5,769 of these were defined by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics as social services, which employed 221,549 people 
and were supported by 255,305 volunteers (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, 
"Social Services: Summary of Operations," paras. 1-3). The sample of 556 
community service organisations who responded to the Australian Council of Social 
Services 2007-08 survey reported they provided services to more than three million 
people (Australian Council of Social Service, 2009). Thirdly, the relationship 
between NPOs and governments has the potential to involve a great deal of 
influence -  in more than one direction. It is through this nexus that NPOs lobby 
government and seek input into the policy development cycle (Maddison & Edgar, 
2008). Many suggest it is also through this nexus government agendas can shape 
the practices of this portion of civil society (Lyons, 2001; Smith & . Lipsky, 1993).
Social policy implementation in Australia involves local, state, territory and federal 
governments as well as a range of non-government actors and organisations. 
Governments are responsible for providing the legislative and regulatory 
framework and often for funding service delivery -  either directly, through 
contracts, subsidies, fee-per-service, and grants, or indirectly, through transfer 
payments to individuals (Lyons, 2001). in Australia, the bulk of this service delivery 
occurs through non-government organisations (private non-profit as well as for- 
profit organisations), who run nursing homes, child care, therapy services,
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accommodation support, youth programs and the like.4 Peak and representative 
organisations for both providers and service users may also be involved in the 
service delivery negotiations between governments and private providers.
The complexity of service delivery relationships derives not only from the number 
of stakeholders involved, but also from their diversity. At the government level, 
responsibility may be shared between multiple layers of government, often with 
input from more than one department at each level (Wanna, 2007). At a provider 
level, organisations might be large or small, for-profit or non-profit, faith based or 
non-faith based, part of a national network or single local providers, providing a 
single or multiple types of service, responsible for managing volunteers, with 
varying degrees of capacity and a broad range of ideologies (Fredericksen & 
London, 2000). Service delivery relationships may vary from short-term contractual 
associations involving minimal communication to well-established, ongoing, 
negotiated partnership with high and regular levels of communication (Gazley, 
2008; Lewis, 1999).
While the provision of human, community and welfare services through non­
government, "third party" providers, such as NPOs is prolific, it is not necessarily 
new. Some non-profit provision predates government involvement (Australian 
Department of Social Services, 1942). However, its use specifically as a "tool" or 
instrument of social policy implementation by governments has grown and changed 
vastly in the past 50 years (Hood, 1983, 2006; Salamon, 2002b; Smith & Lipsky, 
1993).
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For governments, the implementation process is complicated by issues arising from 
"implementation traps... which can bring policies and programs to grief" (Althaus, 
Bridgman, & Davis, 2007, p.168). These traps include, for example, "conflicting 
policy instructions from more than one source (Lindblom, 1980, p.67) or incomplete 
specification, where the objectives of policy are too vague to give clear direction to 
implementation (Althaus et al., 2007). Policy logics based on poorly considered 
causal theories can mean that policies do not lead to their intended consequences 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). In collaborative implementation projects, 
stakeholders can have difficulty agreeing on common aims or sharing power and 
may experience "partnership-fatigue" (Husham & Vangen, 2008, p.35). Another 
challenge common in Australia includes the potential for "buck passing" between 
jurisdictions, agencies and governments that arises from federal divisions of 
responsibility (Mulgan, 2006).
For the NPOs, complications in implementation can arise from tensions between 
interdependence with government and independence from government (Boris & 
Steuerle, 1999; Najam, 2000). NPOs may find themselves simultaneously in 
collaboration and conflict with government, delivering programs driven by goals 
with which they do not agree (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000). The conflicting 
tensions of organisational autonomy and accountability for public funds may cause 
strain (Ospina et al., 2002). NPOs also operate in environments with the added 
complexity of multiple stakeholders, coalitions and peak representative groups a 
common feature (Baiser & McClusky, 2005).
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It is critical to understand how NPOs understand and engage in the implementation 
process. Considering the complexities of the relationship and the significant 
changes through which it has passed in the past 50 years -  with the movement of 
social policy implementation from hierarchies to markets and now networks 
(Kramer, 2000; Parsons, 1995; Rhodes, 2007b) -  it could be assumed that the 
relationship between NPOs and governments in the process of social policy 
implementation is not straightforward (Van Slyke, 2002). Many of those who write 
specifically about the circumstances of NPOs explicitly announce the complexity 
and potentially deleterious effects of a relationship with government for NPOs (and 
service users) involved in social policy (Brock, 2003; Lyons, 1997; Schmid, 2003; 
Smith & Lipsky, 1993). However, systematic attention to implementation via NPOs 
in the public administration and political science literature -  from the perspective of 
NPOs -  is still underdeveloped, with most of this literature focusing on the 
experiences of public servants (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Parsons, 1995).
When Lipsky (1971; 1980) revealed how street level bureaucrats were not the 
faceless, neutral administrators of social policy, understanding of the process of 
social policy implementation broadened and led to investigation into how these 
street level bureaucrats exercise their discretion. Likewise, experience and 
research in social policy implementation suggests that NPOs do not always 
necessarily "do as they're told" (Bigelow & Stone, 1995) and that contracts or 
partnerships are not always what they seem (Gazley, 2008; McGregor-Lowndes & 
Tumour, 2003). So too, the process of social policy implementation warrants
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investigation, not just from the bottom up, but at an organisational level, at the 
nexus between governments and NPOs.
1.4 Towards a research question: A confessional tale
The research question that informed this iterative, inductive, exploratory, empirical 
work developed over the course of the project and came to be: How do NPO 
leaders understand and manage their relationships with governments in the process 
of social policy implementation? I describe the development of my research 
question here in a brief ''confessional" tale (Rhodes, 2007a), despite being 
"somewhat nervous about the looseness and open ended nature" it reveals of my 
approach and my research (Van Maanen, 1988, p.74).
The question's development commenced with my initial overarching passion for 
understanding how policy is informed by practice. Early, excited discussions about 
my topic with close personal colleagues led to an initial flurry of question framing 
(Denzin, 2002). These discussions were often elicited by the innocent question: 
What is your topic? As I sought for the right words to describe my "topic", my initial 
response tended to be that I wanted to know how non-profit provider organisations 
negotiated their relationships with governments. The replies of two colleagues in 
particular stayed with me as definitive moments in the development of my 
question. In one circumstance, my colleague immediately replied with a confidence 
that was almost audacious -  "Well, what government needs to understand is that in 
order to work with us, they need to know how we work". The other, polar opposite 
reply was "What do you mean, negotiate? Government tell us what to do and we
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have to do it or else we lose our funding/' Little was I to know how two such 
different views would embody my eventual findings.
Such discussions, and a great deal of subsequent reflection, led to the development 
of a series of research questions throughout my research -  refined over time 
according to Booth and his colleagues' (2003) topic/question/relevance framework. 
These included, but were not limited to:
How do people (actors) in non-profit human service organisations understand and 
engage in the service delivery relationship(s) with government(s)?
How do actors in non-profit-government community service relationships construct 
and understand their relationships with governments?
How do non-profits in the community services sector negotiate service delivery 
with government?
How do non-profit leaders in the community services sector respond to 
governments in the process of social policy implementation?
How do workers involved in social policy implementation manage the interface 
between governments and non-profits?
How do leaders of non-profit organisations in the human and community services 
sector respond to the day-to-day pressures of governments as they negotiate 
service delivery?
How do non-profit leaders in the human and community services sector 
understand and engage in their relationships with governments as they respond to 
pressures in the course of social policy implementation.
There were some constants amongst this ever-changing question. I was interested 
in the how of this process. I was also not content to simply listen to people's 
accounts of this "how", but wanted to observe what they did and how they did it. 
With years of experience in community service delivery I was concerned that, by 
focusing on listening to people's accounts, I would continue to reinforce the 
preconceived notions I already had about the experiences of this group. By
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observing and shadowing, as well as interviewing and reviewing written 
information, I felt I had a better chance to double check the data I was collecting, 
generating and interpreting, to challenge my assumptions, and to uncover issues 
lying beneath the well-rehearsed rhetoric of conflict and discontent that dominates 
a great deal of the literature (Brown, Kenny, Turner, & Prince, 2000; Rhodes, 't Hart, 
& Noordegraaf, 2007b; Villadsen, 2009).
Also, I was not focused on the workers at the street level of service delivery, but 
instead wanted to know what had occurred in the process of implementation 
before it reached this front-line stage. I was interested in how social policy 
implementation was received and operationalised by the leaders of organisations 
involved with its implementation. Indeed, I was interested not only in how these 
leaders received social policy in this process of implementation, but also what they 
did with it once it was received -  at an organisational level. It was this nexus, this 
space between governments and NPOs, that I felt represented a gap in the political 
science and public administration literature, much more so than the modern day 
experiences of government and non-government street level bureaucrats which 
have been investigated elsewhere (Considine & Lewis, 1999, 2003; Maynard-Moody 
& Musheno, 2003).
1.5 Exploring NPO leaders' experiences in the process of social policy 
implementation
In answering the research question, my first port of call is the literature. In 
Chapter 2, I describe the relationships between governments and non-profits in the 
community services sector, firstly as it is depicted in the implementation literature.
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This literature raises questions for me about what I see as an under-representation 
of non-government actors altogether. I seek to address this by looking to the "third 
sector" body of literature. Here I discover a predominance of structural 
explanations for the social policy-related relationships between governments and 
NPOs. For example, where variations in the relationship between governments and 
non-profits -  from country to country, sector to sector, funding program to funding 
program and organisation to organisation -  are commonly explained by looking to 
the characteristics of the environment or the characteristics of the organisation.
I pursue a greater understanding of structural explanations by tracing them to their 
theoretical roots of organisational and institutional theory. Insights from an 
institutional analysis of interorganisational relationships are neatly consolidated in 
an analytical framework developed by Christine Oliver (1991), which I describe in 
depth. The example of Oliver's framework provides an explanation and application 
of how the relationships between non-profits and governments can be usefully 
conceptualised. I also provide a critique of studies like Oliver's which purport to 
focus on organisational characteristics and structural features of their contexts. I 
also explore other elements of institutional theory which emerge as relevant during 
the process of the research.
Chapter 3 describes the research design of this study. I articulate the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of the ethnographic approach I have 
adopted in my empirical work. I also describe and justify the selection of three 
particular non-profit organisations as the key cases studied "up close" in this 
research (Rhodes et al., 2007b). I explain how I collected and generated data and
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discuss the methods I used for avoiding the typical pitfalls of ethnography. I 
critically reflect on and analyse my fieldwork at the three field sites. I describe the 
"data processing" experience, using NVIVO to code the data, identifying important 
themes, exploring the usefulness and applicability of varying conceptual 
frameworks along the way. I describe the process by which I settle on Oliver's 
framework as an analytic model for the findings. I also elaborate on the heuristic 
model I developed based on Oliver to assist with initial data processing. Finally, I 
describe the key processing task of transitioning the raw data into a set of 
narratives.
I introduce the three cases and participants in Chapter 4. Giving an overview of 
each NPO, I provide a flavour of each organisation and demonstrate the structural 
diversity and dominant ethos of the field sites. ! supplement this with descriptions 
of the key characters and a narrative from each site. In Chapters 5 to 9, these non- 
profits are described further "in their own words", with narratives from each site 
revealing greater insight into each organisation and the people who lead it. I re­
introduce Oliver's framework of analysis in Chapters 5 to 7 and use this framework 
to help analyse the data.
Oliver's framework provides a useful analytic tool for developing an understanding 
of the data, however it does not claim to be exhaustive. In Chapter 8, I introduce a 
range of observations outside the Oliver framework appearing to impact on the 
work of the NPOs in this study. In particular, I address the issue of agency -  the role 
of the NPO leaders in the NPO's response in the process of social policy
implementation. I suggest generally that people matter. I find suggestions in my
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data that, while structural factors such as characteristics of the environment and 
organisation play a role in determining organisational response, there is still scope 
for the exercise of agency and leadership.
In Chapter 9 I suggest that the theoretical framework of organisations as 
institutions, as developed by Selznick (1957) emerges as a suitable and revealing 
way of understanding the experiences of the NPO leaders in this study. The act of 
bringing in this angle of institutional theory and applying it to the involvement of 
NPOs in the process of social policy implementation neatly complements, but 
critically deepens existing institutional understandings of this process. Finally, I 
suggest research agendas emerging from the findings in this study and discuss 
practical and policy implications, seeking to give some advice both to governments 
and non-profits as they strive to work together to implement social policy in 
Australia.
The key original contribution I make in this thesis is to bring insights developed 
from a "thick" description of the experiences of NPO leaders involved with social 
policy implementation to the public administration literature. In doing so I identify 
an underpinning theme in which the leaders see their NPO as being "not just a tool" 
of government. This finding has theoretical implications for understanding how 
NPOs engage in the process of social policy implementation from a Selznickian 
(1957) perspective of institutionalised organisations. I suggest that such a 
perspective reflects Lipsky's (1980) street level bureaucrat paradigm at an 
organisational level. In the same way that Lipsky explored how street level 
bureaucrats "manage their relationship with organizational [sic]5 hierarchy" (Laws
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& Hajer, 2006, p.412), I here explore how NPOs manage their relationship with the 
process of social policy implementation, and discover in the process the importance 
of being "not just a tool".
A secondary original contribution I make here is in the process through which data 
analysis occurs. In using Oliver's structural-functional framework as a heuristic for 
explaining the qualitative fieldwork data, I demonstrate not only the utility and 
limitations of the framework itself, but the benefits of using it specifically to further 
deepen analysis and uncover unexpected themes. In this way, the layers of findings 
and analysis described from Chapters 4 onwards thicken and deepen, culminating in 
the concluding "not just a tool" finding described above. Many relevant findings 
occur in the process of applying Oliver's framework which point towards and 
reinforce the significance of the not just a tool conclusion. Such findings include, 
but are not limited to the active role the NPOs in this study play in the process of 
social policy implementation -  even when simply complying with government 
requests or instructions -  and the important role played by the leader(s), 
particularly in interpreting the NPO's circumstances and framing the options for 
response.
1 The use of the term non-profit and NPOs (non-profit organisations) has intentionally been used 
here despite its difference from the "accepted Australian vernacular" (Barraket, 2008; Casey & 
Dalton, 2006, p.25) to identify the group of organisations in this study as a subset of community 
service providers (which include both non-profit, for-profit and government providers), and non- 
profits (which include organisations far broader than those focusing on social policy 
implementation). Elsewhere these organisations are described as "Nonprofit community service 
organisations" (Baulderstone, 2008). For a comprehensive discussion of how such organisations are 
defined, see Lyons (2001).
21 have removed any identifying information from these notes.
3 There is some debate in the third sector literature about the derivation of NPO leadership -  does it 
come from boards, CEOs or both (see Herman & Heimovics, 1991, 1994; McClusky, 2002; Ospina, 
Diaz, & O'Sullivan, 2002; Saidel & Harlan, 1998)? This study has an inclusive understanding of 
leaders, as referring to the "institutional actors" or "entrepreneurs" (Lowndes, 2005; Scott, 2008),
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the person or group of persons who are responsible for the day-to-day leadership of the NPO as it 
negotiates its path through the process of social policy implementation -  the executive management 
team.
4 Some state/territory/local governments in Australia also directly provide some services in addition 
to those provided through non-government means, such as therapy and accommodation services for 
people with disabilities.
5 Please note I will not subsequently highlight incorrect (American) spelling within quotations -  for 
example, for "organization" (or any derivative of this word), "traveler", "center" or 
"institutionalization". Instead, the reader can assume that when words such as these have been 
spelt this way within a quotation, that it is reproduced verbatim from the original source and is not a 
spelling error.
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CHAPTER 2
DESIGN AND DELIVERY, COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, 
STRUCTURE AND AGENCY: NPOS AND SOCIAL POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Introduction
Seeking to address the research question and its underlying "itches" about the 
process of social policy implementation and the roles of NPOs in that process, this 
review of the literature looks first at the broader literature on social policy 
implementation. I review the standard approaches to describing and 
understanding social policy implementation and attempt to uncover what these 
approaches suggest about the role of NPOs. While I find acknowledgement of NPOs 
or third parties, I do not see evidence of their perspectives in much of this 
literature. Instead the nexus between governments and NPOs remains a dark patch 
in this otherwise well-lit academic consideration of social policy implementation. 
Despite this dark patch, there are still important lessons to be learnt from the 
implementation literature which I describe.
I find suggestions in the implementation literature of a possible false dichotomy 
between designers and providers, between policy and implementation. This raises 
further questions about what is the experience of NPOs in the process of social 
policy implementation, and I seek further illumination via the literature which 
delves into the world of these NPO actors. The third sector literature essentially 
describes the experience of NPOs involved in social policy implementation as vast
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and diverse. The predominant narrative is one of conflict between NPOs and 
governments in which NPOs must struggle to survive and are indelibly and often 
negatively affected by the relationship. But NPOs are also found to exert their 
identity and agency. Explanations for the range and diversity of NPO experiences 
tend to be focused on the organisational and environmental characteristics.
I delve deeper into the underpinning theoretical roots of these explanations, briefly 
exploring institutional and organisational theory. Such investigation suggests useful 
frameworks, such as one developed by Oliver (1991), for explaining and 
understanding the relationship between NPOs and governments. However, this 
literature also suggests there is "more to the picture" than structural explanations. 
Leadership and additional aspects of institutional theory such as Selznick's (1957) 
description of organisations as institutions are explored as possible additional 
approaches which can value-add to the common and typical explanations. I 
conclude with a brief suggestion of the lofty democratic aspirations to which this 
research can contribute.
2.2 The context
Implementation is the term given in the political science and public administration 
literature, to the act or process of implementing a policy: "what happens between 
the establishment of a government policy and its impact in the world of action?" 
(O'Toole (Jr), 2000, p.273). Stylised models in which implementation occurs as a 
part of a policy cycle describe implementation's beginnings as the moment policy 
becomes law or is given government approval (Althaus et al., 2007; Hill & Hupe,
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2009). Social policy travels many paths in its journey from conception to delivery. 
It moves through an at times lengthy and complicated process to the point where it 
is received by a service user "on the ground". This is where a working family claim 
their child-related tax benefit; a woman is supported to move on from a violent 
domestic situation; a young man with mental illness attends a weekly gardening 
group at his local community centre; or an older couple receive their daily meals on 
wheels. A range of federal, state and local government and non-government 
organisations deliver different types of social policy through a vast array of 
payments, projects and programs.
Research into the phenomenon of social policy implementation began its life as a 
cohesive body of literature after a series of studies sought to understand the 
spectacular failures of a range of "new deal" policies in North America in the 1960s 
(Hill & Hupe, 2009). One of the earliest attempts to understand implementation 
was Pressman and Wildavsky's (1974) study tracing the convoluted decision 
pathways involved in the implementation journey. This study spawned a range of 
publications examining the fidelity of policy intentions as they were translated into 
implementation. This first wave of research was later described as the top down 
school of implementation research because of its focus on decisions made at the 
"top" of the implementation chain being effectively translated into action at the 
"bottom".
Implementation failure was seen in the top down school as the delivery of services 
skewed from or different to their original intentions and design (Hill & Hupe, 2003).
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Methods to reduce or limit implementation failure were through limiting the 
number of clearance points involved in implementation, tightly prescribing 
implementation processes and using rigorous throughput and output 
measurements to account for such implementation (Kaufman, 1967; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1974). The fundamental basis of this standpoint was a faith in the policy 
logic formula determined during policy development that such throughputs and 
outputs would lead to the desired policy outcomes (Parsons, 1995). In this top- 
down paradigm, the ideal delivery agency was a passive and compliant cog in the 
wheel of implementation, and if it was not, then it should be (Linder & Peters, 
1987). Any consideration to the role of such delivery agencies and their leaders was 
restricted to identifying and improving their level of compliance.
In response to this top down wave of implementation research, the next phase, 
described as a bottom up approach, delved into the worlds of street level 
bureaucrats -  those people responsible for delivering or implementing social policy 
''who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs" (Lipsky, 1980, p.3). 
This research found that, in the process of delivering services, front line workers 
engaged in particular coping behaviours and exercised discretion as they dealt with 
the unpredictability of the circumstances in which they operated. The cumulative 
effect of these coping behaviours and discretion was that the street level 
bureaucrats effectively created policy as they enacted it in their ongoing 
interactions with service users (Hill 84 Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980).
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From this perspective, a response to social policy implementation "failure” was not 
to increase the level of rigid street level compliance (Flupe & Hill, 2007). Indeed, 
instead of implementation being about rigid compliance, this perspective saw 
implementation as "a process which is structured by conflict and bargaining" 
(Parsons, 1995, p.470) in which street level discretion was an appropriate response 
to the diversity of service delivery (Hill & Flupe, 2003). Therefore, improving and 
safeguarding social policy implementation involved consensus building and 
negotiation, carefully specifying and measuring outcomes, rather than inputs and 
outputs, engaging street level bureaucrats about how policy should be 
implemented, facilitating multiple sources of accountability as well as strong 
professional indoctrination setting baseline standards of appropriate practice (Flupe 
& Hill, 2007; Maynard-Moody, Musheno, & Palumbo, 1990; Parsons, 1995).
The fundamental basis of this standpoint was that implementation involves 
discretion as a response to uncertainty and the "unresolvable tensions" (Maynard- 
Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 157) between abiding by, and discarding "the rules" 
(Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p.158). It therefore requires -  within limits -  
individualised decisions made in the moment informed by appropriately trained 
front line in-the-moment decision makers (Hupe & Hill, 2007; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003).
While the research in this thesis focuses on the leaders of organisations, rather 
than those "street level" workers, the bottom up wave of literature is important for 
a number of reasons. The findings of the street level bureaucrat acknowledge the
Page I 25
Chapter 2: Design and delivery, collaboration and conflict, structure and agency:
NPOs and social policy implementation
importance of people in the process of social policy implementation and suggest a 
role for agency and discretion not just at the street level, but at all levels and stages 
of the process (Lipsky, 1980). These findings also serve as an important reminder 
that the design of social policy implementation does not stop once policy is 
developed, but continues to be influenced and interpreted right to the point at 
which it is received by the service user or citizen (Hill & Hupe, 2003).
Another academic and practical context in which social policy implementation is 
understood, emerged in the 1990s with the new public management (NPM) 
paradigm (Hood, 1995). This approach sees the policy development role of 
government as "steering", while implementation, or "rowing", is best left to the 
expertise of implementation organisations who competitively tender for delivery 
contracts (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). NPM sees various delivery mechanisms as 
instruments of policy implementation, such as purchasing services from "third 
party" providers who operate as tools of government (Hood, 2006; Salamon, 
2002b). Policy is carefully removed from delivery, purchasing from providing, and 
private, non-government organisations or quasi-independent government agencies 
are preferred as more efficient delivery organisations (De Hoog, 1990; Stewart, 
1999). Such measures are implemented for many reasons, such as the perils of 
implementation "capture", where the needs and wishes of delivery organisations 
and mechanisms became more prominent than those of the policy maker or service 
user (Baldwin & Walker, 1995; Boyne, 1998).
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Criticisms of the NPM approach to social policy implementation suggests that, while 
it is a suitable approach for services such as garbage disposal, it is problematic to 
use markets as the systems for delivering complex social services where outcomes 
measurement is inherently difficult (De Hoog, 1984, 1990; Klijn, 2002; Lyons, 1997). 
Critics claim that difficulty in measuring provider organisational performance and 
the "hollowing out" effects on government delivery expertise can make the 
paradigm inherently flawed (Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Rhodes, 1994; Schmid, 2003; 
Stewart, 1999; Van Slyke, 2002).
The role and experience of organisations such as NPOs and their leaders begins to 
surface more so in the NPM paradigm than in the top-down and bottom-up schools 
-  partly because prior to the introduction of NPM, social policy implementation was 
seen as predominantly within the arena of government alone (Boyne, 1998; 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The NPM literature acknowledges the active agency of 
non-government delivery organisations and their leaders with its focus on ensuring 
and enhancing accountability and compliance in complex social policy 
implementation supply markets (Mackintosh, 2000; Van Slyke, 2006). Grouped 
together, the wide range of delivery organisations and their leaders are often seen 
to understand and manage their relationships with governments in the process of 
social policy implementation as utility-maximising agents engaged in a principal- 
agent relationship (Bovens, 1990). The empirical implementation research that 
accompanies this paradigm focuses on assessing the various management 
mechanisms, including an economic focus on principal-agent matters in contracting, 
provider accountability and project management (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke,
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2006; Gazley, 2008; Gooden, 1998; Jensen & Stonecash, 2004; O'Flynn & Alford, 
2008; Osborne, 1997; Reeves, 2008; Romzek & Johnston, 2005).
Yet another academic context to emerge in this lineage of social policy 
implementation via hierarchies and markets, is that of networks (Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). This large, disparate and growing 
body of work is itself a part of a larger academic movement away from the notion 
of a state-centric government to the concept of decentred governance and its 
associated processes (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006b; Edwards, 2002; Kooiman, 2000; Laws 
& Hajer, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2003; Pierre, 2000; Powell, 1990; Rhodes, 1996, 
2000, 2007b). For implementation, this approach has had a variety of impacts. The 
early networks literature provided important signposts of the movement from 
government to governance and heralded the increased role of non-government 
actors in governance (Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997). However, this literature 
did not initially describe the experiences of non-government actors, except when 
providing public administrators with advice on how to manage these networks 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Barraket, 2008; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn, 2002; Milward 
& Provan, 1998, 2003).
The lack of focus on the experiences of non-government actors results in a poor 
definition of their roles in networks (Milward & Provan, 1998). Much of the 
associated empirical research into implementation, encompassing network 
mapping and game theory based enquiry, appears to perpetuate NPM's assumption 
that NPOs and delivery organisations in general are utility maximising agents, albeit
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operating in a more complex and power-shared, game-like environment (Kickert et 
al., 1997; Milward & Provan, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Implementation 
failure is commonly understood as being due to problems arising from stakeholder 
management (meaning government's management of non-government 
stakeholders) (Agranoff, 1999). Recommendations to avoid implementation failure 
therefore include better anticipation of the relationship challenges involved in 
implementation and increasing the skills of public servants in network and 
performance management (Agranoff, 1999; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000; Mulgan & Lee, 2001).
While the networks literature continues to provide valuable advice and insights, it 
remains -  as might be expected for literature in the academic domain of public 
administration -  focused predominantly, although not exclusively, on the 
perspectives of public administrators (see for example, Agranoff, 2006; Feiock & 
Andrew, 2006; Keen, 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Lundin, 2007; O'Toole (Jr), 
1997). The "inter-organizational twilight zone" (Hjern, 1982, p.308) apparent in the 
nexus between NPOs and governments remains one of the "links gone missing in 
public administration conceptualizations of policy formation" (Hjern, 1982, p.302).
In Australia, it is in the public administration practitioner literature in which some 
hints about the experiences and perspectives of "third party providers" in the 
process of social policy implementation are emerging. There is a recent growing 
trend for public administration practitioner literature to include the voices of NPO 
elites who describe positive experiences with collaborative, networked governance
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in the process of social policy development (see for example Head, 2007; Jackson, 
2003; O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008). In part this reflects a renewed focus on civic 
engagement in which NPOs from the community sector are seen "sometimes as a 
proxy for the 'community'" (Barraket, 2006, p.6).
Such indications of an increase in networked approaches to social policy have led 
some to claim that:
the death knell for NPM has been rung and the competitiveness and tensions 
caused by contracting regimes is being replaced by new collaborative partnerships 
(Casey & Dalton, 2006, p.28).
However, these experiences contrast starkly with claims that the era of networked 
and collaborative governance has not been experienced by all and that the 
"rhetoric of collaboration and partnership between government and the 
community sector is not necessarily matched by policy and action" (Hendriks, 2008; 
Keast & Brown, 2006, p.41; Keen, 2006; Walker, O'Toole (Jr), & Meier, 2007). Some 
Australian authors claim this was particularly so in the decade of former Prime 
Minister Howard's leadership, renowned for its closed approach to collaboration, 
especially with social welfare advocacy groups (Barraket, 2008; Hancock, 2006; 
Maddison & Denniss, 2005; Maddison & Edgar, 2008; Melville, 2008; Onyx, Dalton, 
Melville, Casey, & Banks, 2008; Staples, 2006, 2008).
Positive elite experiences are also contrasted by a series of government reports, 
which suggest their networked world is not mirrored in the day-to-day NPO- 
government social policy implementation relationship. Instead, this relationship is 
characterised more by command and control than collaboration, suggesting it is
Page I 30
Chapter 2: Design and delivery, co llabo ra tion  and conflict, structure and agency:
NPOs and socia l p o lic y  implementation
more "where you are that matters" (Auditor-General of Queensland, 2007; 
Australian National Audit Office, 2006; Keast & Brown, 2006; Walker et al., 2007).
I believe that through the NPM and networked governance paradigms, researchers 
in the field of public administration and political science are beginning to 
acknowledge some of the complexity in the picture for third party providers -  that 
they exist, and have a stake in the process of social policy implementation. 
However, I am concerned about what I see in this literature as a possible false 
dichotomy between the policy implementers and the policy designers. This "real 
devil -  the divorce of implementation from policy" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1974, 
p.135) is an age-old problem in the implementation literature, which I believe 
persists, unresolved although modernised, through to today. Such an issue is 
important to explore, of course, "because how one defines the implementation 
problem shapes both the analysis of key issues in the process and the 
recommendations that arise from the analysis" (Cline, 2000, p.551).
In its contemporary manifestation, I see the false dichotomy between policy 
implementation and design as being thus: the involvement of non-government 
third parties in policy design is understood in the social policy implementation 
literature as a feature of collaborative governance, the design phase of social policy. 
NPO involvement occurs when NPOs have been invited, for example, onto a 
taskforce to assist in the design of particularly contentious or complex policy 
(Jackson, 2003). This positions a core group of elite NPO leaders as selected 
participants in the design "phase" of social policy implementation. Here, NPOs are
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welcomed as experts in provision and their input and support is sought to 
strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of social policy implementation 
(Hendriks, 2008).
This approach echoes the underpinning assumptions of the first wave of social 
policy implementation research, the top down school, in which the solution to 
implementation failure is to get the policy logic right in the first place. In this, its 
modern manifestation, the "solution" is found by including stakeholders such as 
NPOs in the design phase, acknowledging the multi-stakeholder findings of the 
NPM and networks literature. Once the decision about policy design is made, the 
assumptions of NPM appear still to apply -  where the implementers are considered 
agents in the principal-agent relationship with government, and the ideal 
relationship is that of compliance. However, one of the fundamental lessons of the 
bottom up school is that implementation design does not necessarily end when 
policy leaves the hands of the designers and that, while uniformity and 
standardisation is sometimes a critical component of fair and equitable social policy 
implementation, passive compliance is not necessarily possible or appropriate in all 
social policy implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2009).
How is it then, that NPOs, considered experts with essential input during one phase 
of the process of social policy implementation, simultaneously then exist as agents, 
tools or instruments of government social policy in the implementation phase? 
What is involved in the process of implementation in the space between where it is 
designed and where it is implemented? What is the role of NPO leaders in this
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process? How do NPOs and governments muddle through (Lindblom, 1959, 1979) 
the process of social policy implementation as it occurs? From this perspective, the 
experience of NPOs and their leaders in the process of social policy 
implementation, at the nexus between NPOs and governments, is unknown. I see 
this is as the gap in the implementation literature to which this study seeks to 
contribute.
2.3 The actors
While the experience and perspectives of NPOs involved in the process of social 
policy implementation is not so much a focus of the implementation literature, it is 
a focus of the ''third sector" literature -  an interdisciplinary, empirical, theoretical 
and opinion-based body of literature investigating third sector organisations such as 
non-profit and voluntary organisations. From this body of literature stem two 
distinct caricatures of the relationship between NPOs and governments in the 
process of social policy implementation: that of collaboration and conflict (Boris & 
Steuerle, 1999; Najam, 2000).
From the conflict perspective, NPOs are portrayed as understanding their 
relationship with government as a necessary evil, a financial means to their social 
justice ends. Here, NPOs manage their relationship with government as a "delicate 
dance" (Brock, 2003, p.l) occurring in "the lion's den" (Maddison & Edgar, 2008, 
p.188), in which NPOs "sup with the devil" (Saunders & Stewart-Weeks, 2009) 
resulting in negative consequences for NPOs such as mission drift and co-option 
(Guo, 2007; Keen, 2006; Spratt, Shucksmith, Philip, & Watson, 2007). From the
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collaboration perspective, the relationship is understood as a pooling of 
complementary and supplementary expertise and resources, managed through 
trust and reciprocity (Brown & Troutt, 2004; Gidron, Kramer, & Salamon, 1992; 
Salamon, 1995; Shaw & Allen, 2006; Young, 1999). Recent empirical research 
suggests that a nuanced understanding of the relationship is also appropriate, in 
which the relationship is dynamic, changing and incorporates elements of both 
collaboration ond conflict (Benjamin, 2008; Ebrahim, 2002; Lowndes & Skelcher, 
1998; Onyx et al., 2008; Ramanath, 2009).
NPOs and governments working together in social policy implementation appear to 
need to balance a number of oppositional forces. Universality and specialisation, 
efficiency and effectiveness, and autonomy, dependence and interdependence can 
all pull the government-NPO relationship in different directions (Boris & Steuerle, 
1999; Brock, 2000, 2003; Saidel, 1991; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). For example, 
accepting government funding through service delivery contracts can be 
accompanied by rigid co-branding requirements or admission policies over which 
the NPO has no influence or control (Brown & Troutt, 2003). The sheer pragmatics 
of complying with accountability mechanisms associated with government 
contracts -  staff time and purchase of appropriate information technology 
resources -  can pull NPO resources "from service delivery to administration" 
(Baulderstone, 2008, p.6; Ryan, Newton, & McGregor-Lowndes, 2008).
Much of the third sector literature over the past two decades provides descriptions 
of relationships between governments and NPOs which reflect and suggest the
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broader NPM context (Baulderstone, 2008; Carson & Kerr, 2003; Keen, 2006; 
Lipsky, 1990). Here, NPOs do indeed experience their role in social policy 
implementation as "tools" (Smith & Lipsky, 1993), operating within a control and 
command relationship with government (McGregor-Lowndes, 2008). This picture is 
sometimes set against a backdrop of previous relationships including "uncontested 
historical" arrangements (Baulderstone, 2008, p.4), in stark contrast to the 
contemporary regimes of increased accountability and decreased funding (McGuire 
& O'Neill, 2008; Walden, 2006). When framed in this light, it is not surprising that 
the key role of NPO leaders is to guide NPOs through organisational change and 
management strategies aiming to maintain organisational survival under these 
conditions (Hancock, 2006; Hodge & Piccolo, 2005; Ospina et al., 2002).
In this context the literature highlights the significant impact that relationships with 
governments can have on NPO structure and function as they engage in the process 
of social policy implementation (Baulderstone, 2008). While the evidence is mixed 
(Rawsthorne, 2005), some of the consequences of the relationships between NPOs 
and governments include isomorphism, resulting in a convergence of values or 
delivery strategies (Considine, 2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Leiter, 2005; 
Mulgan, 2005). This is where non-profits adapt "to mirror and imitate 
characteristics of how their public [or private] sector counterparts operate and are 
structured" (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002, p.ll). The precarious funding which 
is often described as a feature of the relationship between NPOs and governments 
is associated with negative influences on the ability of NPOs to strategically plan as 
well as to attract and retain staff (Akingbola, 2006; Brown & Troutt, 2003;
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Crittenden, 2000; Gronbjerg, 1991). Increased accountability and the prescription 
of funding is described as having a negative impact especially on NPO autonomy 
and discretion, which many argue compromises NPO participation in the 
democratic process (Evans, Richmond, & Shields, 2005; Guo, 2007; Nevile, 2009; 
Walden, 2006).
Responses to these changes have included increased and decreased 
professionalisation of staff, changed roles of NPO leaders and changed composition 
and role of NPO boards (Ebrahim, 2002; Guo, 2007; Hodge & Piccolo, 2005; Smith & 
Lipsky, 1993). Through merger and by forming hybrid structures that have features 
of public, private for-profit and non-profit organisations, non-profits have also been 
found to "cope" with the "conditions of uncertainty" accompanying the change of 
paradigm to NPM and its associated processes (Evers, 2005, p.745; Golensky & 
DeRuiter, 1999; Harris, Harris, Hutchison, & Rochester, 2002; Kramer, 2000). Non- 
profits have responded to shrinking revenue from government by expanding their 
service or client base, networking or employing a "political frame" and operating 
"entrepreneurially" to secure resources (Akingbola, 2006; Alexander, 2000; 
Heimovics, Herman, & Coughlin, 1993; Saidel & Harlan, 1998; Wagner & Meicek, 
2005; Wagner & Spence, 2003).
In sum, it appears that the experiences for NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation is difficult and that NPOs must react and respond with a survival- 
at-all-costs approach. But the picture for NPOs who engage with governments is 
not completely bleak. In contrast to this reactive picture of isomorphism where
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NPOs are "grappling with the challenges" (Akingbola, 2006, p.268) and "weathering 
the storm" (Lune, 2002) through managing "paucity" (Wagner & Spence, 2003). 
There is also a small body of empirical literature which identifies an alternative, 
more proactive set of NPO responses (see for example, Provan, Isett, & Milward, 
2004; Yanacopulos, 2005; Young, 2001).
For example, NPOs have also been found to respond to pressures to conform by 
intensifying the strength with which they exert their own independent identity and 
mission and placing pressures on government decision makers (Barman, 2002; 
Chew, 2006; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Schmid, Bar, & 
Nirel, 2008; Vanderwoerd, 2004). These empirical articles suggest an active role for 
the NPO and its leader, balancing the at times conflicting pressures from 
governments, boards, professions and client groups and the competing 
requirements and pressures to which they are expected to conform (Baiser & 
McClusky, 2005; Ospina et al., 2002; Provan et al., 2004; Spratt et al., 2007; 
Woodward & Marshall, 2004).
Flere, NPOs and their leaders are involved in negotiating (and renegotiating) not 
just survival, but a legitimate role, in a setting which incorporates the complexities 
of multi-stakeholder collaboration in which "traditional boundaries between 
sectors are blurring" (Barraket, 2008, p.4). Such involvement suggests the network 
governance perspective, and provides academic space to explore the nuance and 
role of NPO agency and leadership and a recognition that the NPO acts on the 
environment as well as being acted upon by the environment (Dinham & Lowndes,
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2008). For example, when looking at the back and forth negotiation of 
accountability between governments and NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation, Benjamin (2008) finds that, in certain circumstances, NPOs not 
only challenge funder-initiated accountability frameworks, but also seek to change 
these frameworks.
In summary, the literature focusing on the experiences of the actors -  NPOs and 
their leaders -  confirms the inferences and suggestions of the implementation 
literature and at times gives a detailed depiction of their experiences in the process 
of social policy implementation. In addition to filling out the blanks from the social 
policy implementation literature, the third sector literature also points out the 
potentially profound impacts for the structure and function of NPOs who engage in 
social policy implementation and their subsequent relationship with government. 
The experience for NPOs appears to be far from uniform (Bielefeld, 1992; 
Johansson, 2003).
2.4 Structural explanations
Why is it that NPOs engage in the process of social policy implementation in a range 
of ways, sometimes passively conforming to changing pressures from government 
and sometimes resisting (and all responses in between)? Why do some
organisations exert their identity while others simply absorb new accountability 
measures into their existing reporting frameworks? Questions such as these are 
typically explored in the third sector literature through structural explanations in 
which the behaviour and response of NPOs to their involvement in the process of
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social policy implementation is explained according to features of the organisation 
and environment (Bielefeld, 1992; Blau & Rabrenovic, 1991; Chew, 2006; Chew & 
Osborne, 2008; Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Froelich, 1999; 
Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998; Guo & Acar, 2005; Fleimovics et al., 1993; Flodge & 
Piccolo, 2005; Kramer, 2000; Leiter, 2005; Markham, Johnson, & Bonjean, 1999; 
Provan et al., 2004; Saidel, 1991; Schmid, 2001; Schmid et al., 2008; Smith & 
Gronbjerg, 2006; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Wagner & Spence, 2003; Yanacopulos, 
2005).
Often, explanation occurs with specific reference to the basic tenets of 
organisational (resource dependence) and institutional theory (Boin, 2001; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Rhodes, Binder, & Rockman, 2006a; Scott, 2008; Selznick, 1957). Even when 
organisational and institutional theories are not mentioned, structural explanations 
in the third sector literature replicate the basic tenets of these theories. For 
example, seminal authors Smith and Lipsky (1993) develop a typology of NPOs. The 
first type of NPO is the "traditional social service agency... founded by affluent civic 
leaders... less dependent on government funds... offering] many different services 
and programs" (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p.38).
The second type of non-profit is described by Smith and Lipsky as one which was 
established soon after the 1970s and received funding via government contracts 
early in its organisational life (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). The third type "is the agency 
founded in response to unmet... community needs... started and staffed by
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volunteers or underpaid workers out of strong personal commitments... shoestring 
operations built on shaky financial grounds" (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p.39). The 
explanatory strength of these types of NPOs is clearly articulated by Smith and 
Lipsky:
These distinctions are important because they suggest that different types of 
nonprofits are affected by government funding priorities in different ways. The 
most pronounced shifts and the greatest conflicts with government occur among 
those agencies that initially resemble government least (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, 
P-40).
This explanation cioseiy echoes the institutional concept of isomorphism in which 
organisations are drawn to similar structure and function, influenced by 
predominant organisations in the field (DiMaggio & Poweli, 1983).
Organisational characteristics reported in the third sector literature as important in 
influencing the actions and responses of NPOs in the process of social policy 
implementation include organisational size and age, annual income, capacity, 
mission and board structure (Blau & Rabrenovic, 1991; Chew, 2006; Chew & 
Osborne, 2008; Fredericksen & London, 2000; Ospina et al., 2002; Tucker & 
Sommerfeld, 2006; Wagner & Meicek, 2005). The content of the NPO's work is also 
considered an obvious explanatory feature of its relationship with government -  for 
example whether the NPO is oriented towards advocacy or service delivery 
(Schmid, 2009), or its field of operation, such as health, home care, disability 
services (Guo & Acar, 2005).
Emulating the assertion of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) -  the founding authors of 
resource dependence theory -  "that to understand organizations, it is necessary to
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understand the external constraints they face" (p.225), third sector authors also 
focus their explanations for NPO activity on the environment in which they operate. 
For example, Lyons, the well-recognised Australian NPO scholar, centred his 
seminal 2001 publication around the funding structures under which NPOs were 
financially supported (Lyons, 2001). In doing so, Lyons effectively suggested that 
how NPOs respond to their relationships with government fundamentally depends 
on the funding structures within which they are embedded.
Features of the environment considered or found to be important in explaining an 
NPO's engagement with social policy implementation include its funding sources, 
the type and amount of service supply competition it faces and its history in the 
sector (Akingbola, 2006; Brown & Troutt, 2004; Chew, 2006; Crittenden, 2000; Guo, 
2007; Guo & Acar, 2005; Schmid et al., 2008; Wagner & Meicek, 2005; Yanacopulos, 
2005). Third sector organisations are regularly compared across countries and 
regimes, to see the way in which broader socio-legal structures influence the 
diversity and operation of NPOs (Anheier & Seibel, 1990; Salamon, 2002a; Vincent 
& Harrow, 2005; Young, 1999).
In essence, the combination of resource dependence and institutional theories, as 
commonly applied in the third sector literature, suggest that organisational 
behaviour and response can be predicted by a range of structural factors. Bringing 
together organisational and institutional theoretical literature, Oliver (1991) 
provides a particularly useful framework for understanding organisational response 
to institutional pressures (Provan et al., 2004; Scott, 2004). Because Oliver's
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framework is a useful operationalisation of both resource dependency and 
institutional theories, and because of its successful application in previous NPO 
research (Akingbola, 2006; Alexander, 2000; Baiser & McClusky, 2005; Barman, 
2002; Benjamin, 2008; Bigelow & Stone, 1995; Flack & Ryan, 2003; Galaskiewicz & 
Bielefeld, 1998; Guo, 2007; Johansson, 2003; Provan et al., 2004; Ramanath, 2009; 
Schmid, 2001), I draw heavily on it as an analytical tool for my data from Chapter 5 
onwards. Thus it is important to describe it in some detail here.
Oliver's framework
Oliver (1991) identifies five types of organisational response to institutional 
pressures. She describes the response repertoire of organisations as more than 
passive conformity or isomorphism to their environments, but as consisting of a 
range of responses including defiance, manipulation, avoidance, and compromise, 
as well as acquiescence. Oliver sees these organisational responses as existing on a 
continuum from compliance to resistance, where acquiescence is the most 
compliant response, and manipulation is the most resistant response.
According to Oliver (1991), ten "institutional factors" -  features of the environment 
and its pressures -  determine and therefore predict whether an organisation will 
respond via acquiescence, defiance or any of the five strategic responses. I use the 
term "predictive antecedents" to describe these institutional factors. The ten 
predictive antecedents are: (1) the number of constituents involved and (2) the 
extent to which the organisation is dependent on these constituents; (3) the level 
of constraint imposed on the organisation's discretion; (4) the level of consistency
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between institutional pressures and the goals of the organisation; the levels of (5) 
uncertainty and (6) interconnectedness in the environment; (7) the extent to which 
pressures are generally and diffusely accepted; (8) the level of legal coercion 
involved in exerting the pressures; and the level of (9) legitimacy and (10) economic 
gain to be made from compliance.
Oliver (1991) defines each predictive antecedent not as an either-or feature of the 
environment, but instead as something which might exist in high, moderate or low 
levels. For example, the level of uncertainty in the environment could be low, high 
or anywhere in-between. Oliver also predicts particular causal relationships 
between the antecedents and responses. For example if there is a high level of 
uncertainty in the environment, then Oliver's framework suggests that 
organisational response is likely to be less resistant. If there were a large number of 
constituents involved, then Oliver would suggest that organisational response is 
likely to be more resistant. In this way, Oliver sees each predictive antecedent as 
having either direct or inverse correlation with the level of resistance in the 
organisation's response.
The correlation relationships are hypothesised by Oliver based on her combination 
of neo-institutional and resource dependence theories. Oliver particularly focuses 
on the interplay between the homogenising forces described in institutional theory 
and the active role of managing external dependencies described in resource 
dependence theory. For example, Oliver's interpretation of resource dependence 
theory sees the environment as consisting of those who control resources
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important for the organisation's survival, to which the organisation is linked via 
resource exchange and which it responds to through active management. Oliver's 
description of institutional theory is that the environment consists of those who 
shape and enforce sanctioned norms, which place isomorphic pressures on 
organisations, to which they respond with conformity in order to survive. 
Therefore, for example, in a situation with only very few stakeholders who all hold 
similar expectations of an organisation, the organisation is likely to conform to 
those expectations (as suggested by institutional theory). However, in a 
circumstance with multiple stakeholders exerting a range of conflicting 
expectations on an organisation, Oliver predicts the organisation will not conform, 
partly because it cannot, and partly because -  as suggested by resource 
dependence theory -  it manages the conflicting expectations according to what 
best suits its needs.
Oliver (1991) brings together all the elements of the framework into a complex 
predictive-matrix which suggests, in effect, a range of prediction-profiles for the 
various organisational responses. For example, Oliver predicts that acquiescence 
will occur when an organisation is likely to gain high levels of legitimacy and 
economic gain from compliance; when there is a low number of constituents or 
stakeholders on whom the organisation is highly dependent; when the institutional 
pressures are consistent with the goals of the organisation and the level of 
constraint on organisation's discretion is low; when there is a high level of legal 
coercion involved in exerting the pressures and these pressures are generally and 
diffusely accepted in the field; and when both the levels of uncertainty and
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interconnectedness are high (Oliver, 1991). A drawback of Oliver's work is its focus 
on the characteristics of institutional pressures and that it does not incorporate 
organisational or other characteristics.
As mentioned above, Oliver's framework has featured in the work of many third 
sector researchers (Akingbola, 2006; Alexander, 2000; Benjamin, 2008; Flack & 
Ryan, 2003; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998; Guo, 2007; Ramanath, 2009; Schmid, 
2001). Some have specifically built on Oliver's framework (Baiser & McClusky, 
2005; Barman, 2002; Bigelow & Stone, 1995; Johansson, 2003; Provan et al., 2004) 
while others have applied it directly to organisational responses outside the non­
profit sector (see for example, Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, & 
Justis, 2008; Milliken, Martins, & Morgan, 1998). One study entitled Why Don't 
They Do What We Want? An Exploration of Organizational Responses to 
Institutional Pressures in Community Health Centers [sic] applies Oliver directly to 
NPOs involved in social policy implementation (Bigelow & Stone, 1995).
Using a case study approach, Bigelow and Stone (1995) traced the history of eight 
NPOs providing government funded community health services as they responded 
to pressures for funding cuts by their government funders. These authors found a 
variety of non-profit responses to these imposed government budget cuts, not just 
conformity (Bigelow 84 Stone, 1995). The other types of response found included 
failed conformity, where the non-profit attempted to reduce its budget but failed 
and was declared bankrupt, as well as passive and active resistance. One NPO also 
demonstrated what Bigelow and Stone described as "symbolic compliance"
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(identical to Oliver's compromise response), where the NPO made "efforts to 
comply sufficiently to maintain legitimacy without losing support from other 
internal or external constituencies whose interests and expectations diverged from 
those of the funding source" (Bigelow & Stone, 1995, p.185).
As well as the influence of factors identified within Oliver's framework, Bigelow and 
Stone (1995) also identify other features that impact on the NPO response of the 
cases examined in their research. These features include the skills and values of the 
non-profit administrators and leaders, the internal relationships within the non­
profit, the history of the relationship between the non-profit and funder, and the 
relationships between the non-profit and other organisations. Bigelow and Stone's 
(1995) study both demonstrates the usefulness of Oliver's framework for 
qualitative investigation into the actions and responses of NPOs in the process of 
social policy implementation as well as implying there is more to the explanatory 
picture than structural explanations expect.
2.5 More to the explanatory picture: Agency via leadership in institutionalised 
settings
While Oliver's framework provides a comprehensive picture of organisational 
response, even structurally based theories such as organisational and institutional 
theories typically recognise and acknowledge the role of agency (Scott, 2008). 
Indeed, the importance of individual agency in the social policy implementation 
literature has been already discussed -  through, for example, the roles of policy 
elites and street level bureaucrats. Therefore, it would be remiss not to seek out
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and explore the way in which such agency plays a role in organisational behaviour 
and response according to the third sector, institutional and organisational 
explanatory literatures.
Typically, in these literatures, the role of individual agency is understood through 
the actions and behaviours of organisational leaders. A review of the third sector 
empirical literature incorporating leadership reveals that NPO leaders have been 
found to have an impact on organisational direction and ultimate survival (Stone, 
Bigelow, & Crittenden, 1999). They do this through setting organisational mission 
and strategic directions according to a balance of the various stakeholder agendas 
and priorities, balancing innovation and stability within the broader context of 
demand and supply (Brown & Moore, 2001; Heimovics et al., 1993; Jaskyte, 2004; 
Moore, 1995; Ospina et al., 2002; Rechtman, 2006).b
NPO leaders can have an impact on the organisation's networks, relationships and 
collaboration with other organisations (Goldman & Kahnweiler, 2000; Galaskiewicz 
and Shatin, 1981, cited in Stone et al., 1999; Wagner & Meicek, 2005). They do 
this, for example, by operating as boundary spanners between NPOs and 
governments to foster trusting, respectful and cooperative relationships in which 
"accountability is organic, and organizations feel supported in their mission but not 
controlled" (Brown & Troutt, 2004, p.5). For example, Ospina and her colleagues 
(2002) highlight the importance of how NPO leaders define the "community" to 
whom they are accountable in determining the NPO's activities.
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Tracing suggestions such as the importance of leadership to their empirical and 
theoretical roots is a daunting task, for the general body of leadership literature is 
vast (Burns, 1978; Hermann, 1986). Leadership literature as it relates specifically to 
leading NPOs is more a discrete field of which a majority focuses on providing NPO 
managers with advice about running their organisations (see for example, Drucker, 
1990; Herman, 1994). Such advice consists of information about, for example, 
"building donor constituency" (Drucker, 1990, p.65), "scanning and analysing the 
external environment and its potential impact" (Courtney, 2002, pl71) and 
developing "board-centered leadership skills" (Herman & Heimovics, 1994, p.141).
This body of literature also incorporates a small but growing sub-set of empirical 
and explanatory social science research (Powell & Steinberg, 2006).7 Unfortunately, 
apart from a couple of notable exceptions (see, for example, Schmid, 2006, 2009; 
Wallis & Dollery, 2006) theory driven accounts of the role of leaders in NPOs are 
still uncommon, and mostly have not been empirically explored. Like the Bigelow 
and Stone (1995) study mentioned above, the role of leadership in empirical third 
sector research tends to be uncovered in the process of looking more generally at 
the operation of NPOs.
While the third sector empirical literature describes findings suggesting that leaders 
and their actions are important in determining organisational behaviour and 
response, the institutional theory literature makes some suggestions about why this 
is so. Institutional theory, a vast and interdisciplinary field (Rhodes et al., 2006a), 
points out that organisations and their leaders not only respond to their
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environments (as described above) but also act on their environment (Lowndes, 
2005; Pfeffer, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Neo-institutional theory in particular 
asserts that legitimate practices in highly institutionalised environments are socially 
defined, and therefore organisations seek to act upon and engage with these 
environments as a way of being involved in the definition of these benchmarks of 
legitimacy (March & Olsen, 1989; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Social policy implementation does indeed often occur in a setting in which many 
aspects of effectiveness are difficult to quantify and measure (De Hoog, 1984; 
Mackintosh, 2000; Van Slyke, 2006). In this way, "nonprofit organizations operate 
in environments characterized by uncertain relationships between means and 
ends" (Bigelow & Stone, 1995, p.183). Social policy goals and outcomes, legitimate 
practices (and their prices) may be contested, long term, vague and less directly 
related to single and specific inputs than they are to a constellation of inputs 
(Ebrahim, 2002; Llewellyn, 1998) -  or even be "independent of actual goal 
attainment or effectiveness" (Alexander, 2000, p.290; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Perrow, 1973). As noted above (in 2.3) NPOs do also act on their environments to 
influence the benchmarks of legitimate practice in social policy implementation 
(Benjamin, 2008). An entire subset of the third sector is devoted to advocacy and 
lobbying. Although, as the lesson of the street level bureaucrat would suggest, it is 
not just in advocacy and lobbying that social policy implementation is influenced 
and designed as it is interpreted.
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For NPOs involved with the process of social policy implementation, operating 
within a highly institutionalised environment also emphasises that supplying 
legitimate, socially sanctioned and endorsed services can be just as important as 
providing services proven to be effective (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Ospina et al., 
2002). For example, Ebrahim (2002) found that for the NPOs he studied, it was 
important to provide monitoring and regular reporting to funders -  even though 
this reporting “ may never actually be used for decision making but is collected to 
lend legitimacy to an organization's activities" (Ebrahim, 2002, p.103). In this way, 
data and information sharing are decoupled with the core work of the NPO and 
operate with "symbolic value in the sense that they function to legitimate the 
organization's activities while also preventing unwanted funder interference" 
(Ebrahim, 2002, p.104). This example shows the subtle ways in which NPOs exert 
their agency in their day-to-day activities, without necessarily needing to engage in 
"advocacy" or "lobbying" activities. In this way, the NPOs and their leaders act as 
institutional entrepreneurs (Lowndes, 2005; Scott, 2008).
Early institutional theory also suggests the importance of organisations as 
institutions -  or institutionalised organisations. The classic author in this stream of 
institutional theory is Selznick (Scott, 2008; Selznick, 1949, 1957). Selznick (1957) 
defines an institutionalised organisation as one which is "infuse[d] with value 
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand" (p.17). According to 
Selznick, institutionalised organisations, have:
a distinctive identity... values, ways of acting and believing that are deemed 
important for their own sake... [Therefore] self maintenance becomes more than 
bare organisational survival; it becomes a struggle to preserve the uniqueness of
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the group in the face of new problems and altered circumstances" (Selznick, 1957, 
P-21).
Because of their distinctive identity and their infusion with value, institutionalised 
organisations tread a fine balance between valuing their own autonomy with their 
capacity to be adaptive and to respond to changes in the environment (Perrow, 
1973). They are usually willing to sacrifice short-term losses for long-term goals and 
they operate with a specifically tailored "adaptive belief system" (Boin & 
Christensen, 2008, p.273) -  or a "logic of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 1989). 
Such an adaptive belief system, logic of appropriateness, or dominant culture 
involves a range of norms or shared assumptions about how the world operates 
and how the organisation, and its workers, fit into the world. The norms define the 
organisation's distinctive competence, operational processes and acceptability to 
internal and external stakeholders. Such norms can be regulative (involving laws 
and legally sanctioned norms), normative (involving appropriate or morally 
governed norms) or cognitive (embedded, taken-for-granted norms) (Scott, 2008).
In particular, existing as an institution sets an organisation apart from being "an 
expendable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job" (Selznick, 1957, p.5). 
In an institutionalised organisation, the firmly established logic of appropriateness
define what constitutes appropriate action... [and mean that] rather than acting 
out of overt rational self-interest, individuals are said to behave according to their 
sense of duty and obligation as structured by prevailing rules and routines (Rhodes, 
Binder, & Rockman, 2006b, p.xvi).
The process by which an organisation becomes an institution is not necessarily 
straightforward, all-or-nothing or immediate, but moves through phases (Boin &
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Christensen, 2008). Thus, "organizations vary in their degree of institutionalization 
" (Scott, 2008, p.22). An organisation is less likely to be highly institutionalised if it 
has precise and unambiguous goals and technologies. In this "developmental 
context" (Selznick, 1957) different leadership roles are emphasised at different 
stages of its institutionalisation. Selznick describes specific leadership tasks for 
those leading organisations that are institutions, which include setting and 
defending the vision of the organisation, recruitment and training of personnel 
(especially the organisation's elites) who embody the values of the organisation, 
defining mission and purpose through a "distinctive competence" (p.87), defending 
integrity and ordering internal conflict.
Since Selznick initiated this stream of institutional theory, the idea of organisations 
as institutions has typically been applied to large public organisations, which are 
often highly rule-bound bureaucratised agencies, characterised by embedded 
hierarchies and inflexibility. However, I am interested in the simple notion of a 
values-infused organisation, with a distinct culture, striving to achieve or believing 
itself to have a particular type of legitimacy because I see this as a fitting 
description for many NPOs. Indeed, many authors writing in the third sector 
literature describe NPOs as inherently value-embedded and some suggest this is 
part of their distinctive comparative advantage (Billis & Glennerster, 1998; 
Cheverton, 2007; Nevile, 2009; Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). For example, Frumkin 
and Andre-Clarke (2000) suggest that the "expressive, noninstrumental dimension... 
[is] what separates the nonprofit sector from other social sectors" (p.142).
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However, I find it an acutely uncomfortable mis-match to conceptualise NPOs as 
institutions -  especially considering the indelible normative association I have 
between " institutions" and "evil" because of my knowledge of dehumanising 
whole-of-life services for people with disabilities, as described in Chapter 1. I am 
not the only one with this discomfort: the desirability of institutions is debated with 
many authors acknowledging the "dark side" of institutions, citing the Nazi SS and 
Hoover's FBI (Boin, 2001). This sinister element of institutions is, however, in no 
way a necessary feature of their set of characteristics (Perrow, 1973). Indeed, 
Selznick's original concept of highly institutionalised organisations sees them more 
as organisations with significant, important, resilient, adaptive and moral bodies. 
For Boin and Christensen (2008),
institutions enjoy a high level of general support: An institution is widely accepted 
and taken for granted... Its way of working has become its trademark. It is valued 
not only for what it does but what it is... a vessel for societal aspirations (Boin & 
Christensen, 2008, p.274).
Normative judgements about the value of institutions aside, the involvement of 
institutions in social policy implementation and of leaders in institutions has 
particular implications. Consider, for example, principal-agent approaches to 
implementation via third parties as it has been described above in 2.2. A key 
assumption of the NPM approach to social policy implementation via "third parties" 
is the notion that these third parties are "tools" of government. Yet, for an NPO to 
be a tool or instrument delivering government's intentions is the organisational 
antithesis of it being a self-determining, autonomous institution. It would seem
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that such incongruous operating paradigms may further complicate the already 
complicated process of social policy implementation.
Both the role of leadership and the implications of NPOs as institutions suggest 
there is much more to the explanatory picture of how NPOs are involved in the 
process of social policy implementation than only structural explanations. What is 
lacking, however, is a comprehensive exploratory empirical investigation into how 
such explanations combine to form a cohesive theoretical approach drawing 
together the multiple and varying streams of this disparate literature. It is this how 
question, about how NPOs are involved in the process of social policy 
implementation, how structural explanations play a role, and how other aspects 
blend in to this overall picture that I seek to address in this thesis.
2.6 Conclusion
It can seem that understanding of the role and engagement of NPOs in social policy 
implementation is an experience involving a confusing blend of a limitless number 
of approaches, frameworks and theoretical foundations. The research presented in 
this thesis seeks to focus on the mundane realities of day-to-day NPO involvement 
in the process of social policy implementation. However, such "mundane" research 
can speak to lofty questions of democracy. Bringing together this range of 
perspectives full circle back to key issues in political science and public 
administration provides an interesting picture with implications on the democratic 
processes underpinning the role of institutions in the polity and, for this study, in
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the process of social policy implementation. In this regard, it is interesting to 
consider March and Olsen's (1984) perspective on institutions:
Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also 
on the design of political institutions. The bureaucratic agency, the legislative 
committee, and the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but 
they are also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that 
define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own right (p.738).
It is particularly interesting to consider what would happen to this defining 
perspective if added to the list of "the bureaucratic agency, the legislative 
committee, and the appellate court" was "the process of social policy 
implementation through non-government third parties", with "third parties" also 
considered as political actors in their own right.
Such a perspective weaves in tightly with the puzzle raised above in 2.2, about 
where policy design ends, considering the lesson of the street level bureaucrat in 
which policy is interpreted and effectively written as it is enacted. The implications 
of such a puzzle could be significant, and correspond with the notion of decentred 
governance raised in the governance-networks literature (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006b; 
Dinham & Lowndes, 2008):
Nonprofits are a new institutional form. Their emergence as a central feature of 
the polity represents a new configuration of public and private power (Hall, 1994, 
P-4).
It is important to understand the experience and role of NPOs in the process of 
social policy implementation for this and many other reasons. Recent research 
contends that the impact of government funding on NPO activity is varied 
(Akingbola, 2006) and the relationships between governments and NPOs are "not
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simple or obvious" (Onyx et al., 2008, p.631). This review of the literature has 
briefly traced the history of implementation research, the experiences of NPOs, the 
role of structural explanations stemming from institutional and organisational 
theory, as well as suggested the role of leaders and aspects of institutional theory 
relevant for understanding NPO involvement in social policy implementation. In 
exploring this range of empirical and theoretical I have set the scene for empirical 
investigation into the lived worlds of NPOs in Australian social policy 
implementation and built a case for empirical investigation led by the research 
question: How do non-profit organisation (NPO) leaders understand and manage 
their relationships with governments in the process of social policy implementation?
6 For a comprehensive review of articles relating to non-profit strategic management from 1977- 
1999 see Stone et al., 1999.
7 Even with the presence of the US based "Non-profit Leadership and Management" journal the 
focus of publications has been more on advice for non-profit managers, such as tips for running an 
efficient and stable non-profit organisation rather than into the phenomenon of leadership per se.
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EXPLORING THE EXPERIENCES OF NPO LEADERS
3.1 Travelling alongside
Kvale (1996) depicts two broad metaphors of the researcher's role: a miner or a 
traveller. One type of researcher seeks to gather information as:
a miner who unearths the valuable metal. Some miners seek objective facts to be 
quantified, others seek nuggets of essential meaning. In both conceptions the 
knowledge is waiting in the subjects' interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by 
the miner... The knowledge nuggets remain constant through the transformations 
of appearances on the conveyer belt from the oral stage to the written storage...
The alternative traveler metaphor understands the [researcher] as a traveller on a 
journey that leads to a tale to be told upon returning home... The traveler explores 
the many domains of the country, as unknown territory or with maps, roaming 
freely around the territory. The traveler may also deliberately seek a route that 
leads to the goal. The [researcher] wanders along with the local inhabitants, asks 
questions that lead the subjects to tell their own stories of their lived world, and 
converses with them in the original Latin meaning of conversation as "wandering 
together with"... The potentialities of meanings in the original stories are 
differentiated and unfolded through the traveler's interpretations; the tales are 
remolded into new narratives... The journey may not only lead to new knowledge; 
the traveler might change as well... Through conversations, the traveler can also 
lead others to new understanding and insight as they, through their own story­
telling, may come to reflect on previously natural-seeming matters of course in 
their own culture (Kvale, 1996, pp.3-4, original emphasis).
Throughout this research process, I have adopted a researcher-as-traveller 
approach, rooted in an interpretivist philosophy. I do not seek to recover objective 
and immutable truths. Instead I depict and analyse how participants interpret and 
understand the experience of social policy implementation, and what this means 
for their involvement in it (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).
The phenomenon I wish to investigate in this thesis -  how NPO leaders understand, 
manage and respond to their relationships with governments in the process of
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social policy implementation -  is socially constructed and personally experienced 
(Bigelow & Stone, 1995; Ebrahim, 2002; Laws & Hajer, 2006; Reingold & Liu, 2009; 
Schneider, 2006). The pursuit of knowledge through interpretation acknowledges 
and values the unique and different interpretations and explanations that exist 
around any one set of events or issues, and seeks to find not one true truth, but to 
develop an informed, considered and deep understanding of events and issues 
(Bevir & Rhodes, 2002; Dinham & Lowndes, 2008; Robson, 2002; Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The findings presented in this thesis are the culmination and 
synthesis of my interpretation of these events and have been shaped by the 
uniqueness of my involvement in the research process (Hendriks, 2007). Despite 
this uniqueness, I share a belief with others that such interpretations can also speak 
to a bigger picture (Bevir & Rhodes, 2002; Rhodes et al., 2007b) -  in this case, the 
bigger picture of the theory and practice of social policy implementation.
The empirical question underpinning this research project not only reflects my 
epistemological and ontological positions, but has also fed my decision about the 
use of ethnography as a suitable and appropriate method for this research. 
Ethnography is a well-established method for studying the operation of 
organisations, including NPOs (Czarniawska, 1997; Lea, 2008; Pondy, Frost, Morgan, 
& Dandridge, 1983; Schneider, 2006; Shehata, 2006; Van Maanen, 1979, 1998; 
Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005; Woodward, 1980). There is also a small 
but steadily growing body of literature that supports and promotes the use of 
interpretive approaches -  such as observation -  to policy and implementation 
research (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006a; Dryzek, 2006; Finlayson, Bevir, Rhodes, Dowding,
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& Hay, 2004; Rhodes, 2002; Rhodes et al., 2007b; Yanow, 2000; Yanow & Schwartz- 
Shea, 2006).
In particular, I have opted for an ethnographic design involving observation and 
fieldwork instead of more common interviewing and focus group techniques for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, I use ethnographic methods here because I believe 
shadowing NPO leaders in their day-to-day work is a highly informative way of 
learning about their experiences and the best way to investigate the research 
question (Rhodes, 2002; Rhodes et al., 2007b). Such an approach allows the 
"individual dimension" (Geuijen, t Hart, Princen, & Yesilkagit, 2008, p.24) -  the 
person within the organisation -  to be uncovered.
Secondly, having worked for an extensive period of time in community service 
organisations, I was concerned about the extent to which my preconceived 
expectations and beliefs might bias my findings to the extent to render them 
prejudiced. By electing to enter into the worlds of the participants through 
observing and reflecting on their day-to-day work, I hoped to be increase the 
opportunity to be reflexive: to challenge, question and analyse not only my own, 
but also their assumptions about what was going on (Rhodes et al., 2007b).
Thirdly, there is a strong narrative of power imbalance surrounding the relationship 
between NPOs and governments (see for example, Spratt et al., 2007). Much third 
sector literature argues a normative point, and claims injustice on behalf of NPOs 
involved in social policy implementation and the third sector as a whole (see for 
example, Lyons & Passey, 2006). It can be important for academic accounts to
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incorporate advocacy, particularly in the field of policy studies (Dryzek, 1982). As 
described in Chapter 1, like many scholars with an early applied career in their fields 
of research, a sense of injustice in this power and expertise imbalance between 
practitioners and policymakers was part of my drive to conduct this research 
(Hendriks, 2007; Lea, 2008). However, again like others such as Hendricks (2007) 
and Lea (2008), I had a strong desire to conduct sensitive, balanced and considered 
research which did not seek from the outset to prove any one preconceived 
normative argument. I felt that it was not enough to repeat and record the 
antagonistic rhetoric in interviews with NPO leaders, but instead it would be more 
useful to see these leaders in action (Robson, 2002).
3.2 The cases: Choosing and comparing
Case study research is useful for addressing the empirical question driving this 
research. For example, case study research is useful when the context is 
intrinsically linked to the phenomenon being researched -  as is the case for NPO 
engagement in social policy (George & Bennett, 2005). Because of the strong 
themes in the literature speaking of the significance of different organisational 
features of NPOs, I felt it was also important to conduct comparative study of more 
than one NPO (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). The interpretivist tradition acknowledges 
that the richness of interpretive lessons can be enhanced through analysing more 
than one scenario, developing more than one thick description and comparing and 
contrasting these (Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003a). Selection of the three cases 
was essentially through a theoretically sensitised snowball sample method -  in part 
led by the participants, and in part informed by previous approaches to
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investigating the involvement of NPOs in social policy implementation (Howarth, 
2005; Smith & Lipsky, 1993).
The first case, Faith Aid Australia (FAA), was initially intended as a site 
approximating a pilot case, in which I would conduct exploratory fieldwork (Yin, 
2003, pp.79-80).I *8 The focus of my fieldwork at FAA was on becoming sensitised to 
the issues in the field, allowing investigation to be led by the data and the 
participants, and focusing on open questions such as "what is going on here?" This 
fieldwork placement allowed an opportunity for me to scope the usefulness of 
concepts from the literature and highlight other areas of the literature to which 
attention should be paid. I was able to begin refining my fieldwork skills at FAA, 
developing the craftsmanship of qualitative data gathering and establishing my 
legitimacy as a researcher (Kvale, 1996).
I had met Eddy, one of the key participants at FAA as I conducted informal scoping
interviews with a handful of high profile community service leaders prior to
commencing case selection. I accessed these people through my personal and
extended networks. I had six offers for field site placements stemming from this
initial round of interviews, and because of FAA's broad connections with provider
organisations in various networks, this organisation was seen as a particularly 
useful starting point from which other field site organisations could be selected and
contacted. Also, while my broad topic of interest -  the relationship between
governments and NPOs -  had become well established, at this stage I still sought 
participant led development of my research question. Thus, the fact that FAA was
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an organisation for whom maintaining ongoing relationships with government was 
one of its key roles meant it was highly suitable for my first fieldwork placement.
In selecting the second and third fieldwork sites using a snowballing method, I 
requested that the FAA participants suggest potential field sites that displayed 
structural diversity, and to describe to me why they would be suitable for 
involvement in the study (O'Reilly, 2004). From this range of suggestions, I 
developed a short-list of five NPOs, and -  after introduction and consent were 
sought in accordance with my ethics requirements -  I spoke in person with 
members of the leadership teams of these organisations to discuss their potential 
as a field site. In this process, I eliminated three sites as unsuitable. One was 
eliminated because my discussion with its leader revealed she did not believe her 
agency had enough of a relationship with government to sustain my interest for any 
period of time -  despite my "insatiable enthusiasm" (Punch, 1989, p.186) that the 
site would be of interest to me regardless. A second was removed from the short 
list because it operated in the same state as another of the cases. A third was not 
considered suitable because its operations were in rural and remote areas, which 
was out of the scope of this research.
The eventually selected additional fieldwork sites -  the Provincevale Community 
Centre (PCC) and Robwood -  were suggested by the women at FAA for a range of 
reasons. According to them, both NPOs had an active relationship with government 
and were led by reflective and engaged leaders. Both were, moreover, involved 
with more than one level of government, receiving funding from both state and 
federal levels of government. In retrospect, it is clear to see that this selection
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process strongly influenced the findings of this research. The organisations 
suggested and the leaders who were willing for me to spend time with them are 
particular types of people and organisations. Overall, these three NPOs were 
organisations led by people who had something to say about their relationship with 
government.
While such purposive sampling of the NPOs based on their interest in the issue 
under investigation is a method used elsewhere in third sector research (see for 
example, Baulderstone, 2008), I believe my sampling here of NPOs and leaders with 
an active relationship with government led to one of two key limitations of this 
research. I believe as a result, a sampling "bias" can be seen in the findings. I 
wonder how my findings would have been different if I had spent time in the 
abovementioned NPO who did not fee! they had "enough" of a relationship with 
government to sustain my interest.
This limitation was not, however, completely problematic. By sampling three NPOs 
with varying structural features and a similar desire to have "active" relationship 
with government, I was able to identify similarities and differences in their 
experiences. By conducting a range of "auxiliary" interviews (described below in 
3.4), I was also able to gain a range of perspectives which highlighted the 
uniqueness of this "active" relationship perspective. I contrast the impact of this 
active relationship between NPOs and governments in the process of social policy 
implementation with an alternative approach in Chapter 9.
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A second limitation of this study was that I examined a relationship from only one 
perspective, that of the NPO. Throughout this thesis, the experience and opinion of 
"'government" remains opaque. I sought to address this limitation in the early 
phases of the research, with an initial research design that incorporated fieldwork 
with two NPOs and two teams of government workers (those responsible for 
managing two departments' relationships with NPOs). After extended negotiations 
and despite an initial round of positive pilot interviews with one team of 
government employees, I was unfortunately unable to secure approval in both 
state and federal government hierarchies to conduct fieldwork. Difficulties 
accessing governments for ethnographic research are not unique to this study 
(Rhodes et al., 2007b; Vincent & Harrow, 2005). Thus, the focus of the research 
remained firmly on the NPO.
The fieldwork conducted for this study consisted of between one and three months 
with each NPO, occurring consecutively with gaps for analysis in between.9 While 
the duration of ethnographic fieldwork varies enormously, this is a relatively limited 
amount of fieldwork compared to some, but not all ethnographers (Bernard, 2006; 
Rhodes et al., 2007b). There are a number of reasons I conducted fieldwork 
spanning this length of time. Firstly, I sought diversity and comparison, which led to 
the selection of the three different field sites, consequentially limiting the time I 
had to spend with each. Secondly, the length of the two shorter fieldwork 
placements emerged as an antidote to "fatigue" experienced in the longer, first 
placement (Punch, 1989). Twice I returned to a field site after the initial period of 
fieldwork had finished to gather follow-up data. The overall period of fieldwork ran
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from March 2007 to September 2008. Despite major changes that occurred during 
this period (a change of government after more than a decade of conservative rule) 
affecting the "political landscape of the day... the emerging themes suggest a more 
generic phenomenon" (Onyx et al., 2008, p.635).
The three field sites were in three different locations on the eastern seaboard of 
Australia.10 I maintained email, phone or personal contact with all of the key 
participants up to the time this thesis was completed. The key participants -  
ranging from one to four people per organisation -  were all part of the leadership 
teams within their organisations. An example of an agreement with a field site is 
included in the appendices. This agreement existed in addition to all the 
requirements for individual informed consent as required by the ANU ethics 
committee. The project, of course, received ethical approval with the Australian 
National University and abided by the Australian Government regulations for 
research with human participants (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999).
It is important to note here that sampling intentionally did not incorporate selecting 
field sites based on them experiencing specific changes in organisational structure 
or as they responded to particular events -  as many other NPO studies have done 
(see for example, Acheson, 2001; Austin, 2003; Baulderstone, 2008; Benjamin, 
2008; Brown & Troutt, 2004; Provan et al., 2004; Ramanath, 2009). I was interested 
in shadowing NPO leaders going about their ordinary day-to-day activities, as I felt 
this was an under-studied element of their function. Studying the day-to-day 
activities of organisations and their leaders is an important aspect of understanding
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their ordinary and ongoing involvement in institutional processes (Czarniawska, 
1997; Lowndes, 2005; Mintzberg, 1989; Rhodes et al., 2007b).
3.3 The life worlds of the leaders and the NPOs
As is common with ethnographic research, three primary sources of data 
generation occurred during fieldwork: interviews, observation (including some 
participation) and agency document review (O'Reilly, 2004).
Interviews
Ongoing ethnographic interviews occurred throughout fieldwork placement. While 
often appearing as unstructured conversations, these interviews were typically 
intentional and focused (Kvale, 1996). It was important to blend open-ended 
"deliberately naive" (Kvale, 1996, p.31) questioning with careful, reflexive, steering 
questions. This second type of reflexive and focused questions typically stemmed 
from my practice of daily reflection and journal note-taking (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell, & Alexander, 1995).
As fieldwork at each site progressed, it was a challenge to balance sensitive and 
respectful interview questioning with challenging and controversial questioning, in 
which I would mirror the participant's claims and assumptions back to them, 
highlighting discrepancies I perceived and seeking explanations. Questioning 
participants on their fundamental assumptions such as "why should you ask for 
funding for this when you have your own revenue that could pay for it?" could be a 
confronting experience. While risky, questions such as these "red herring"
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questions often elicited impassioned responses which led to crucial insights into the 
culture and norms underpinning their work.
The risk associated with such questioning was heightened considering the delicate 
power balance that existed between myself and the participants (Rhodes et al., 
2007b). In many ways the participant held the power of ownership over the 
information, knowledge and experience about which I sought to learn. I was a 
guest in their workplace, and was grateful for their time and willingness to 
participate. My arrangements with each participant and field site guaranteed them 
the ability to veto or amend anything I wrote about them in any publicly available 
document or presentation (Rhodes et al., 2007b). Yet, they were also allowing 
themselves to be potentially very vulnerable in admitting me to their day-to-day 
working environment, and in inviting me to interpret their work and experiences.
It was important to establish relationships of trust with the participants very quickly 
(Adler & Adler, 1987). Typically I did this by introducing myself with information 
emphasising that I had worked in the community services sector for a number of 
years before moving to policy and now to research. The cumulative intention of 
this introduction was to establish myself as an insider, staking out a claim to a 
membership role (Adler & Adler, 1987). In this way I sought to establish myself as a 
"knowledgeable observer" (Rhodes et al., 2007b, p.221) with a specific sensitivity, 
knowledge base, and allegiance to the plight of the struggling community services 
worker and advocate as quickly as possible.
Page I 67
Chapter 3: Exploring the experiences ofNPO leaders
While I believe this insider status led to high levels of access and honesty from the 
participants, there were also negative consequences. I have no hesitation in 
acknowledging my respect and admiration for the participants I shadowed -  despite 
the "bipolar" view of admiration and frustration that a researcher sometimes 
develops about their participants (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p.xii; Rhodes 
et al., 2007b). There was a strong and ongoing need for me to ensure that I 
remained openly critical of their work throughout the process, avoiding "going 
native", "capture" or "conflict" between my role as a researcher and an insider 
(Adler & Adler, 1987; Punch, 1989). At times, particularly in my first fieldwork 
placement, I found it difficult to challenge some of the underpinning assumptions of 
the participants, purely because I was daunted with admiration about their work. 
In my journal at this time I note on many occasions frustration with my timidity. 
Like a craftswoman learning her trade, I am satisfied that I became much better at a 
critical approach over time. Critical reflexivity and academic detachment was 
important as I monitored my engagement with the research process. However, this 
limitation can continue to exist especially when participants do not wish to divulge 
their whole experiences or with the researcher's struggles of "how do I know what I 
do not know" (Punch, 1989; t Hart, 2007).
The ethnographic interviews focused on gathering descriptive and specific 
information about the participant's life world, the "everyday lived world of the 
interviewee" (Kvale, 1996, p.30), and how they ascribed meaning to this. One of 
my favourite aspects of ethnography is the capacity to conduct ongoing interviews, 
and to interview a participant immediately after you have observed their
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participation in a particular event, augmenting observation with the participant's 
own reflections (O'Reilly, 2004). These interviews -  short and long -  were typically 
recorded on a small handheld MP3 Dictaphone. My MP3 Dictaphone was never far 
from my hand, and the participants were aware that at any stage I might be 
recording what we were saying -  although I was, of course, never covert about this. 
There were many times also when I did not record what was said, at the explicit 
request of the participants. My agreements with the participants prior to 
conducting fieldwork included that I would not record group discussions when 
these had not been approved by all members of the group. In instances such as 
these I kept comprehensive handwritten or typed notes, and I would indicate (for 
example, in capital letters) when I had noted down a phrase verbatim and when I 
had paraphrased it in my own words.
During the course of fieldwork, sometimes the key participants would recommend 
-  and arrange -  for me to speak with another person about particular issues or 
perspectives. Other times I was intrigued by certain people associated with the 
participants and their organisations and I requested permission from the 
participants to approach them for interviews. In the spirit of the researcher- 
traveller metaphor, acknowledging the "serendipity and happenstance" of 
ethnographic research (Rhodes et al., 2007b, pp.209-210), these "auxiliary" 
interviews served to raise issues and broaden my understanding of the topic at 
hand and the work of the participants and their organisations. Indeed, some of 
these auxiliary interviews demonstrated an at-times fine line between ongoing 
ethnographic conversations and formal interviews. These interviews were useful,
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and they are referred to a handful of times in Chapters 4 to 9, but they were not 
the primary sources from which I drew meaning and interpretation.
Observation
I initially began fieldwork for this research with the intention of engaging in “active 
membership", incorporating both observation and participation. Active 
membership is where a researcher assumes a functional role in the setting while 
still striving to “cling to some... detachment... [and a] commitment to their 
academic role" (Adler & Adler, 1987, p. p.51). Participation was a strong theme in 
my three months at FAA, during which time I prepared a number of position papers 
for the organisation. This was an informative process and particularly highlighted 
to me some of the tensions for the FAA team between representing service users 
and service providers.
However, this process also had its drawbacks. By the end of my placement at FAA, 
as I was beginning to understand and engage more with the work of the three 
executive women at the office, I was also coming to the deadline for my position 
paper work to be complete, which drew me away from the events I wished to 
observe. For this reason, I elected not to engage in specific participation projects at 
Robwood or the PCC. I did not completely remove myself from participation 
however; for example, there were many occasions where I found myself working 
alongside Kelly, for example, assisting her to prepare for an upcoming governance 
committee meeting. The experience of participation in this instance was, however,
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qualitatively different to one where I had "my" project that I worked on, mostly 
separate to the others in the office.
I maintained both a handwritten and typed journal throughout the phases of data 
generation, collection and processing (described below). These journals contained 
descriptive notes, analytic notes and methodological notes (Bernard, 2006). Topics 
covered in the descriptive notes included information about what happened, how 
long things took, the gender and age mix of people involved, inter- and intra­
personal dynamics, the settings in which events occurred, the behaviours of those 
involved, and the key participants' reflections (O'Reilly, 2004). Analytic notes were 
my reflections on what was happening, sometimes written amongst the field notes 
and sometimes written at the end of a day or week as I reflected on the fieldwork. 
Methodological notes were where I kept a record of questions, topics or people I 
wished to follow up. Keeping an analytical and reflexive journal was a crucial 
feature of my daily practice of reflecting on the day's experiences, and aided the 
intimately intertwined process of data collection and analysis (Miles & Huberman,
1994) .
For example, in the handwritten journal I typically kept blank a 5cm margin on the 
right side of the page, in which, during the day I would scrawl notes to myself, 
highlight questions or comments that I wanted to follow up (Minichiello et al.,
1995) . In the evenings I would scour these notes again, highlighting and 
summarising issues that needed clarification, making comments on themes I felt 
were emerging as well as analysing the impact I was having on data generation. In
the electronic journal I was able to delineate from notes and reflections using
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different fonts and indenting and dating the reflective text. Keeping both an 
electronic and handwritten journal was important for ensuring flexibility -  there 
were times when it was more appropriate or inconspicuous to be using one or the 
other. There were also times when the sheer upper limb pain of repetitive strain 
required me to use one or another technique.
Interviewing, shadowing and observation can be an exhausting and intimate 
experience, for both the participant and the researcher (Punch, 1989). Towards the 
end of my fieldwork with Kelly at the PCC, she and I were participating in a group 
network meeting. The members of the group all introduced themselves, and as 
usual I introduced myself as a student researcher from the Australian National 
University, who was shadowing Kelly. Kelly, sitting next to me, introduced herself 
next as "I'm Kelly and I'm sick of being shadowed! It feels like I have been in 
constant supervision for weeks! She remembers everything I say and do, and she 
asks me why I do things differently from one circumstance to the next. I'm 
exhausted!" Lucky for us, Kelly and I had the opportunity to spend some time apart 
that day, as opposed to our typical schedule of travelling together in the car and 
going to meetings for up to 10 hours per day, giving ourselves the space of separate 
offices to regroup and refresh. When it was time again for us to return to our 
intensive schedule, I checked with Kelly that she was happy to go on with the 
shadowing, to which she responded with laughter and reassurance, expressing 
relief that she'd had the chance to vent and have a short break.
Not every field site is so exhausting, however, and it is easy to find yourself tucked
away in a corner, concerned that your participants have forgotten about you. This
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is especially the case when shadowing more than one person in an organisation. 
Again, as I learnt more about the craft of ethnography throughout the experience 
of fieldwork, I learnt to actively manage my levels of exhaustion and effort as well 
as my time -  both during the day while attending fieldwork, as well as in the 
evenings, while reflecting on fieldwork.
Agency document review
During fieldwork at each organisation I had access to their internal data via their 
hard and electronic filing systems. Data I gathered during the process of agency 
document review included primary internal and publicly available documentation 
such as contracts (service agreements), reporting forms, correspondence, meeting 
minutes, plans and strategy documents, submissions, foundation documents, policy 
and procedure manuals, budgets, media releases, organisational charts, 
presentation notes, newsletter articles, brochures and briefing notes as well as 
print-outs or photocopies of the participants diaries for the time I spent with them. 
This data formed an important additional set of information and artefacts (Lea, 
2008) which greatly assisted during data processing as I constructed time-lines or 
gathered together more objective data about each field site. It also served as a 
useful cross-reference for my field notes and observations.
3.4 Developing and dealing with the narratives
Following fieldwork at each site, I commenced an intensive period of processing 
(writing up), analysing and thematically coding the data from that case. Here I 
often relied on voice recognition software, which enabled me to dictate my notes
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into a typed format. As is often the case with qualitative data, coding occurred 
initially with the assistance of the NVIVO computer software package (Marshall, 
2002). Seeking to encourage codes to emerge from the data, a variety of coding 
schemes were derived, aiming initially to uncover as many relevant issues as 
possible and gradually moving towards a more conceptual and theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon over the course of data collection and analysis 
(Minichiello et al., 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, these initial sets of 
codes remained theoretically bewildering. I then sought to apply a range of 
relevant theoretically driven lenses to the data (Allison, 1971). This involved 
experimenting with developing codes informed by, for example, Rhodes and Bevir's 
beliefs/practices/traditions/dilemmas framework (Bevir & Rhodes, 2001, 2006a, 
2008; Rhodes, 2007b), amongst others. Each coding experiment provided further 
insights into the data. Eventually these coding efforts directed my theoretical 
attention towards the framework developed by Oliver (1991), described in 
Chapter 2.
Despite my frustrations at the structuralist-functionalist, positivistic and predictive 
nature of the Oliver (1991) framework, I could see its merit as a heuristic device 
assisting me to arrange and view my data from a theoretically relevant standpoint. 
Heuristic devices such as this can serve as conceptual tools to assist the interpretive 
researcher with highlighting and identifying deeper themes in the data (Hendriks, 
2007; Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 2004). Interpretive descriptions and 
explanations do not aim to define complex phenomenon in terms of dependent and 
independent variables in order to replicate and predict outcomes for similar events
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and issues (Rhodes et al., 2007b). However, in this study, using Oliver's framework 
as a heuristic specifically aiming to encourage deeper exploration into the data, 
rather than proving or disproving the utility of the framework per se was very 
useful (Oakleigh, Forthcoming). Through using it, and the associated process of 
grouping my data into narrative episodes, my otherwise unwieldy "thick" 
ethnographic data set (Geertz, 1973) became manageable, and to some extent it 
was the beginning of a phase in which the "different themes make sensible patterns 
and enter into a coherent unity" (Kvale, 1996, p.48).
Co-authoring narrative episodes
As a preliminary step in analysing the data according to the heuristic based on 
Oliver (1991), it was necessary to group the data into episode-based narratives 
(Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003b). These narrative episodes were "composite" 
stories in which I drew together information sometimes spanning the length of the 
fieldwork placement (Dinham & Lowndes, 2008, p.831). I carefully constructed the 
narrative episodes seeking to represent the data in a way that was authentic to the 
lived experience of the participants, while also demonstrating the specific themes 
emerging from analysis.
The first step in constructing the narrative episodes involved converting the "raw" 
data into a narrative. Below is a small section of a transcribed interview with Gail 
and Sile, participants at FAA.
G I think the thing about that is that sometimes it can be difficult for people 
who work in linear... [we are interrupted by the waitress]... but yes, I think that 
becomes incredibly difficult for people to understand if they've worked in 
government...
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S yeah, exactly...
G I remember my E.A. [executive assistant]... I would say "why did you swap 
that meeting over?" and he would say -  because that's a deputy secretary and 
that's a branch head, and it was simple, you know, pawn, or bishop out beats 
pawn...
In order to bring this data into a format that was useable and understandable by an 
external reader, I interpretively edited this text into the following:
"Sometimes it can be difficult for people who work in linear settings, in hierarchical 
organisations like government, to understand... When I worked in the public service 
I would say to my EA "why did you swap that meeting over?" and he would say -  
because that's a deputy secretary and that's a branch head, and it was simple, you 
know...bishop... beats pawn..."
It is important to note here my use of italicised and non-italicised text. In all the 
narratives and quotations presented in this thesis, text is presented in italics when 
(and only when) it is quoted directly verbatim from the participants or their 
organisation's written information. All other text is not in italics and includes text 
from my field notes; occasions where I have paraphrased what participants have 
said (often due to having taken shorthand notes during conversations or meetings 
rather than having made recordings from which full verbatim transcriptions can be 
reproduced). Non-italicised text also includes contextual descriptions that were 
post-produced either during the fieldwork, when writing up detailed and reflective 
field notes from each day, or while preparing the narratives. In this way I sought to 
bring together information from a range of sources and reflections to create 
comprehensive and comprehensible "re-enacted" episodes.
I decided to maintain this level of delineation between the italicised and non- 
italicised text, even though I acknowledge that the narratives are co-authored
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between myself and the participants. They are essentially my interpretations which 
have been approved by the participants (Kvale, 1996). This was firstly because I felt 
it was important in terms of authenticity to be transparent about text which 
directly quoted the participant and that which did not and secondly to avoid losing 
myself in this data (Hendriks, 2007; Van Maanen, 1979). While my findings are 
interpretive and do seek to delve into the meanings the participants ascribe to their 
lived reality, the narratives are not used for a deeply-intricate discourse-level of 
analysis (Fairclough, 1989; Torfing, 2005). I therefore consider re-telling fieldwork 
narratives in this way as legitimate for the level of analysis that occurs in this study.
I then made informed decisions about how and where to draw boundaries around 
the data, deciding where a narrative began and ended. I considered carefully what 
should be the size of a narrative. What constituted a full narrative and what was 
only part of a narrative? Some were short while other narratives were lengthy 
episodes, tracing the experience of a range of participants over the course of 
several months. How could these two "pieces" of information be comparable?
They were comparable, of course, precisely because they were not intended to be 
comparable in a positivist sense of the term. Ethnographic findings are more about 
themes and patterns than the number of events and I had no intentions of 
quantifying and explaining the data with reference to the frequency or size of 
narratives (Schneider, 2006). Thus, it was entirely appropriate to let the data 
influence the size and scope of the narratives themselves. As much as possible, I 
sought to let the data dictate its own narratives by tracing the course of particular 
episodes. This meant that in some circumstances, the episodes were very lengthy
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(such as my description of Robwood's EOI negotiation in Chapter 5), while others 
were shorter (such as my description of the PCC's experiences of avoidance in 
Chapter 6).
The Oliver model as an interpretive heuristic
When the data across each site was grouped into narratives, I assigned to each one 
(or more) of Oliver's five organisational response tactics -  acquiesce, compromise, 
avoid, defy and manipulate -  according to my judgement of best fit. I also noted 
when I felt the response tactic was not a good fit. I then considered the role of 
each predictive antecedent in each narrative, making an informed judgement about 
whether it existed to a high, moderate or low level. To assist me in this data 
processing task, I operationalised Oliver’s matrix into both a pictorial heuristic 
model, to help me see what was occurring in each narrative, as well as using a 
series of colour coded Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to help me compare narratives 
across and between field sites.
It is important to stress again, however, that despite the use below of terms such as 
"plotting" and "levels", this model was developed strictly and only as a heuristic 
device. I did not attempt to objectively measure the data involved in this process or 
even to specify the "gradient" of any correlation relationships between the 
antecedents and responses, above a simple direct or inverse distinction, as 
suggested by Oliver (1991). Instead, this heuristic model and the interpretive 
process around it served as an effective and useful device for bringing a particular 
focus onto the data in order to aid and direct further and deeper analysis.
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In this heuristic model the horizontal plane depicted what positivist researchers 
might call the dependent variable -  the amount or level of resistance in an 
organisation's strategic response to institutional pressures, from less to more. The 
vertical plane depicted what might be called the independent variable -  the level or 
strength of each predictive antecedent, from low to high. The model acknowledges 
how, in Oliver’s (1991) framework, the predictive antecedent levels influence the 
level of resistance in the organisational response. The direct and inverse 
correlations between the predictive antecedents and the organisational strategic 
responses were pictorially represented in the heuristic model via an ascending 
diagonal line for the predictive antecedents with a direct correlation, and a 
descending diagonal line for those with an inverse correlation -  see Figure 1.
More(Resistance to Institutional Pressures)
Figure 1: The Oliver (1991) model as an interpretive heuristic -  relationships between antecedents and
organisational responses
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Each antecedent can be plotted onto the model according to its strength and 
whether it is defined by Oliver (1991) as having an roughly inverse or direct 
correlation with the resistance of organisational response. For example, when 
there were a high number of stakeholders -  an antecedent with a direct correlation 
to resistance -  then this antecedent was plotted in the top right corner of the 
graph, indicating that it leads to a higher level of resistance (see Figure 2). When a 
high level of legitimacy was likely to be gained from compliance -  an antecedent 
with an "inverse correlation" to resistance -  then this was plotted in the top left 
corner of the graph, indicating that, according to Oliver, it leads to a lower level of 
resistance in the organisation's response to institutional pressures. A diagrammatic 
representation of these examples is at Figure 2 below.
Potential for 
legitimacy gain 
(high)
Number of 
stakeholders 
(high)
Figure 2: The Oliver (1991) model as an interpretive heuristic -  plotting antecedents onto the model
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According to Oliver's predictions, a clustering of antecedents to the left of this 
heuristic model, for example, should predict a tendency in that instance for the 
organisation to respond with acquiescence -  see Figure 3 below. This is easily seen 
at a glance when Oliver’s five organisational responses are overlaid onto the 
horizontal axis as a comparison (also in Figure 3). All ten antecedents in Oliver's 
prediction profile for acquiescence are present and plotted in Figure 3. These are 
represented by the small, overlapping, labelled rectangular boxes plotted on the 
two diagonal lines -  two are plotted on the inverse correlation line and the 
remaining eight are plotted on the direct correlation line.
AVOID DEFY MANIPULATEACQUIESCE COMPROMISE
(Resistance to Institutional Pressures)
Consistency of 
institutional norms 
with organisation 
goals
Voluntary diffusion 
of pressures 
Environmental 
interconnected­
ness 
Level of 
dependency on 
stakeholders 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Potential for 
economic gain 
Potential for 
legitimacy gain 
Legal enforcement 
of pressures 
Constraint on 
discretion/ 
autonomy 
Number of 
stakeholders
Figure 3: The Oliver (1991) model as an interpretive heuristic -  an example of "acquiescence"
Using this model for preliminary data analysis was an extremely useful heuristic 
technique for visualising the relationship between the tactical response strategies 
and their predictive antecedents. When applied to all the narratives across the
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three sites, it was especially helpful as a way of seeing trends in antecedents, 
responses or narratives that did not "behave" as might have been expected. I have 
included three examples of how I visually represented narrative episodes using this 
heuristic in the appendices.
This data analysis method served as a valuable interpretive cross-check, alerting me 
to multiple ways to understand and interpret the data and to see clarity in what 
otherwise was a densely rich data pool. The use of this heuristic device was not an 
end in itself, but instead was part of an iterative process which directed deeper 
subsequent analysis of the data. Through using this heuristic device, I identified a 
number of key themes emerging from the data and began writing these themes up, 
initially through Oliver's lens (in Chapters 5 to 7), and later moving "beyond" Oliver. 
Based on these themes I carefully selected a set of narratives to include in Chapters 
5 to 9, and developed detailed descriptions of them. In this way, I experienced how 
"writing up is not the end of research but the start of a new phase that is just as 
challenging" (Rhodes et al., 2007b, p.229).
3.5 Authenticity and verification
Getting up close is intuitively appealing for students of elites but it also harbours 
some classic pitfalls that have driven many social scientists away. We acknowledge 
these pitfalls. We do not downplay them. We seek to cope with them explicitly 
(Rhodes et al. 2007b, p.8).
In the standard annals of scientific research there are the three pillars of 
generalisability, reliability and validity (Kvale, 1996). These three pillars describe 
the way knowledge is verified, defended and authenticated within a positivistic 
paradigm. I am reluctant to provide defence of my methods based on these pillars,
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after all, "ethnographic tools are not just a softer, even inferior, versions of 
quantitative techniques. They are different in both aims and evaluation" (Rhodes 
et al., 2007b, p.219). Instead I adopt an interpretative alternative to knowledge 
verification. This suggests that "validation comes to depend on the quality of 
craftsmanship during investigation, continually checking, questioning, and 
theoretically interpreting the findings" (Kvale, 1996, p.241). There were a number 
of ways I sought to validate my research and findings which corresponded with my 
interpretive approach (Dinham & Lowndes, 2008; Rhodes et al., 2007b).
Firstly, I attempted to maintain an open and critical practice of self-reflection, as 
described above in the use of journal-keeping throughout the research process (not 
just during fieldwork). In the process of interpretation and analysis, I became 
acutely aware of the plurality of interpretations (Kvale, 1996). Qualitative data is 
rife with contradictions (Hendriks, 2007). Initially such contradictions were difficult 
to cope with as a researcher, especially with deeply entrenched, lingering implicit 
positivist notions that perhaps there is one truth, if only I looked hard and well 
enough for it. I initially mistook these contradictions as some sort of fault of my 
data collection skills. However, for the researcher-traveller, contradictions become 
the topic of a subsequent ethnographic interview and the researcher's 
understanding of the issue deepens further. Therefore, over time, I learned to 
savour the contradictions, as they often highlighted fascinating issues that led to 
deep insights about how the participants understood their roie in their world.
In this way, my parallel use of interviews, observation and agency document review
provided the opportunity for corroboration, and even triangulation. From my
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interpretivist perspective, this was not done with the intention of falsifying one 
source or another, or developing one true account of what happens. Instead, the 
purpose of triangulation in this study was to deepen my understanding of the 
multiple truths that can exist.
Secondly, I tested my research findings with a broader public -  academic and 
practitioner -  throughout the process of developing them. Adler and Adler (1987) 
recommend researchers "periodically realign their perspective with those of 
outsiders in order to analyse the setting critically" (p.51). I met regularly with my 
supervisor, who never failed to provide challenging and thought-provoking 
responses to my latest set of findings and frustrations. These regular meetings also 
served as debriefs, and I was in regular contact with my supervisor either directly or 
via email during fieldwork (Punch, 1989). I presented ongoing updates of my 
findings at the Australian Political Science Association Conference in 2007 and to 
the Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research Conference in 2008. I published 
my early findings in a peer-reviewed journal (Oakleigh, Forthcoming).11 Adapted 
case study material from my research was presented at a series of training 
workshops for senior executives in government, non-profits and business 
enterprises with the Centre for Social Impact, University of New South Wales. 
These experiences confirmed and validated both the NPO experiences I was 
describing as well as the analytical framework I was using to understand them.
Thirdly, and most crucially, in recognition that an interpretivist "notion of 
'objective' knowledge is inter-subjective agreement" (Rhodes, 't Hart, &
Noordegraaf, 2007a, p .ll) , I sought feedback and approval from the participants. I
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provided the final selection of narrative episodes, as they appear in this thesis, to 
the participants. In doing so I requested that they not only check the narratives 
for confidentiality and de-identification, but that they also confirm that the episode 
narratives were an authentic and balanced interpretation, from their perspective, 
of my fieldwork at their organisation. With a handful of minor edits and 
clarifications, the participants were all happy for the narratives to be included. The 
participants were also offered the opportunity to have their reflections and 
responses to reading the narratives included in this thesis. Not all the participants 
wished to do so, but the comments of those who did are included in the 
appendices.
3.6 Conclusion
One of the great acts of delusion which a thesis seeks to conjure is a linear 
description of what has been a profoundly non-linear process. Knowledge is not 
static, and literature became apparent along the journey of my research as it was 
published or discovered as I went into the dark corners I had not before thought to 
shine a torch into. In this way, while the literature review in Chapter 2 describes a 
logical sequence of investigation, occurring entirely before I had "entered the field" 
and commenced my data collection and analysis, the lived experience of this was 
far from that.
Published research involving more and more nuanced and sophisticated 
understandings of the relationship between NPOs and governments, descriptive 
and explanatory, became available throughout the course of the research project.
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My understanding of the relevant theoretical frameworks blossomed once a 
framework began to emerge from the data. While I sought to theoretically sensitise 
myself to the predominant themes in the NPO and social policy implementation 
literature before entering the field, I could not predict the findings -  especially in 
relation to institutional theory and organisational leaders. Such an experience 
makes a slight mockery of a well developed theoretical argument followed by a 
series of chapters on the findings of the research which appear to pay no heed to 
how they have been pre-empted in the literature review. Therefore, my desire in 
this chapter has been to specifically claim and detail the iterative inductive- 
deductive process of this research.
This chapter has described the methodological approach I have taken in this 
research process. In an effort to be transparent and clear about these methods, I 
have raised and discussed some of the issues that were particularly relevant in the 
processes of case selection, data gathering, generation, processing and analysis 
(Hendriks, 2007). I have sought to bring experience of ethnography to life and 
acknowledged my role and influence in the findings that have emerged. I have 
described and acknowledged the limitations and restrictions of my methods. In 
doing so, I have provided a behind-the-scenes picture about how the data and 
analysis of the following chapters emerged and occurred. The following chapters 
go on to describe the findings of my research firstly from the perspective of Oliver's 
framework, and secondly moving beyond this framework to explore the data at a 
deeper and more interpretive and synthesised level. Finally, I apply these findings 
to puzzles of social policy implementation driving the core empirical question of this
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thesis: how do NPO leaders understand and manage their relationships with 
governments in the process of social policy implementation?
8 Yin's writings on case study research (see for example, Yin, 2003) are useful for any case study 
based research, however, it is important to acknowledge that my use of cases here is based on a 
different epistemological foundation to Yin's more positivistic approach.
9 Including follow-up visits, I spent one month (full time) each at the PCC and Robwood, and three 
months (3 days per week) at FAA.
10 As a part of my agreement with each site, I guaranteed a level of confidentiality and de­
identification extending to their specific locations.
11 In anticipation of an imminent name change, please note I have used my married name for this 
publication, as opposed to my maiden name (Procter).
121 had also previously gained approval from the participants for the particular narratives I had 
already used in public forums.
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CHAPTER 4
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CASES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is the first in a series of four chapters reporting the fieldwork in this 
study. These chapters aim to present the findings in consecutive layers of 
deepening interpretation and "thickness", commencing with the "thin", birds eye 
description in this chapter. Here follows an overview of cases, their statistics, 
budgets, staffing and programs -  characteristics that involve less, rather than more 
interpretation aimed at providing a rudimentary picture of the organisations 
involved to create a backdrop for the narratives and analysis presented in the 
remainder of this thesis. Subsequent to this initial "thin" description, I elaborate on 
the key characters I observed during my fieldwork at each site, and provide a 
snapshot of my fieldwork observations from each, aiming to give an overall feel for 
the character and nature of each organisation. I have presented the cases 
according to the sequence of fieldwork visits -  first describing Faith Aid Australia, 
then the Provincevale Community Centre (PCC) and finally Robwood.
The following five chapters draw heavily on fieldwork data. The data is presented 
both in the form of long narratives and short quotes which serve as 
"reconstructions" or "re-enactments" of events observed or described. The full 
process by which these narratives were developed, including the use of italicised 
and non-italicised text has been described in Chapter 3.
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4.2 Faith Aid Australia
The national network of faith-based human and community service providers 
affiliated with the "Faith" Church of Australia forms the Faith Aid network, of which 
Faith Aid Australia (FAA) is the "national office". The network of service providers 
incorporates approximately 1,300 sites across Australia, employing 35,000 workers, 
involving 24,000 volunteers and providing support to 2 million people per year 
([Faith Aid Australia], 2006a).13 Faith Aid network organisations provide a wide 
range of services including support for people who are ageing, children, families 
and people with disabilities. This network of autonomous service provider 
organisations is linked and represented to both the state and the church hierarchies 
by FAA.
FAA's mission statement was to voice the Faith Church's "commitment to 
supporting individuals, families and communities through advocacy and the 
enhancement o f community service provision" ([Faith Aid Australia], 2005, p.l). At 
the time of my fieldwork there, FAA's key responsibilities included but were not 
limited to the following ([Faith Aid Australia], 2005, pp.1-2):
• theological reflection on the Church's community service work;
• advocating to government and the Church about policies and practices which 
enhance the dignity of people, especially those who are most disadvantaged 
and marginalised-,
• information exchange amongst the Church and the service providers;
• enhancing the quality of service provision;
• representing the views of Faith Church service providers to governments;
• working with other churches and peak organisations; and
• responding to requests from the Church governing bodies.
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In many ways the work of FAA was similar to that of a peak or representative body, 
with it seeking to have an impact to " influence and activate change for better 
quality of life outcomes for the most disadvantaged people of Australia” through 
work across its network, with other peaks, with the government and with its own 
capacity ([Faith Aid Australia], 2006b, p.2). The accountability, governance and 
reporting responsibilities of FAA were to the Faith Church through a governance 
committee with around 15 appointed members providing national representation 
from both the provider and church networks, which met twice per year. The role of 
the committee was to monitor and guide the work prioritisation and funding of 
FAA, and to assist in the coordination of FAA with other arms of the network and 
church.
While the office did not provide publically available annua! reports of its functions 
or funding, it made its budget documents available to me at the time of my 
fieldwork there. In these internal budget documents, the annual income of FAA 
was listed as just over half a million dollars, none of which was a direct payment 
from government ([Faith Aid Australia], 2007a). At the time of fieldwork, FAA was 
also a part of a advocacy coalition and was receiving around 5% of its income for 
the work involved with this coalition. A majority of FAA's income (53%) was spent 
on salaries, with 11% on travel and vehicle expenses, 8% spent on the costs of 
various committees, and 3% on IT costs ([Faith Aid Australia], 2007a).
At its establishment (in its current form) in the 1990s, the Faith Church had 
specified that FAA be funded by a levy placed on service providers to the amount of 
0.05% of their annual turnover. Flowever, this decision had "received mixed
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adherence" ([Faith Aid Australia], 2006b, p.12). At the time of my fieldwork there, 
FAA received approximately only 60% of the funding it was due under this 
requirement ([Faith Aid Australia], 2007b). Securing appropriate revenue to 
achieve the activities of FAA was therefore a key issue for the organisation -  
especially as it sought to increase its capacity for its work with government and 
across the network. In addition to the monetary income flowing into FAA, the 
network also provided additional in-kind and financial support such as assistance 
with Information and Communication Technology (ICT), vehicles and travel.
Key characters
At the time of fieldwork, FAA was staffed by four women -  one employed in a CEO 
or Director's role, two at a "senior executive" level and one office manager. At one 
stage, Marji, a seconded worker from an interstate provider organisation, also 
joined the team. She and her role are described briefly in Chapter 6. My fieldwork 
observations predominantly traced and followed the work of the three senior 
workers, Eddy, Sile and Gail.
Eddy, the CEO or Director of Faith Aid Australia, trained as a psychologist and had 
experience working as both a service provider and as an adviser in government. 
Eddy's role at Faith Aid was as a figurehead, the leader of the organisation. She was 
the longstanding worker in the office, commencing there about three years before 
my fieldwork began. Eddy and her family were enthusiastically engaged in the Faith 
Church, and this faith-based identity formed a foundation for her involvement in 
Faith Aid Australia. Eddy's role at Faith Aid Australia involved significant networking
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amongst the church, the network of Faith Aid service providers and the 
Government, as well as involvement with a broader sector-wide advocacy coalition. 
The media-savvy Eddy used her strong faith base and passion for service as an 
expression of faith, her charismatic and engaging personality, storytelling skills, and 
networking skills to fuel her work.
Eddy's right-hand woman, Sile, was the Assistant Director of FAA. Also with a long 
history of involvement with, and strong links to the Faith Church, Sile's focus was 
particularly on connecting with the network and the church. Site had made 
significant sacrifices for this job, she had moved interstate, leaving two of her three 
(young adult) children in her home town in order to work in this role, hier decision 
to do so was profoundly influenced by her connection to Eddy's values and vision 
for the organisation, network and church. She also worked on the network's 
branding project, seeking to bring together the various brands associated with the 
Faith Church's different service delivery agencies in the various states and 
territories. For Sile, the work of FAA was centred around its foundations in the 
church, providing "a national focus for Faith Church's community services work... 
relating to the Christian witness of being with the people who are the most 
disadvantaged'' [Sile].
The National Communications and Government Liaison Director, Gail, had also 
made significant sacrifice, in this instance financially, to work at Faith Aid after 
transferring from a Senior Executive Position in the Public Service. While Gail did 
not consider herself a "person of faith" she joked that she was destined to spend
much of her working life working in faith-based organisations. She had already
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spent significant parts of her career in the non-profit service delivery sector. She 
described FAA as providing "a home to the work of individual agencies in the 
network... a link to a national focus and back to other agencies... around 
professional support... but also being the part that enables the network to be 
greater than the sum of its parts... it's not just an individual seeking their emergency 
relief on a Saturday morning, but there is a place fo r that to be taken to policy and 
advocacy" [Gail].
Snapshot
The work of the office covered a range of activities. When interacting with 
governments, FAA generally concentrated its efforts on the federal government. 
FAA staff met with parliamentarians from a variety of parties, government workers, 
church leaders, service providers and other peak organisations -  across the country 
-during the period of fieldwork. The organisation also had a demonstrated history 
of making submissions and providing evidence at various government inquiries. 
Their work was informed by regular contact with, and visits to the service providers 
and Church representatives across the network, as well as a series of industry- 
specific network advisory committees, who met or teleconferenced regularly.
Faith Aid Australia, at the time of my fieldwork, was based in a centrally located 
shared community facility alongside a range of other community and non-profit 
organisations in a capital city on the eastern seaboard of Australia. There was a 
long-term plan to co-locate FAA with other Faith Church bodies at a different 
location and a medium term plan for FAA to relocate to a larger premises to
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accommodate more workers. The mood in the office was one of casual and 
collegiate fun and frivolity -  the office members regularly joked with each other 
and demonstrated the trademarks of women who not only worked, but also 
socialised together. However, despite the air of casual frivolity, Eddy, Gail and Sile 
conducted themselves with professionalism when necessary. People's attire was 
typically smart casual, with suits worn only on days when there were meetings or 
visits to parliament (Eddy had what she called her "emergency" suit hanging by the 
door in case of a last minute call into an important meeting).
As discussed in Chapter 3, life for me in the FAA office generally focused on the 
position paper work I was preparing (the "participant" side of my participant- 
observation), punctuated with my attendance alongside Eddy, Sile or Gail at a series 
of significant events. The significant events I attended included the two-day twice- 
yearly governance committee meeting, quarterly "advisory committee" meetings 
with two different groups of Faith Aid network providers, an "advocacy alliance 
day" at Parliament House, and budget night at Parliament House (described below). 
The parliamentary forum described in Chapter 6 was also a significant event that 
occurred during my fieldwork at FAA. Preparation work for these events formed a 
fair proportion of the general, day-to-day work that occurred in the office. Other 
day to day work, some of which I observed and some of which I did not, included 
things such as diary and work planning meetings, website planning meetings, brand 
development work, negotiating and securing future funding from the church and 
provider networks and "bushfire" work (dealing with conflict in the networks).
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First thing on any one morning, Gail might be at her desk streaming a news podcast 
from a website about a particularly topical issue, busily summarising and analysing 
this information to send around to a list of Faith Aid organisations w ith a registered 
interest in that topic. Sile might be scanning the newspapers for other relevant 
media that has an impact on their work. Eddy might well be travelling or at a 
meeting w ith a member of the Faith Aid network or one of a range of advocacy 
coalitions. Phone calls coming into the office could be from a diverse range of 
inquirers. For example, one morning I took a call from a retired Faith Church 
minister from Tasmania who seemed to know Eddy, making inquiries about the size 
and scope of the network. On another day I took a call from a woman inquiring 
about the availability of places in Faith Aid nursing homes in her area.
One key event -  budget night
The following edited transcription from my fieldwork journal describes my 
experience tagging along with the FAA women at Parliament Flouse on the night the 
federal budget was announced in Parliament Flouse, Canberra.
We arrive at Parliament Flouse at four in the afternoon of budget night. The public 
car park is already full. Gail has some type of pass that allows her to park in a 
particular area where she thinks there might still be car parks available. All the 
different types of parliamentary passes seem to me a funny kind of status symbol 
of insider and outsider-ness. As I wait in the Parliament Flouse foyer for Gail to 
park the car and meet me, I see Eddy, who comes across to chat to me. I 
complement her on her appearance and she jokingly tells me she is terrified of 
being fried by the media later that night. I must admit, she looks unusually 
nervous, maybe more so than I've ever seen her.
Eddy tells me she's just received a call from one of the departments about a 
"secret" meeting she's been invited to that was scheduled to occur after the 
"lockup". She is considering delegating attendance at that to Sile and Gail because 
she wants to remain present at Parliament Flouse for the entire night, and this 
meeting will be held on site at the department itself. Sile and Gail arrive, we meet 
a parliamentarian's staffer, who greets us warmly, despite having never met some
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of us before, demonstrating we're “ insiders" enough to warrant being issued with 
an unaccompanied pass. To have an unaccompanied pass is important as it allows 
us all relatively free movement within Parliament House for the evening.
At 4.30pm an advocacy coalition that Faith Aid is a part of consisting of provider 
and consumer representatives meets at the public cafe to share “ intelligence" and 
arrange logistics. There were about 20 people huddled around, 70% are middle 
aged men -  which I find unusual compared to my typical experience of being in a 
predominantly female dominated environment. Eddy sees the notes I'm taking, 
and pointing to my scribbles about the percentages of men and women present, 
she comments that having 30% women present is "good, usually there were more 
men than that -  this high level stuff's is seen as a man's world". The meeting starts 
with the words "we've got to be quick 'cos we have to go meet the PM soon, he 
keeps changing the time he'll meet with us". There's a lot of discussion pre­
empting what they think will be announced. Not for the last time, I am reminded 
of students gathering before a big exam, trying to guess what the questions will be 
about in order to target their preparation appropriately.
There's a buzz in the air. Even though tonight is not a night when policy changes 
will be decided upon, or when deals will be brokered -  after all, the budget is 
already prepared and ready for announcement -  there is still an air of anticipation. 
Many have travelled from interstate for this day. i can only assume we are all here 
to demonstrate our presence and for networking and intelligence opportunities. 
Indeed, as the night unfolds, there is a sense that a core group of familiar faces are 
checking out who's here -  who's making hushed plans at Aussie's cafe, who 
appears to be in the know, who has the most accurate intelligence and who looks 
the busiest? I recognise personalities from think tanks, advocacy groups and 
coalitions. Everywhere I go, and every person I speak with looks at the FAA badge I 
am wearing -  I feel it is as if to check what part in this strange dance I am expected 
to fulfil and particularly whether I am to be trusted. At times it feels like a high 
school formal, with attendees checking each other out, watching how they dance 
and who they're dancing with. Coincidentally, this high-school-formal ambience is 
enhanced particularly by the occasional presence of a man in a tuxedo or a woman 
in a formal dress -  there is a gala event occurring somewhere in Parliament House.
At 5.00pm, our FAA group move to Aussie's Cafe where we plan our moves for the 
evening. We negotiate who will attend the small select meeting at the 
department, who will attend various department lock-ins, and who'll stay at 
Parliament House. We need to be quite flexible to fit in with the changing 
arrangements of the evening and fact we are only a small group. I then go to an 
advocacy coalition meeting in the staff dining room to hear how things went in 
their meeting with the Prime Minister and his staffers -  we gather around to hear 
the latest intelligence about what will be announced. The coalition group tell us 
what they believe will be the broad topics that will feature in the budget, and seek 
people with expertise in these areas to assist them with responses.
I pick up some take-away food and go wait at "base camp" -  a parliamentarian has 
offered us space in their office for the evening. I try and sit in a part of the office 
where I'm out of anyone's way. While they all appear to be busy, it's surprisingly 
calm inside the office, not at all like the frantic feeling in the corridors. Gradually, 
more and more people -  I am not sure who they are -  begin to congregate in the 
office. At 7.20pm, ten minutes before the budget speech begins, two people from
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the office go to collect the budget papers. When they arrive back, only a few 
minutes later, everyone drops what they're doing and immediately starts reading 
them. With notepads in hand and budget papers on laps, at 7.30pm we turn the 
TV onto the internal parliamentary station and sit down to watch the budget 
speech. Everyone, including the parliamentarian, is calmly taking down notes 
about what is said by the treasurer. I must admit, as we sit on the couch watching 
the budget handed down on the TV, I feel a bit like I'm in a geek's version of 
backstage a rock concert, or in the coach's box at a football game. I'm very excited 
but am trying not to show it. Everyone else seems so cool, calm and collected -  I 
feel so naive. By the time the speech is over everyone in the office is hard at work 
analysing the mountain of papers for issues of interest to the parliamentarian.
Benefitting from the freedom of my unaccompanied pass, I go to the press gallery 
corridor to watch people "doing the boxes". I see Eddy, who's practicing her four- 
line "sound byte" over and over again before she says her piece in front of the 
cameras. When she gets up to make her statement, I take some quick photos of 
her surrounded by hundreds of microphones. The next day, everyone loves the 
grandeur of this photo, and it is used prominently in the FAA newsletter. Eddy 
seems to be very busy talking with a range of people, many of whom I don't know, 
it feels like the pinnacle of the night's buzz is right now.
At 8.3Upm I go down to the staff dining room and we all regroup -  the FAA women 
are back from their various meetings and lock-ups. We debrief about what had 
been happening: I ran through what was said in the Treasurer's speech and they 
told me about the lockup and the "secret meeting". The lockup included about 170 
people from the industry including about 15 people from the department -  the 
sector and departmental people are carefully labelled with white and green name 
tags. Each Deputy Secretary gave a speech about their measures. There was time 
for only a couple of questions before everyone wanted to leave in order to be able 
to read through the information provided. The "secret" meeting consisted of 
about 10 people, including a couple of the departmental deputy secretaries. At 
this meeting the department covered information in quite a bit of detail that was 
particularly relevant to one part of the Faith Aid network.
From soon after 9pm we go back to "base camp" and prepare media releases for 
the network and the press. We went through the budget papers to find the detail 
of the measures announced in order to develop responses. The media releases 
include completing a series of templates pre-prepared for the purpose. By about 
11.40pm we have finalised these press releases and we email them on to the 
media contacts. Although to our disappointment, we discover that the parliament 
media office had closed at 11.30pm. This means that our press releases would not 
be "boxed" until the next morning. We finish for the day leaving Parliament Flouse 
just before midnight. Gail mentions a few parties she's heard of -  hosted by the 
various political parties. However, we decide not to go to these because of the 
importance of being seen to be non-partisan.
All in all, FAA was an organisation seeking to establish itself as a national player in 
social policy advocacy. Developed from an identified need in the network for a
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space in which national issues were considered, it was in an unusual situation: FAA 
had been established much more recently than many of its church and provider 
counterparts and yet it inhabited a prominent position. It aimed to bring together a 
previously disparate network consisting of some already high-profile state based 
organisations, yet its status and legitimacy in its own right were still emerging. 
Eddy and her team attempted to deal with this by seeking to "score goals", 
presenting a flexible, responsive, high level and professional profile to those outside 
the office, maintaining a loyal and committed, jovial and tight-knit group on the 
inside. Eddy's leadership was visionary, ideological and charismatic, with a strong 
focus on faith, networking and building alliances. Gail and Sile both saw Eddy 
clearly as the leader of the organisation, with their work dovetailing each other's 
and complementing hers.
Difficulties faced by FAA were to do with expectations that it be everything to 
everyone with very limited resources and a desire to sustainably secure these 
resources from a wide and disparate group of organisations. There was also the 
potential for tension between the goals of FAA to represent "poor and 
marginalised" with representing its network of service providers. The identity of 
the provider network as a network was evolving and organisations involved were 
incredibly diverse -  thus, there was varied buy-in to FAA's work. Both the 
advantages and disadvantages of FAA's existence within the Faith Church were 
evident -  with the hindering effects of any large institution's history and 
bureaucracy but the benefits of its established and strong voice.
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4.3 The Provincevale Community Centre
Within a three hour drive of its nearest capital city is Provincevale, a small regional 
town with a population of 13,000. Provincevale serves as a service hub for the 
surrounding areas with a hospital, mental health facilities, Centrelink and Medicare 
offices, banks, post offices, state government and local council offices all located in 
its small town centre. In many ways, at the time of my fieldwork, Provincevale was 
a booming town and was experiencing growth and population increase. However, 
it also experienced high levels of disadvantage. In particular, features of the 
surrounding area included higher than average levels of unemployment, single 
parent families, people with disabilities, families living on benefits and high levels of 
domestic violence protection orders and child protection notifications. So while 
Provincevale was a thriving town in a growing region, it had also a darker 
underbelly of disadvantage and need, with many disaffected community members 
requiring support.
In the central area of Provincevale was the Provincevale Community Centre (PCC). 
The PCC was an organisation established in 1980 by a group of community 
volunteers, which had been receiving state government funding since 1987. At the 
time of my fieldwork, the PCC was a small non-profit organisation with an annual 
turnover of less than $500,000, with 70% of this income coming from government 
funding for program delivery. Of the PCC's expenditure that year, around 70% went 
towards "staff costs" (wages, consultant fees, superannuation, salary sacrifice, 
worker's compensation and holiday pay). These two figures are both slightly higher 
than the average income and expenditure amounts reported by the Australian
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Bureau of Statistics, which suggests that on average, 55% of a non-profit social 
service organisation income is from government sources and 62% is spent on labour 
costs (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009).
Between 40 and 50 volunteers and students were involved in the work of the 
centre as well as 12 paid part-time workers (11 of whom were women) filling the 
equivalent of 6 full-time positions. Most of the positions were not permanent and 
none were permanent beyond the scope of any service and funding agreement -  of 
which the longest was three years. Most of the staff at the PCC had been working 
in the community or health sectors for a majority of their careers and were earning 
full-time equivalent incomes of less than $60,000. The number of people recorded 
as visiting the centre between November 2006 and September 2007 -  to attend 
programs, meetings or dropping in, including visitors for the numerous events and 
groups run out of the centre -  averaged at over 1,000 per month.
The PCC had five service agreements with three state and federal government 
departments to provide early intervention parenting support programs as well as 
community services and development projects for a range of people, including 
people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. Priding itself on being 
a "generalist" service provider, the PCC advertised its activities through 
photocopied pamphlets and a newsletter available at the centre -  the PCC had no 
website although its contact details could be found on a couple of "community 
access" websites. These services and activities included, but were not limited to: 
information and referral; a social issues library; a parenting support program;
playgroups; community development projects; a multicultural community program;
Page I 100
Chapter 4:An in troduction  to the cases
community education and workshops; micro-finance and financial skills assistance; 
mental health support; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander support and education; 
a savings and loans circle for people on fixed low incomes as well as events for 
volunteer week, seniors week, NAIDOC week, international women's day and 
harmony day -  typically facilitated by PCC workers and run by target group 
volunteers aiming to build their skills, confidence and social networking.
In addition to the projects and programs for which the PCC was directly responsible, 
its grounds and meeting rooms were used by more than 66 external groups to 
conduct activities ranging from domestic violence counselling to yoga classes and 
from narcotics anonymous meetings to Ramadan celebrations. The income (and 
"management fees") derived from these room rentals provided 25% of the PCC's 
annual income at the time of my fieldwork there. The PCC was also involved in a 
number of other initiatives. For example, it was part of a non-trading co-operative 
with other similar non-profit organisations and partnered with a state peak body in 
a project implementing the state government's uniform baseline procedural 
standards for all community service organisations.
The PCC described its mission as "building community by working together" and its 
activities as " inspired by a vision in which people experience healthy relationships 
and create sustainable communities that are safe and just... working with 
community members (individuals, families and groups) to assist in establishing and 
strengthening their formal and informal sources of support within the community". 
The underlying values and principles were: community involvement; working for
reconciliation; celebrating cultural diversity; connecting and belonging;
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empowerment; development; mutual partnerships; knowledge, education and 
training; responsiveness; transparency and accountability; pro-activity; 
sustainability; and social justice. Its goals included to develop and deliver programs 
which addressed the needs of the community using an action research process and 
to sustain a vibrant, dynamic, quality community organisation.
PCC was governed by a management committee consisting of seven people and had 
about 30 members -  a mixture of individuals and organisations. The management 
committee met every second month, meeting once during the fieldwork period, 
with sub-committee and working group meetings held in between each 
management committee meeting. Some members of the management committee 
were also in regular attendance at the centre, performing various tasks such as 
signing cheques, assisting with preparation for the annual audit and supporting the 
management of financial systems, representing the centre to visiting guests, and 
even working as the paid cleaner of the centre. The management committee of the 
PCC delegated responsibility to the coordinator for the initiation or preparation of 
tenders or funding applications and were not clearly engaged in leadership, 
lobbying or fundraising for the PCC. Instead, their role appeared to be supporting 
the work of the organisation with their professional expertise or enthusiastic 
encouragement when necessary. The PCC was involved in a number of coalitions 
and networks. During the period of observation, the relationship with government 
-  as observed through the interactions between the non-profit and government -  
included telephone conversations, visits by public servants and politicians to the 
PCC, and report submission.
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Key character
Unlike the fieldwork experiences at FAA or Robwood, fieldwork observation at the 
PCC primarily focused on one key informant, Kelly. 14 Kelly was the part time 
"coordinator" and senior community worker at the PCC and had been working 
there for seven years at the time of my fieldwork there. The position at the PCC 
had been Kelly's first job after she'd finished her social work degree, where she 
studied as a mature age student. Kelly spent her early career working primarily in 
the community sector. Kelly planned to resign from the PCC within six months of 
fieldwork commencing, to begin her own PhD research about a particular style of 
community development practice.
Kelly -  a feisty and lively woman in her early forties -  described herself as "a bit go 
getter-ish" with "a lot of energy" who was "driven and a workaholic." She felt this 
complemented the PCC's status as having "a little bit of a leadership role in the 
sector", doing more than "just what's adequate". For Kelly, her role as the 
"coordinator" of PCC was about "taking responsibility" for the organisation. 
Despite her passion, or possibly because of it, Kelly described herself as tired of 
working at the PCC, particularly of spending her weekends doing PCC work, but she 
was also very anxious about leaving -  "it's like a family". Others in the organisation 
saw Kelly as an inspirational leader, passionately committed to her style of 
professional practice.
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Snapshot
At the time of my fieldwork there, the PCC was housed in a typical, big, old- 
fashioned building in the style of those in the neighbourhood with bright 
indigenous-designed murals painted on its letterbox and fence, giving it a 
welcoming and grassroots feel. When you entered the front door of the centre, the 
walls were covered in pamphlets and posters advertising community events and 
programs, with slogans from social justice campaigns abounding. The "front line" 
worker sat at a desk in an office shared with three others, including myself. Her 
desk was at the open reception window and she fielded the broad range of 
enquiries from people that entered from the street. For example, one morning, a 
middle-aged man came to the front desk inquiring about a work-for-the-dole form 
to sign and we directed him to someone who could help him. Later that afternoon 
a pregnant woman walked in from the street, she'd been shopping in town when 
she started to have contractions so she'd come to the centre asking them to call a 
friend to come and collect her!
The feel at the centre was one of a warm and inclusive community -  on any day you 
might find a local housing cooperative hosting their annual general meeting in the 
meeting rooms at the back of the centre, a local group of people with mental illness 
preparing food to share in the community kitchen, or a group of women with 
culturally and linguistically diverse background preparing goods or a grant 
application for an upcoming festival. Many of the workers in the centre spent their 
time both based in the building and out in the community, and a whiteboard in the 
main office kept track of where everyone was at any time. On the tea room
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refrigerator at the PCC there was a photo of Kelly, Linda and the (now former) 
federal government minister responsible for the portfolio which funded one of the 
PCC's programs. Rather cheekily, one of the workers framed it with a piece of 
paper that said: “Wanted, Reward $20,000“ .
A day in the life
A typical day in the life, shadowing Kelly, involved following her from one meeting 
to the next -  often with long drives between each meeting. The following narrative 
describes one such day:
Kelly and I meet at the PCC in the morning before heading off to her first meeting 
for the day. She gets me to drive because she's still working on her laptop 
preparing for her presentation as we go. She's been asked by the coordinator of 
the Multicultural Community Worker Program network (which Noni -  another of 
PCC staff members is a part of) to present about community work, to help the 
network "get a common language, a common understanding of community 
development work". In the car on the way to the meeting, Kelly gives us a rundown 
about the history of this particular funding program and this associated network, 
or, as she describes it: "the dirt... there's always dirt..."
“Originally this program started out funding only a few workers across the state -  
but recently it expanded and took on another 20 or so workers. This expansion led 
to tensions about the model of professional practice being employed by the 
different workers. The problem is that the department is funding a style of 
professional practice without realising or understanding what that means... so 
there's been a struggle for us because some of the goals included in the reports 
that Noni has to fill in don't relate to the work she's doing -  and these goals keep 
shifting and changing, it's moving from one style of practice to another style of 
practice -  it's quite a problem... When ! was preparing the original application you 
had to follow the departments' guidelines.... but the aims are broad enough that 
you could put your kind of stamp on it, which is really very good... you find with this 
community work type funding, because governments don't really understand the 
work, they make quite broad goals and performance measures [laughing], and 
that's sort of good fo r us... because then we can just sort of mould that to what we 
think are the local needs..."
"So now the reporting isn't in line with what we said we'd do in the original 
application, instead the reporting is in line with what they want to see... and there is 
no process fo r Noni to report on the things she does in her reporting mechanism. So 
she's had to kind of make it up in a sense. We made that decision early on that she 
would still report on it, the stuff she does that isn't included in their criteria... she 
was anxious because there's a whole section on advocacy reporting and she doesn't
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really do that, so she only gives minimal reports in that section, about the things 
she does that could be interpreted as advocacy... so we'll see, I said 'we'll just write 
bits and pieces of what you do, don't worry too much'..."
"And, anyway, there's no formal MOUs between PCC and the rest of the people in 
the network or the others who are funded by this program, so there's no actual 
obligation for Noni to even take part in the network, although she does, because 
it's good to share the support with the others. Even the network coordinator, his 
organisation have no formal MOU with PCC as part of the funding agreement, so 
he'd better watch his p's and q's because he can't tell Noni what to do -  we are her 
employer and we say what she'll do..."
We arrive at the meeting venue and Kelly gives her presentation. It is late by the 
time she starts and so it is cut short -  with Kelly covering only a fraction of what 
she'd hoped to. I was disappointed and felt she didn't get the chance to address 
her core aims. I ask Kelly if she felt the multiple hours of preparation and driving 
were worth it to give that presentation for that length of time to that group of 
people? My question is plainly loaded, because / am wondering if it was worth it. I 
ask her how she decides about prioritising her work? She replies: "when I was at 
uni we were encouraged to spend quite some time considering our 'practice 
framework', and for me, one of the things which frames my work is an 'educative' 
practice framework -  I seek out opportunities to educate others. And, yeah, sure, 
there are different types of educational opportunities and that one back there 
probably wasn't the best..."
On our long journey to the next meeting, our conversation wanders from one topic 
to the next.
"We'll get the $1,000 grants... a lot of managers won’t... and it's probably as much 
effort to get a $3,000 as a $30,000 but the little ones give you a bit of creativity... 
and you can do so much good with two and a half grand..."
"With our board, I try and recruit people who either live in the area, or have some
kind of connection to the PCC in some way...... I think that's the better type of
committee but usually those people aren't very skilled, so I had to train them... to 
get them to think how they should be thinking and it's a very invidious position fo r 
me to be telling them how to think..."
"I'm the coordinator but I don't act in a hierarchical way, I don't make any decisions 
without consulting with everyone... because I've empowered my staff, we're all on 
the same page, we're all heading in the same direction and we know what we're all 
doing and it's all good..."
On the highway we stop at a bakery to buy a sticky bun to share at the meeting 
we're heading towards, which we reach 90 minutes later. The group is a 
government initiative about developing good governance procedures for 
community organisations. It is held at another community centre. There are seven 
of us at the meeting, six women and one man. The attendees are all either 
organisation managers, leaders, board members or sole workers -  people 
responsible for their organisation's compliance with government standards. Today 
they are looking at an "exit policy" for staff and clients. The aim is that together 
they provide each other with peer support as they implement these standards.
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The members of the group are concerned that an "exit policy" is relevant only for a 
specific style of service delivery, and to many it does not seem appropriate for their 
style of work. How do you implement a policy about "client exit" when your work 
with homeless people is typically once off? They talk about the "stupid" and 
"frustrating" data collection forms they have to fill in for the government, and how 
"when you ask a vulnerable and homeless person if they're from a culturally and 
linguistically diverse background, they just look at you like you're weird." When 
the meeting starts to get bogged down in these definitions, Kelly recommends they 
avoid getting "trapped in the words of these things" and they should "try and get 
back to the essence of it".
The board member present has placed plastic post-it marker tabs throughout the 
manual denoting the different sections. Some of the group members marvels at 
the thought of having a budget for buying that kind of "plush" stationery. I am 
reminded of this later on in my fieldwork when, at the request of the staff, I 
present the PCC with a paper cutting guillotine as a farewell and thank you present 
for welcoming me during my fieldwork. I find this small detail intriguing, especially 
in the knowledge that according to the annual report, the PCC had an operating 
surplus of $60,000 the previous year, surely enough to buy a replacement guillotine 
or other types of "plush" stationery. However, I remember what it is like to work in 
an organisation with a strong cultural commitment to frugal spending practices 
from my days working as a community occupational therapist.
At 2.30pm the meeting is brought to an abrupt close when one of the group 
remembers she has to go to another appointment. They book a time for the next 
meeting. We discuss how it is a lot of work required to meet these requirements -  
it takes hours and hours of time "out of your service delivery" just for the $7,000 
they are given for it. One group member wearily comments: Does it make a better 
service -  all this checking? Faced with the imminent challenges of organisational 
memory loss in the wake of her upcoming departure from the PCC, Kelly contests 
this, saying that "well, if  a good longstanding worker leaves, everything leaves with 
them"
Kelly then drives us back to the PCC. We debrief from the meeting and discuss a 
variety of issues, like the way she feels government turns a "blind eye" to some of 
the things that happen in the sector. When we return to the centre we set up for a 
long afternoon preparing for the PCC's annual accountability meeting with the 
department. This involves completing a 25 page pro-forma report, which is 
approached with a chorus of groans. There is some confusion about to what part 
of the organisation this report relates. Its focus is on the procedural and 
governance aspects of the organisation -  although Kelly believes it only applies to 
just one of the several programs that run from the PCC.
"We've been told that you only have to fill this in about programs that are greater 
than $50,000. Well, I haven't heard that officially, but I did hear it on the 
grapevine, and I don't expect to be hearing things officially from them at the 
moment anyway, because they had such trouble filling the position, we've hardly 
been hearing anything from them."
The process is therefore complicated by the fact that the program which this report 
is related to makes up less than 20% of the funded activities at the organisation, 
yet the questions often relate to the activities of the organisation as a whole.
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There are numerous requests in the report to supply supporting documentation, 
which causes Kelly a fair bit of stress -  "we'll run off the whole frigging insurance 
policy and all the frigging board of management minutes... do we have to submit a 
hard copy or an electronic copy? Last year it was just an electronic copy but this 
year I don't know... We've never been asked for this level of detail before. We've 
only ever been asked for an index for our policies and procedures manual before -  
not the actual policies themselves." The preparation for this report continues for 
the remainder of the afternoon and into the evening. I am exhausted by the time 
the day is over. Kelly and I are the last to leave the building for the day at 6pm.
The actual meeting between the government representative and Kelly about this 
report occurs after my fieldwork period at the PCC. Kelly agrees to discuss it with 
me on the phone, so the day after the meeting happened, I telephone Kelly to talk 
with her about it. "Our new government officer, she's taking a different approach 
compared to previous annual reviews. She's a dot-the-i, cross-the-t sort of person, 
so there was a lot more checking up, if  you know what I mean... it fe lt like an audit; 
'show me this, show me that' and there was a lot of me getting up and going and 
getting things and bringing them to be viewed. So that was different, I've never 
had that before... I guess... that's the way things will go in the future, so that was 
interesting... it's another example of the ramping up of the bureaucratic approach 
that government now does with us... and she said that they will come every quarter 
and check on things... it will be interesting to see if they stick to it given in the past 
they've said they'll do things and they don't do them."
"They also said that we should have had the meeting in the evening so that 
someone from the committee could have been there... that's very different 
expectations to what were there in the past.... it fe lt like the whole new world order 
thing... no one said can we make sure someone from the committee is there... no 
one said that prior to the meeting, it's just then when you don't do it and they say 
'oh, why isn't there someone from your committee here?' ...Whereas before I would 
just email the document in and I didn't get any feedback at all, no feedback, no 
visit, no nothing... zero."
"Do you remember there was a question on that thing, about 'the organisation has 
a copy of the service agreement'? ...I thought it was such a ridiculous thing, and so I 
just ignored it, I thought it was absurd, and she pointed that out, she said "you 
haven't responded to this" and I said 7 thought you were joking, what do you 
mean... of course we have a copy of it ' and she said 'yeah, but lots of organisations 
doesn't even know where they are, and they haven't read them and they don't 
know what the contractual agreement is with the department', so that's the level of 
some people they're working with, so you know, fa ir enough."
"I thought 'I've got to get to know this new player and give them what they want.' 
Although I'm not really sure what they want, but anyway it'll be all right... With this, 
it feels like every different personality will do something slightly differently... it's all 
dependent on the personality of the bureaucrat... So that's why I'm saying I just 
have to get to know this person... 'cos that's the way she wants it done... Just after 
my meeting with this bureaucrat, I went to another meeting where I saw a 
colleague and friend of mine. He has his meeting with this same government 
worker next week, and I warned him, I said to be prepared, this will be a different 
process to what we have had before and what you have experienced before. So it
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will be interesting to see what others think, when word gets out, when a few of us 
have done it."
All in all, the PCC was an example of a classic grassroots community based multi­
function organisation. It sought and claimed to be of the community, was 
supported by a number of volunteers, and its location, appearance and reputation 
mean that you can never be sure who will walk through the door and present 
themselves seeking support or assistance. There was structure in the PCC's staffing 
system in as much as the workers all knew Kelly was the boss and they deferred to 
her with any questions or problems. However, as she states, Kelly actively sought 
to co-ordinate the centre and its workers in a collaborative and consensus-reaching 
manner, and there was no shortage of workers providing input into the direction of 
their own work and the work of the organisation. The difficulties for the PCC were 
archetypal for such an organisation. Such difficulties consisted of an experience of 
under-resourcing by the over-stretched part time workers and volunteers, lurching 
from one funding grant to the next supported by an enthusiastic but time-poor and 
under-skilled voluntary management committee.
Like that of Eddy at FAA, Kelly's leadership of the PCC was also visionary and 
ideological. Unlike FAA, however, the PCC was a small but well-established 
organisation in its area. Kelly's role was often focused on defending the trademark 
style of professional practice employed by the workers at the centre -  through 
educating others about this style of practice and through forming cooperative 
relationships with other similar organisations. As an extension of this, Kelly was not 
afraid to voice her opinions, and was clear about other organisations, practices or
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actions that she felt were not acceptable. In this way, a strong feature of her 
leadership was in the defining of organisations, people and practices as similar or 
different to the PCC and its philosophies and practices.
4.4 Robwood
At the time of my fieldwork, Robwood was a large, faith based, multi-site 
organisation providing a range of services for about 2,000 children and families on 
any given day. Established about 100 years ago, Robwood had 650 staff, a budget 
of more than $40 million, of which around 80% was government funding, with an 
investment portfolio of more than $100 million earning an annual return of more 
than $6 million. At the time of fieldwork, Robwood ran more than 80 programs 
from 27 locations across the state, with its central office based in that state's capital 
city. Robwood held more than 120 contracts with 12 government departments. 
Funding provided via these agreements ranged from less than $500 to more than 
$4 million dollars per agreement, averaged at about $300,000 per agreement 
([Robwood], 2007b). Robwood's major expense was in staffing costs (60%).
The range of programs provided by Robwood included family and community 
centres, parenting support programs, supported play groups, education programs 
for parents and children, as well as youth programs, out-of-home care and intensive 
family support. In addition to its service delivery, Robwood also operated research, 
policy development and advocacy functions, with its vision, aim and purposes all 
revolving around making "o just and safe society fo r all children, young people and 
their families” ([Robwood], 2007a, p.l). According to its annual report for 2006/07,
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Robwood workers presented at a number of conferences, released numerous press 
releases and had "more than 20 meetings with politicians (State and Federal) and 
senior government officials" ([Robwood], 2007a, p.41).
At the time of my fieldwork there, Robwood was an extremely well resourced 
organisation -  as it stated in its strategic plan "we are... in the position of having a 
robust and financially viable organisation that is well placed to provide leadership, 
advocacy and direct services fo r children, young people and families across this 
area... We have positive relationships in many areas of policy and service delivery... 
and we have both the capacity and the reputation to grow our research and training 
and make our resources available to other agencies” ([Robwood], 2006, p.3). Key 
issues identified in Robwood's 2006/07 report included that it had increased its 
service outlets and expanded the number and content of its programs, it had 
engaged in a campaign for the rights of children, and it had engaged in research and 
had established a training institute.
The ten members on Robwood's board of management were all highly qualified, 
well connected, award winning, successful business and church-affiliated men (six) 
and women (four) -  from private industry, the non-government sector, the church, 
or in retirement. Their role was in guiding the strategic direction of Robwood, and 
maintaining a link between the organisation and the church. During the period of 
my fieldwork, while I did not get a sense that their role was to initiate or suggest 
new directions or projects for Robwood, they had a strong presence in the process 
of approving organisational directions or actions. Especially for contentious issues, 
I sensed that the workers in the organisation felt the "buck" stopped with the
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board. In this way, I formed the impression that they acted as a sort of invisible 
moral barometer, overseeing the position or directions recommended by the senior 
staff during difficult phases of organisation transition.
Key characters
Originally a Social Worker, Kaye, the CEO of Robwood, had extensive experience 
working in the human and community services -  both in government and in the 
non-government sectors. Having worked at Robwood for seven years, and 
approaching her retirement, Kaye had strong opinions about social justice, policy 
and service delivery and was a vocal participant in public debates around the issues 
in the sector. I imagine she would have proved a formidable foe, and I once heard 
her joke about having been "kicked out" of government minister's offices for 
voicing her strongly held opinions in the past. Kaye was involved in the state-based, 
sector-specific service provider peak body and was in direct contact with both state 
and federal politicians and bureaucrats.
Kaye's approval and direction were pivotal driving forces behind the senior 
workers' actions and decisions -  for example, these senior workers would report 
back to her immediately after controversial meetings, and would use her directives 
as their guiding light when navigating difficult or confusing territory. I observed 
Kaye taking on a variety of leadership roles. She was a talented facilitator, able to 
clarify complex and intertwined issues, and generate a consensus opinion from a 
group of otherwise adversarial participants. Kaye also demonstrated decisive and 
authoritative leadership at times, such as when unexpected events caused time
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pressures to mount considerably. As the CEO of Robwood, Kaye saw herself as 
having " the responsibility for both the outcomes for the service users with whom we 
work and the overall structure and sustainability of the organization" [Kaye]. Many 
others both inside and external to the organisation saw her as the visionary 
figurehead of Robwood -  she was well known and well respected in the sector and 
admired in the organisation for her astute skills in strategic leadership.
One of eight senior directors, Ronan had worked with Robwood for 13 years, 
spending most of his time in the organisation coordinating and managing a range of 
its regional and rural services. While normally an operational director, Ronan was 
"off line" during the period of fieldwork to oversee and coordinate a range of 
organisational development activities such as the preparation of funding 
submissions. Ronan was a frugal, cautious and pragmatic operator, with a careful 
eye for detail, who is described by others in the organisation as having 
"exceptional" skills in developing and forecasting budgets and navigating 
spreadsheets. Ronan was also well known for his work in the sector for these skills 
in costing and forecasting, which he had contributed to sector-wide initiatives to 
understand the real or true cost of service delivery.
Ronan was also a social worker and held a masters degree in health administration. 
He had worked in both the government and non-government sectors over the last 
30 years. Ronan was very passionate about the quality of service provided to the 
vulnerable target group supported by Robwood, and spoke emotively about this in 
extreme circumstances. However, Ronan's typical mode of operation was to use 
logic and reason to support his arguments for high quality service delivery.
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The four other characters to feature in the Robwood narratives are Sophia, Stan, 
Monty and Julie. Sophia features below in the snapshot depiction of Robwood. 
Stan, the Chief Financial Officer of Robwood, features in Chapter 6 (6.2). Julie, who 
features in Chapter 6 (6.3), was Robwood's senior manager responsible for 
government relations. Monty, usually one of the senior executive directors, was 
the acting CEO of Robwood during my final week there. Typically, Monty's job 
involved heading up a branch of Robwood that had up until recently been an 
independent organisation. Speaking from his perspective as both an outsider and 
insider, Monty had some fascinating reflections on the difference in his experience, 
formerly as the CEO of that organisation -  with no independent reserves of funding 
and one which operated in what renowned as a tightly contractually controlled 
environment -  and his observations of the way that Robwood operated.
Snapshot
During the period of my fieldwork, I visited seven of the 27 locations from which 
Robwood delivered and coordinated its services. These sites varied greatly 
depending on their function; from the grassroots and hospitable child- and family- 
friendly community centre to the foreboding, heritage listed head office, to the 
modern and slick service offices of the research, policy development and advocacy 
branch. Life at Robwood was in many ways like that in a large service-delivery 
bureaucracy, with protocols and proforma for various organisational procedures 
such as making funding applications, preparing internal income and expense 
reports or engaging with the media and there was a sophisticated intranet and 
Wide Area Network system for internal communication.
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There was a strong sense of hierarchy at Robwood, with multiple layers of 
management and the numerous centralised functions of head office, such as the 
human resources department, not always well received by the workers in the field. 
One amusing encounter I witnessed in the tea room of a regional office involved 
the half-in-jest fury of a service outlet coordinator, enraged by a directive given by 
the centralised communications and branding team to display a particular type of 
sign on the front of the community centre for children and families that she 
coordinated. This sign had a particular type and style of organisational logo on it -  
it was formal and official in its appearance. She felt the sign was "not welcoming" 
at all, was outraged that she be instructed to comply with such a directive, and 
planned to "decorate" it with child-like finger painting to make it more family- and 
child-friendly.
Despite such centre-periphery tensions (classic difficulties of any large 
organisation), there was a strong sense of collegiality and organisational identity 
amongst the workers I met during my fieldwork at Robwood. Many of these 
workers had been with Robwood for several years and passionately believed in the 
mission and values of the organisation. Practices of organisational culture building 
and reinforcement were strong, and the organisation's leader, Kaye, was very well 
respected and admired throughout the organisation. For example, I knew of at 
least one senior executive who had sought to work for Robwood specifically for the 
chance to work under Kaye's leadership. Even the more reserved workers I spoke 
with in passing admired Kaye's leadership and strength.
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The contract compliance process
It is difficult to find a representative example of a key event or a day in the life at 
Robwood, on account of the incredible diversity of experiences of the 650 staff in 
the organisation. The two key events I observed and traced throughout my 
fieldwork -  negotiating the EOI process and meeting the minister -  are given 
lengthy descriptions in Chapters 5 and 6. Below is a short narrative describing the 
work of Sophia, the Robwood administrator who is responsible for managing its 
many government contracts.
About a week into my fieldwork at Robwood, while attending a meeting with 
Ronan at one of Robwood's regional head quarters, I have a conversation with one 
of the senior managers about my research. She asks if I've seen examples of the 
contracts and service agreements they hold with the various departments. When I 
say "no", with her eyes rolling, she takes me to her PA's room which has three filing 
cabinets full of contracts. She starts to describe the very detailed process 
established by the administrative section at head office about how it all works, and 
giving up on this description, recommends that I go to see Sophia, the woman at 
central administration who coordinates it all.
I make a time with Sophia, the PA for Robwood's Chief Financial Officer, and when I 
arrive I'm struck by her office which is virtually filled with bookshelves containing 
coloured folders full of the contracts, service agreements and funding agreements 
that Robwood holds with various government departments. I reflect to Sophia how 
it's clear to see evidence of what I've heard about Kaye, the CEO's "growth agenda" 
-  it's obvious that there are considerably more folders full of contracts for the 
current year than for previous years and about twice as many as a few years ago.
Sophia has grouped the contracts according to the government department they're 
held with and then as a secondary grouping by the region they're in. Previously she 
just grouped the agreements according to the region but she'd changed it, finding 
it was more convenient for her to group the contacts according to department. 
This was in part because of the different reporting requirements from each 
department, but also an effective way of trouble-shooting any unexpected 
idiosyncrasies. For example, if she received a random and unexplained invoice in 
the mail from a department for particular amount of money, it was easier for her 
to identify what this invoice might be for if she had all the contracts for this 
department grouped together. She stated such idiosyncrasies or unexpected 
practices were not uncommon.
Sophia holds a register of all the contracts on eight interlinked excel spreadsheets, 
and is working on converting this database into a specialised database aiming for 
more efficient data entry and reports. "Now, if Kaye rings me up wanting to know 
how many programs we have from a particular funding stream, I can do that, but
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generating the reports is a cumbersome process and could be done far more 
efficiently" [Sophia].
Sophia uses this database every day -  new contracts are constantly coming in and 
there's always contract management work to be done. The contract management 
aspect of her position gets very busy particularly during the annual acquittal 
process -  which is about to begin -  because she has to coordinate that across the 
entire organisation. When she receives a copy of a new contract, Sophia reads 
through the contract and establishes a electronic file of compliance events for the 
program. Sophia then gives each director across the organisation a monthly 
prompt to check the register to see what reports are due and if necessary to then 
prompt the program managers about what's due. Some reports go straight from 
Sophia to the funder, others are left up to the program manager in the field. This 
delegation is streamlined and recorded on the register according to the 
requirements of the reporting.
Some departments provide funding for a range of programs in one payment, often 
grouped according to the location of the government office out of which they're 
regionally administered. Robwood then allocate this funding to the particular 
programs and managers according to formulas they've derived. Some programs 
have their own specific reporting templates while others are happy for generic 
income and expenditure reports to be submitted. There have been some reporting 
requirements where a compromise between the department and Robwood has 
been negotiated. For example, Ronan and the Chief Financial Officer recently 
negotiated for Robwood to supply just one full audited statement for the whole 
organisation to a particular government department, instead of several audit 
reports for each program funding stream within that department.
Typically contract reporting also requires a description of program activities, 
outcome reporting, a "certificate of currency", insurance details, and so on. Sophia 
has a list of the requirements for each funder, which she gives to the program 
manager to provide. As Sophia and I finish our discussion, I compliment her on 
organising such a thorough system for what appears to be a complicated and 
finicky process.
In summary, my picture of Robwood, developed from fieldwork spent mostly 
shadowing the senior executive team, was that of a very weil established 
organisation which sought to maintain a high level of quality service delivery to a 
vulnerable population about which it was passionate. The difficulties it faced often 
related to its size and the fact that within the last ten years it had changed from 
being an organisation in which "everyone knew everyone" to one currently where 
"you might walk past people in the corridor and not even know who they are"
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[Ronan]. Because of its independent revenue, it had always been able to provide 
what it saw as a high quality of service delivery (for example, by paying its staff 
above-award wages), even when this meant that it needed to "prop up" funding it 
received from government for these services. This independent revenue also 
meant it was able to initiate new and innovative service delivery programs as well 
as foster a strong and prominent research and policy arm -  two functions which 
took pride of place, next to the quality of its service delivery, in its organisational 
identity.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided an introduction to the three cases, with a description 
of the key characters and an outline, snapshot and narrative illustrating life at the 
organisation. The aim of this chapter has been to provide an overall feel for the 
different sites, providing a broad brush stroke backdrop to the subsequent chapters 
which describe in much greater detail the experiences of the workers in each 
organisation as they respond to pressures from government. This backdrop 
highlights in particular the similarities and differences between three different 
organisations.
In many ways, my experiences at each field site were vastly different. After all, the 
organisations themselves were different -  particularly in terms of their size and 
scope. Robwood was a large organisation, while both FAA and the PCC were much 
smaller. FAA did not provide direct services, while the PCC and Robwood both did. 
Robwood had by far been established for the longest period of time, with the PCC
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having been in operation for around two decades and FAA established more 
recently. The PCC had its focus solely on a local and discrete regional area, 
Robwood's tentacles reached far across the state while FAA sought to represent a 
national network and Australian people more generally. While I did not seek to 
select a "representative" sample, it was appropriate to select organisations that 
were structurally diverse, not only from a theoretical perspective, but also because 
this reflects the heterogeneous population of NPOs in Australia (Leiter, 2005).
However, there were similarities too. Both Robwood and the PCC provided some 
services for families with children. Each organisation was full of committed and 
passionate front line and senior workers. There was a strong sense of 
professionalism across each organisation, and a particularly strong commitment to 
particular forms of professional practice or a particular ideological basis from which 
professional practice stemmed. Each organisation aspired to be, or saw itself, as a 
leader, embodying a particular set of principles and values. In particular, this set of 
principles and values was one that firmly advocated for social policy and service 
delivery which appropriately and fully supported vulnerable and marginalised 
people -  often described by the participants generically using the words "social 
justice". Even though I saw little evidence of systematic, ongoing and direct input 
to service delivery or work prioritisation by those who received it, their voices rang 
clear in the ears of the workers I shadowed and were at the forefront of the drive 
underpinning their work.15 Such values -  and dilemmas about the congruity of 
organisational values and service user values -  are a common experience for NPOs 
(Nevile, 2009).
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The following chapters build on the organisational and character backdrop 
described here, as the stage is set for scenes to unfold. The narratives that happen 
next describe a range of key events from each organisation as the participants 
responded to pressures experienced from government. A theoretical lens for 
analysing and interpreting these narratives is proposed, applied and later built 
upon. Through doing so, the similarities and differences in the organisations 
involved in this study prove to serve an illuminating role on the experience of 
responding to pressures from governments.
13 Note: in accordance with my confidentiality agreements to ensure each case's anonymity, 
references to documents or websites affiliated with the cases are also de-identified.
14 Other people associated with the PCC are also mentioned during some of the narratives. Please 
note that all of these people are referred to by pseudonyms.
15 All three NPOs had occasional and ad hoc mechanisms for creating a space to hear the voices of 
their service users, and all were certainly keen to develop more systematised systems for this input. 
Robwood had recently begun conducting an annual event that focused on gathering the opinions of 
its services users. This event had great potential for directing service delivery into the future and 
was possibly already making a diffuse impact on the perspectives of its leaders. However, during the 
time of my fieldwork, despite the pride with which Robwood staff spoke of the event, I did not at 
any stage hear anyone specifically refer to its findings as they went about their work. Despite this, 
Robwood staff (as with the staff at FAA and the PCC) all demonstrated deep knowledge of the needs 
and strengths of their target populations. Unfortunately, it was not within the scope of this research 
to investigate specifically how the workers developed and added to this implicit knowledge base.
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COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES
5.1 Return to Oliver
The following four chapters analyse the data from this study using Oliver's (1991, 
p.145) framework and typology of organisational "strategic responses to 
institutional pressures". This framework was introduced, described and justified as 
a lens of analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. Oliver groups organisational responses into 
five categories, acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. 
She sees these strategies as existing on a continuum of least to most active and 
resistant -  where acquiescence is the strategy which is most passive and least 
resists institutional pressures, and manipulation is the most active and resistant. 
Data relating to acquiescence and compromise are presented in this chapter. 
Avoidance, defiance and manipulation are presented in Chapter 6. Oliver also 
predicts when an organisation will utilise one particular strategy in favour of 
another according to a range of ten predictive antecedents which are features of 
the institutional pressures themselves. Data is presented and analysed according to 
these predictive antecedents in Chapter 7. Additional themes arising from this 
research are explored in Chapters 8 and 9.
The purpose of presenting narratives here of acquiescence and compromise, and 
later of avoidance, defiance or manipulation is of course not to seek to "prove" the 
existence or otherwise that the participants and organisations in this study utilised
such responses. Seeking to prove such a finding would be more appropriately
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pursued through other methods. These narratives serve instead to illustrate the 
process by which such responses occur. In this way, my deep ethnographic 
exposure to the data allows for rich and "thick" descriptions about the interplay 
between the many factors involved in each narrative (Geertz, 1973). Narratives and 
examples which are used in the next four chapters have been specifically selected 
for their ability to shed particular and, at times, cumulative light on the 
phenomenon under investigation; introducing and building on analytical concepts 
as the exploration deepens.
Throughout the narratives, the focus of the study remains on the experience of the 
participants and their organisations primarily as they responded to pressures from 
"government". While Oliver (1991) and others recognise a broad range of 
directions from which institutional pressures may stem (Woodward & Marshall, 
2004), it was necessary to draw at least some boundaries around the phenomenon 
under investigation. As the primary focus of this study is the nexus between non- 
profits and governments, the findings reported below focus on this. The definition 
of "government" shared by the participants throughout the course of fieldwork 
included both its administrative and political arms.
5.2 Acquiescence
According to Oliver's framework, the strategy of "acquiescence" is used when an 
organisation simply and passively accedes to the institutional pressures placed on it 
through habit, imitation or compliance. Acquiescence via habit occurs when an 
organisation adheres automatically to "preconscious or taken-for-granted rules or
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values" (Oliver, 1991, p.152) such as to employ managers or administrators, to 
register with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) or to conduct their work ethically. 
Acquiescence via imitation "refers to either conscious or unconscious mimicry of 
institutional models, including, for example, the imitation of successful 
organizations" (Oliver, 1991, p.152). Acquiescence via compliance is where an 
organisation "consciously and strategically chooses to comply with institutional 
pressures in anticipation of specific self-serving benefits that may range from social 
support to resources or predictability" (Oliver, 1991, p.153).
Acquiescence, Oliver argues, will occur when:
• an organisation is likely to gain high levels of legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance;
• there is a small number of constituents or stakeholders on whom the 
organisation is highly dependent;
• the institutional pressures are consistent with the goals of the organisation 
and the level of constraint on organisation's discretion is low;
• there is a high level of legal coercion involved in exerting the pressures and 
these pressures are generally and diffusely accepted in the field; and
• both the levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness with other in the field 
are high.
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Instances of acquiescence in all three field sites in this study were easy to spot. The 
three organisations I observed all demonstrated all three forms of acquiescence at 
some stage in their work. They adhered to many taken for granted rules or values 
such as employing people to lead, administer and do the work of the organisation. 
They were all answerable to organisational governance structures (albeit, 
sometimes involving complex, church-related governance structures). Imitation 
could be observed, for example, in how the PCC drew extensively on generic 
governance and administrative policies and procedures, adapted from examples 
provided by various peak bodies on the internet. Imitation was also a feature 
underpinning Eddy's push for an expanded organisation; she would point towards 
her counterpart church national bodies with greater staffing levels as one of many 
strategies when arguing for similar conditions.
For Robwood, imitation played more of a role as a benchmark indicating if it was 
falling "behind the pack". Robwood did not appear to regularly imitate other 
agencies, viewing itself as a leader in the field. Flowever, when its performance or 
circumstances did not mirror that of its peers, this could initiate a strong 
organisational response. Compliance with specific institutional pressures exerted 
by "government" was also observed in all three agencies. For example: I observed 
how the PCC strictly complied with the ATO self-reporting requirements for a public 
benevolent institution (PBI); how Robwood complied with contract management 
practices; and how FAA were careful to demonstrate its compliant "we won't bite 
you" approach in parts of their relationship with government. Examples from FAA 
and the PCC are given below, along with my analysis of each.
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"We won't bite you" -  Eddy and FAA's response to a major government 
announcement
Much of what I observed and heard about at FAA was in relation to their role at the 
time as an intermediary between government and one part of the Faith Aid service 
delivery network. There had been significant ongoing interactions back and forth in 
the six to twelve months preceding my fieldwork there and a key communication 
forum between the provider network and government occurred during my 
fieldwork at FAA. In the lead up to this forum, Eddy described to me the 
background of these interactions:
"We'd had input into the development of social policy in this particular field for a 
number of years, and it intensified in the year leading up to a big government 
announcement about it. About eight months out from the announcement, the 
minister attended a meeting of our providers. The minister was seeking a broad 
position statement from us about what aspects of a possible future government 
initiatives could be tolerated, as well as a statement on the viability of such future 
possible initiatives."
"At that time, we spent some weeks preparing these statements. We could've 
decided not to... but we didn't. We decided to develop a national position, we did a 
whole lot of work on it... We did that because I thought it was important for our 
network to know it's own mind... for everybody to actually say 'here's where we 
stand,' so... that we could say... 'Minister you need to know this is the position of 
the network, this is the nationally determined position through our governance 
structures'... Basically it was... saying 'we won't bite you...' Because quite a number 
of years ago our church had made some strong public statements about a 
particular government proposal, and we believe that we still feel the ripples of 
damage done to the relationship with government at that time."
"So, the weekend that this big social policy initiative was announced I'd been away 
from mobile phone coverage with my family, and as we stopped on Sunday lunch 
time for a meal on the way home, I checked my phone. There was a message on it 
from the minister's chief of staff, who had called me late on Saturday to give me a 
rundown of the announcement the following day -  because you want to warm 
your stakeholders up when you put out something that big... I realise that there 
would have been other stakeholders who would have received calls about the 
announcement before us, it's all about where you f it  into the scheme of things... 
but I think terrific, because a few years ago we wouldn't have been on the calling 
list at all... So I called them back and was on the phone to them for about half an 
hour, while they provided me with the details of the announcement."
"I think you have to be flexible with this kind of work -  a colleague who sits on my 
governance committee will often say 'now, just slow down a minute Eddy,' and I'll
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say 'no I can't slow down, there's this thing that's just come out from government 
and if we don't ride the wave then we're stuck.' And because we've built up 
relationships of trust, they'll say fine', and they'll say 'are you sure you need to do it 
now?' And we'll say 'yes' or sometimes the answer's 'no' but sometimes if  it's fast, 
then you get signoff and you get people involved, so it's not just one of us... going in 
to a meeting or representing the network, but instead it has sign-off from a 
national network."
"So then I spent the rest of the car ride home describing the details of the 
announcement to some key stakeholders within the provider network while we 
figured out what the pitch of our media release response should be. A large part of 
why we put out a media release on that day was about wanting to keep a good 
relationship with government because if  you don't have access you don't have 
influence. But we were very clear what we would be looking for in the detail of the 
initiative and we were very measured... We were glad that what we put out first 
was quite tempered; we didn't have to do a back-flip later on, because we found 
some flaws in the announcement later on after looking at it in detail. That's why 
it's important to know who you are... it's very easy to be seduced into 'we're the 
government's best friend'... but when government's selling a policy, they want you 
for your support - and you have to remember where your loyalty is, which has got 
to be to Australian communities all the time..."
"So then over the next few weeks our people across the service provider network 
analysed the initiative in depth. We were able to operate as a conduit for 
information during that process, attending small invitation only and larger briefing 
meetings with government and passing that information on to our service provider 
network, as well as bringing people from across our network together to consider 
the initiative."
"I was laughing just the other day with another colleague from one of the provider 
organisations who helped us analyse the announcement at that time. She was 
saying 'oh, everyone in that organisation loves the way you guys work down here 
because we're always involved and you get us involved.' I laughed and expressed 
my sympathy to a couple of their senior staff members, 'cos there were several 
weekends there earlier this year where they worked with me almost all the day on 
Sunday, over the phone and email to crack the numbers, and I was so appreciative 
of it, and she said, 'no, they loved it, because they were feeding straight in to 
government through you guys' and it's such a quid pro quo because we couldn't've 
done what we did... without their knowledge. It was taking their knowledge and the 
knowledge of the other providers together, and that's why FAA has the access that 
it has and why we have the influence we have because people know it's not just me 
speaking, and that's why my busy schedule of constant travel around the country, 
meeting with the providers and the church representatives is really important so 
that I can maintain those relationships with people across the country in our 
network."
"So anyway, in the end, we figured out there were some ways the government 
initiative needed to be changed. But at that point you can't provide valuable policy 
input, it's done and dusted... all you can do is try to ameliorate some of the 
scratchiest edges... I think good policy input starts at as much of a 'green fields' as 
you can do in the real world... What are we trying to achieve? What's the purpose? 
Who's it for and how do we best achieve it? Given all the givens... the constraints...
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But we never got a chance as a sector to do that and I think that's literally and 
seriously a tragedy for Australia..."
This is an interesting example of FAA seeking to "put runs on the board" in their 
relationship with government through acquiescing -  within clear limits -  to the 
pressure from government to state their position and broadly support the 
government initiative. The key balancing point here appeared to be between the 
capacity for this acquiescent strategy to give the organisation what it needed, such 
as "runs on the board" and secondly the internal organisational desire to act with 
integrity and authenticity about "what could be tolerated". Here the FAA women 
needed to consider proactively using acquiescence as a tactic to meet 
organisational goals such as to increase the organisation's "access" and therefore 
its "influence", subsequently also increasing their legitimacy and future economic 
gain. This response also met the internal organisational goal to build a unified 
network voice, thus building the strength of the organisation as a representative of 
the network.
A counter-balance to this instrumentalism of acquiescence was the need to ensure 
that the content of what they were doing was consistent with the values of the 
organisation and network. In other words, FAA's tactical response pivoted around 
one that was "tempered" enough to maintain consistency with organisational goals, 
but acquiescent enough to comply fully with the institutional pressures from 
government. Here, the strength of the potential future benefits (including their 
perceived limited capacity to influence policy at that late stage) and the relative
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consistency between the announcement and network position ended up tipping 
the balance away from a more resistant strategy.
In terms of Oliver's (1991) framework, my interpretation of this episode is that the 
participants here believed acquiescence would lead to increased legitimacy and 
therefore economic gain. There was at least congruence, if not consistency 
between the institutional pressures and organisation goals. Only one stakeholder, 
government, was involved -  on whom the FAA was highly dependent for its 
legitimacy. All such factors led to an acquiescent response, in accordance with 
Oliver's predictions. There were high levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness. 
Eddy was only told of the details of the announcement the day before its release, 
and she knew FAA's response would be closely monitored by both government and 
provider and church networks. Therefore, as predicted by Oliver, these factors all 
combined to produce the "tempered” but still acquiescent response -  where their 
more resistant criticisms of the model came out only after detailed analysis. 
Acquiescence occurred despite the low and moderate levels of legal coercion and 
voluntary diffusion of norms, which Oliver suggested would lead to a more resistant 
response.
As far as the women at FAA were concerned, acquiescence was the response that 
would best meet their overarching organisational goal to gain future "access". As 
summarised by Eddy: "terrific, because a few years ago we wouldn't have been on 
the calling list at all". The constraint of working for "several weekends" was also 
ameliorated by the fact they felt they were "feeding straight in to government". In
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other words, despite the moderate levels of constraint, the participants' 
perspectives of the positive by-products made acquiescence worth it.
The low level of trust in the relationship and awareness of being "seduced" by 
government into being its "best friend " when it was "selling” its policy -  an 
interpretation Eddy made based on the history of her relationship with government 
-  seemed to be the key feature leading to a possible increased level of resistance. 
It was this factor, which sits outside the Oliver framework, that brought in a hint of 
compromise to a narrative otherwise all about acquiescence.
Overall, this narrative demonstrates that perhaps not all of Oliver's predictive 
antecedents carry equal weight in every circumstance. Here, Eddy's overarching 
goal to have access (and therefore influence) was arguably one of the strongest 
underpinning factors driving acquiescence. Instead of Oliver's predictions about 
factors drawing the response towards a more resistant one involving compromise 
rather than acquiescence with government's requests, it was the history and low 
trust of the relationship, a dynamic, negotiated and interpreted factor, rather than 
a static characteristic of the pressures themselves, which did so.
The PCC and its PBI tax status compliance
One of the first things Kelly mentions on my first day with her at the PCC is that:
"PCC is a small organisation, and so I feel like I have to be a lawyer and a tax officer, 
have a business degree -  for example dealing with the requirements of PBI, Public 
Benevolent Institution, tax exemption. You now have to do an annual review of 
your status to see if you're still compliant with the requirements -  which is a 
change from something that the government previously did for you. The PBI is 
important for us because it means the PCC is fringe benefit tax exempt and can 
offer its staff salary sacrificing, effectively meaning you can offer people a higher 
salary, which is important because it's so hard to get and keep good staff."
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"We've prepared a workshop about how to do a PBI self evaluation to share with 
some other organisations. Although, we don't really want to share it too widely, 
we're are keeping our cards close to our chest, because we don't want the heavy 
hand of the law coming down to scrutinise -  just in case we're not doing it right."
So, a few days later, I sit in on the PCC's workshop about how to self-assess if 
you're compliant with the PBI status. There are about ten people involved in the 
two hour workshop from four or five similar organisations, all of whom have close 
working relationships with the PCC and have been invited to attend. Winston (the 
assistant coordinator) and Kelly together describe to the group what it means to 
have PBI status, and how they ensure that PCC continues to be complaint with it:
"We did a time probe, where all the workers kept detailed records of how they 
spent all their time for a period of a week, to make sure that a majority of our work 
-  which we're assuming is at least 51% of what we spend our time on -  is about 
what the tax office calls directly alleviating poverty. We've also had a meeting 
about it with our office administrator to check that 51% of what happens overall in 
this building is about alleviating poverty."
The subsequent discussion initiated by the group members centres around the 
definitions of "alleviating poverty" to which Kelly responds:
"It's easy for a homeless shelter to determine if it is still eligible for PBI, it's clearly 
alleviating poverty but it's more difficult for our organisations to do so. The words 
included in the ATO definitions aren't even in line with our philosophy here... 
helping people who are "suffering", experiencing "helplessness" or "misfortune" -  
it's not very strengths based. It's difficult, because our model of practice, the 
whole point of our organisation, is that we do work that's indirect -  but this 
definition talks about organisations that directly work towards alleviating poverty -  
like where a client comes to you for food or shelter. I mean, we still work to 
alleviate poverty, but just not always in a direct way. It's difficult. So we’ve self 
evaluated and have found that we still do comply, but whether a tax person would 
also assess us as the same is unknown."
None of the other organisations represented in the room have any system in place 
for ongoing checking of their compliance with PBI status and one worker is amazed 
at the level of effort that the PCC have gone to in order to do this -  such a thing 
wasn't even on her "radar". She asks Kelly what prompted her to instigate this 
process. Kelly goes and gets a rather innocuous and standardised letter, kept on 
file from the ATO which describes their on-line annual reporting process. This 
online annual reporting process includes that you must tick a box stating your 
organisation is still complaint with its PBI status. Kelly wasn't sure exactly whether 
the PCC was still compliant, and so she developed this process to find out whether 
they could keep ticking this box. Some of the others present marvel at how they 
have ticked that box without considering its implications, assuming if they were 
compliant before, when they were originally awarded the status, then they'd still 
be compliant now. There is some discussion about how much effort should go into 
checking ongoing compliance, but Kelly is adamant:
"It's important because it can affect whether you decide to take on new programs 
or not, 'cos if you take on a big new program it might tip you over the edge of not 
complying with the PBI stuff. And we've heard of one organisation not so far away
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being audited by the Tax Office. I'm not sure if there are penalties if they find 
you've done something wrong -  I guess you could be asked to pay back the money 
that's involved in salary sacrificing back, although we haven't heard of anyone 
having to do that. If you at least can show something like due diligence of the 
management committee, then the person I spoke to at the Tax Office said you'd be 
less likely to ha\/e to pay back the salary sacrifice, but you'd just have your RBI 
status scrapped"
The discussion in the room turns to what kind of records need to be kept to prove 
this compliance: "What is due diligence anyway? Is it enough for us to just minute 
that we've noted that we're still complaint with the PBI regulations it in the 
management committee minutes or do you need to keep the full paper trail, where 
we demonstrate how we've figured this out? The other organisation I've heard of, 
the one who was checked by the ATO, they came out and went through the 
records."
Other discussion questions include: How do you measure the full activity of your 
organisation? By staff hours? By money spent? What about for the activities that 
occur in the centre's rented rooms but are run by people who are external to the 
centre? And how do you define people on the poverty line?
Kelly says: "It's difficult because we don't know for sure how the ATO wili actually 
do these reviews, and in all honesty the way they do it will probably vary with each 
auditor. I mean they'll probably just look at all this and say 'OK'. There aren't any 
guidelines from the ATO about this. I knew someone whose friend used to be an 
Australian Tax Office compliance officer -  and she said they would get a bonus if 
they found out things about the organisation that were wrong. It's not like before 
where it was very laid back. Now you have to be more and more like a business -  
you have to think like an ATO person when you write to the ATO. Although, it's a 
helpful process too, it helps to help keep in mind the core work of your 
organisation, it's good to reflect on what you're doing."
In this instance, at Kelly's initiative, the PCC is zealous in its compliance with the PBI 
tax status and this narrative demonstrates clearly how Oliver's predictive 
antecedents impact on Kelly's decision to acquiesce. In most ways, the "prediction 
profile" hypothesised by Oliver is identical to Kelly's interpretation of the PCC's 
situation. For Kelly, the two biggest reasons for her commitment to compliance are 
the penalties if they are found to be noncompliant and the uncertainty about if 
they'll be "audited". In other words, from Kelly's perspective, the PCC is likely to 
gain high levels of economic gain from acquiescence, and the environment is very 
uncertain.
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The importance of economic gain from compliance is especially pertinent when 
considering the PCC in relation to the other organisations in the workshop that day, 
in that the PBI status was very important to the PCC. One workshop participant 
represented an organisation which did not even have the PBI status yet, he had 
come to the meeting to learn more about PBI status, so PBI status compliance was 
irrelevant for him. Another participant in the workshop -  the one for whom such a 
process was not on her “ radar" -  was the only employee of a one-person 
organisation, possibly making the economic impact of non-compliance seem less 
significant to her. However, it is impossible for me to make definitive claims about 
this as I did not discuss the issue with any of the other workshop participants and I 
do not know whether these other participants implemented the process after 
attending the workshop.
The implications of the penalties if they were found to be noncompliant were 
heightened due to their effect on the PCC's capacity to offer their staff salary 
sacrificing, which makes them an employer with comparative advantage when 
recruiting and keeping staff. As is evident in her conversation about the potential 
to be audited, Kelly's uncertainty is heightened by the fact that her environment is 
highly interconnected and therefore she knows of another organisation which has 
been audited; because the requirements for self assessment have only recently 
been introduced and there are no guidelines for them; and because she does not 
know precisely what the consequences for non-compliance are. I do not know if 
the other people in the room also knew about the auditing of the nearby 
organisation, but it is interesting to see how Kelly's own interpretation about the
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likelihood of being audited based on experiences from her highly interconnected 
environment, comes through strongly as a theme causing her, in part, to push for 
this zealous compliance.
There was really only one constituent placing this pressure on the organisation, the 
ATO, and Kelly perceived the PCC to be highly dependent on them for their tax 
status and also that they had the "heavy hand of the law" behind them (in other 
words, there is a high level of Oliver's "coercion"). These pressures to comply are 
consistent with the organisation's goals, even though they are worded differently 
and have a different philosophical basis. Such consistency -  meaning also that Kelly 
can see how the PBI compliance checking process has positive side-effects as she 
takes to opportunity to reflect on the core business of the organisation -  helped to 
counteract the effects of the moderate level of constraint placed on the 
organisation in the process. There is only a very low level of diffused voluntary 
norms about complying with the PBI -  it is not widespread practice amongst Kelly's 
colleagues to be so vigilant. However, I believe the reason this does not affect the 
tactic of acquiescence here is that Kelly sees the PCC as a "bit of a leader" in the 
area and showing initiative like this is consistent with this role (especially 
considering that the PCC hosted the workshop describing the process to allied 
organisations). I further discuss and compare the role of each of Oliver's tactics 
across the three sites in Chapter 7.
One thing that is particularly fascinating about this narrative is the shared and 
dynamic experience of defining what it means to comply. The process of defining 
compliance and resistance is a theme that arises regularly at all field sites and
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across each organisational response. This narrative broadly supports Oliver's 
framework -  the antecedents generally, although not always align closely to those 
suggested by Oliver. This narrative also raises significant additional themes -  such 
as defining what it means to comply -  and begins to suggest leadership or initiative 
and personal experience as an explanation for when the factors do not fit.
5.3 Compromise
Because acquiescence is sometimes considered to be "unpalatable or unworkable" 
by organisational elites (Oliver, 1991, p.153), Oliver suggests that organisations 
compromise and "may attempt to balance, pacify or bargain with external 
constituents" (p.153). Oliver defines compromise as occurring in three ways -  
balancing, pacifying and bargaining. Balancing refers to when an organisation seeks 
to "achieve parity among or between multiple stakeholders and internal interests" 
(p.153); pacifying refers to when an organisation continues to do something 
considered undesirable while simultaneously seeking to pacify the sources that 
consider it undesirable; bargaining occurs when an organisation seeks "some 
concessions from an external constituent in its demands or expectations" (p.154).
Oliver predicts that compromise will occur when:
• an organisation is likely to gain low levels of legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance;
• there is a high number of constituents or stakeholders and the organisation 
is highly dependent on at least some of these constituents;
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• the institutional pressures are moderately consistent with the goals of the 
organisation and there is also a moderate level of constraint on 
organisation's discretion;
• there is a moderate level of legal coercion involved in exerting the pressures 
and these pressures are generally and diffusely accepted in the field; and
• both the levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness are high.
For Oliver, the big differences in this "prediction profile" compared to what was 
predicted to lead to an acquiescent response are that the amount of legitimacy and 
economic gain to be acquired from compliance are now low instead of high, and 
the number of stakeholders is now high instead of low. Smaller changes entail 
moderate instead of high or low levels of consistency, constraint and coercion. In 
other words, if, in 5.2 above the PCC did not believe they would potentially lose 
significant economic gain or legitimacy from complying with the PBI requirements, 
or if FAA had a great range of stakeholders with vastly differing opinions on how 
they should have responded to the announcement from government, then perhaps 
their responses may have been to compromise instead of acquiesce. However, 
unlike controlled experiments, this study reports on real life, where circumstances 
cannot be manipulated.
These real life experiences regularly threw up instances where the leaders I 
observed perceived the need for compromise. Overall at each site, the stage was 
well-set for compromise: all the participants were regularly required to balance the
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expectations of multiple stakeholders and internal interests, and these expectations 
were sometimes conflicting. At FAA, for example, Eddy was acutely aware of the 
balancing act required in following her organisational vision to advocate for poor 
and disadvantaged people with some pressures from the provider network to 
represent providers. At the PCC, Kelly needed to balance the organisation's 
"commitment to noncompetition" with her board's directive to seek funds to 
extend the PCC building when she discovered that a nearby organisation had 
already approached the local developer from whom she would have otherwise 
sought philanthropic support.
However, it was at Robwood that the experience of compromise shone through as 
a very strong theme in many of organisational responses to institutional pressures 
that I observed and was told about. One extended narrative was a particularly 
obvious example of such compromise -  the experience of Ronan negotiating a 
range of expressions of interest (EOls) submitted for a particular form of service 
delivery for children, young people and their families with the state department 
responsible for community services. This stream of events covering the full month 
of my fieldwork (and more) quickly became a strong focus of my observations at 
this field site and are described below.
Robwood's EOI negotiation
On my first day at Robwood, Ronan provides me with an extensive briefing and 
introduction to the sector as we travel to his first meeting for the day. He speaks 
rapidly and with obvious substantial knowledge and a long history of involvement 
with the sector:
"This type of service delivery has been in dire straits for a long time. In the last 
fifteen years there have been numerous parliamentary and committee inquiries,
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various commission, council and reference group reports, particularly criticising the 
department's way of running things and basically just saying how stuffed up it all 
is."
"More than a year ago, as a part of a large five year package, the state government 
announced a package of around $100 million of recurrent funding for this 
particular type of service delivery that we are experts in. An EOI -  expression of 
interest -  process was announced for this funding, and the department advertised 
it as being for a range of different things, like for the NGO sector to increase its 
capacity, to do new things, broaden innovative service delivery, provide different 
types of services and that sort of thing. It was a bit of a 'go for what you like' kind 
of thing. They didn't give any specifics about what they wanted, they just talked 
about the number of kids in each region that needed a service. It was really 
exciting -  it felt like there was a lot of potential and opportunity."
"We developed an organisational expansion plan for this funding, which included a 
really big set of bids, and we took it to the board -  it was essential, of course, to 
have the board onside. I described it as a once in a lifetime opportunity, with the 
funding a good f it  with the core business of Robwood, that it was ethical and likely 
to be in the best interests of the kids we work with. My presentation to the board 
also highlighted that if we were successful on these bids, the level of government 
funding of services of this type would increase substantially, reducing the extent to 
which Robwood financially props these services up -  which was something they 
were happy to hear, and something that was in line with a strategic decision we'd 
made a couple of years ago to stop co-funding things that were, in our opinion, 
programs which government should be fully funding. The board were keen, so my 
role was to prepare more than 30 EOls for services across the state worth more 
than $50 million recurrent. Everyone was getting really excited and wanting to put 
staff on before they'd even been approved any of the tenders -  I had to get people 
to slow down. I had hoped at best we might win about $14-15m worth. But we've 
only been offered $4-5m worth. This is disappointing -  and infuriating, really."
"So we submitted those EOls almost exactly a year ago, and the department said 
it'd get back to the sector soon, but didn't do so until eight months later! Then, 
when the minister announced it, all the department did was to put a list up on the 
website, which didn't really tell anyone much at all, just who was successful and 
who wasn't, and there were a lot of mistakes in the lis t ... we were put down for 
things we never bid for! We were down fo r at least one area where we don't even 
operate in... And they broke apart the models we submitted... for example, our 
flagship model is this particular style of service delivery that is all integrated, all one 
model, and they broke it up and said, 'well, we'll talk to you about that part of the 
service delivery, but not the other part...' So we will talk to the department about 
that, but it's a little different to what we had in mind, because it's all supposed to 
be a part of the integrated model."
"And then some new players like this other organisation which has been around for 
only a few years, they actually got a guernsey in a rural area where we provide 
most of the services, to do a type of service delivery which it is sort of around the 
same sorts of clients that we work with, so what is that about? I understand there 
is an expression of interest process, and there must be probity, and fa ir play, but we 
thought we had it in on that one. So when we sat down for negotiation I said 'just 
for the record, I want to tell you how utterly disappointed and actually angry we are
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about that decision,' and they said 'oh, we can negotiate around that...' I said 
'that's great, but we weren't on the list.' But now, we are doing that -  we're 
negotiating around providing that service after all. It's quite interesting given how 
much emphasis is put on the word probity.... in the end if you read the documents 
from the beginning they sort of were written in a way so that it gave the 
department lots of options to say they will do whatever they like. It's a 
bastardisation of the whole probity thing really in a way... it is messy."
"Anyway, a couple of months after the minister's announcement of the 'winners 
and losers', we had still heard nothing more about it -  the department hadn't 
contacted us to start negotiating the contracts. One of the head honcho's in our 
parent organisation was meeting with the minister about something else, and said 
'look, what's happening here? You've announced this but none of it's happening 
yet...' and the impression I got was that the minister didn't actually know that! The 
minister thought it was all out and happening after the announcement! So after 
that we noticed a lot of rapid activity in the department, I guess the minister must 
have put some heat on the department."
"So as I said, about $4-5m of our submissions were 'successful'. But now, even 
though these EOls were supposedly considered successful, the department is still 
saying to us that our costs are too high. And they have made a big deal about how 
the funding is 'rolled up', where the intention is that you never need to go to go 
back to the department for another cent of money for the services delivered. So 
you have to cost for the peaks and troughs of all that into the future. So we've got 
to cost for stuff like orthodontic work as well. But when I said that at the last 
meeting, one senior department officer said that these days, orthodontic work is 
just trendy! I couldn't believe it!! I mean, quality is so important here, you have to 
do this stuff well, this is high risk stuff, you're dealing with people's lives -  not just 
the production of some widget in a factory! Government hate us and they love us -  
we do good work, but it costs them -  it's the tension between needing us and 
loathing us."
Hoping to elicit an informative response from Ronan, I make what I guess is a 
potentially controversial statement: I mention how "it's a bind -  that government 
can't afford all the things that Robwood wants to provide", and I suggest that 
"perhaps it's fair enough they ask Robwood to decrease its costs."
Ronan replies "well, that's their problem, it's too risky, you try and take an 
inadequately funded, substandard service proposal to your board to approve, 
they'll say 'no way'. I'd rather that we do the things we do well, than do too many 
things badly."
We arrive at the meeting we're travelling to: it has specifically been organised and 
run by the peak body for providers in the field to discuss this particular EOI 
negotiation process, and is attended by about 20 women and five men 
representing a range of services. As the meeting starts, while the facilitator is 
attempting to fix the data projector, he asks people to share their expectations and 
experiences of the relationship with the department during this process. An 
agitated and extended uproar ensues, begun by Ronan's comment: "I'd expected 
them to at least have read my documents and my EOI document -  I put a lot of 
time into that..."
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Once the data projector has been fixed and the uproar has subsided, the facilitator 
presents his analysis of the situation. He emphasises the importance of each and 
every organisation's CEO meeting with the head of the department -  I can see 
Ronan nodding and indicating that the Robwood CEO, Kaye, has already done so, 
while some of the representatives of smaller organisations catch each other's eyes 
and raise their eyebrows, as if to indicate the impossibility of such a suggestion. 
The facilitator also highlights what he sees are the key negotiating points. For 
example, he encourages the organisations not to compromise on the model of 
service delivery, stating that the department "are between a rock and a hard place, 
so let's at least do our bit well". He also reminds the participants of the 
importance of professionalism during the negotiation process -  recommending 
that people do not "wear your anger on your sleeve, if you do, you'll just be cut 
off".
At one point a couple of the larger organisations, again, led by Ronan, discuss in 
general terms their caseload ratios and unit costs, I notice some of the others 
writing these figures down. Frustration is vented about the difficulties in 
negotiating with a department that is both a funder and a provider -  and the 
inequity of provision conditions between what the department does and what it 
expects the non-government sector to do: "they have teams of workers dedicated 
to things that our workers are expected to carry in addition to their caseloads, and 
they can afford to buy in lots of external support for their ancillary functions, I find 
it hard not to say 'but you do it, so you should fund me to do it tool' when we are 
negotiating this stuff". Tips are shared about how to ensure that the organisations 
are funded for the full cost of their service delivery including these ancillary and 
administration aspects and about the efficiencies of scale that can be achieved 
through servicing a large client group.
The workshop draws to a close with the group agreeing to raise some issues with 
the head of the department through the peak body. I find it difficult to tell if there 
is a positive or negative feeling in the room as we leave -  I'm tempted to 
summarise it as negative, however it seems almost as though the participants are 
so accustomed to such adversarial and unsatisfactory experiences that it's hard to 
say.
Ronan and I then travel to his next meeting at the department's head quarters. He 
meets another Robwood executive, Emma, at a cafe nearby as they plan for the 
meeting together. This meeting is about negotiating the specifications of funding 
and models for one of their "successful" EOI submissions. I ask Ronan what he's 
done to prepare for this meeting: he states that after they'd been told by the 
department that their costs for this particular part of the EOls were "too high", 
Robwood's CEO, Kaye, had asked him to prepare a paper detailing the reasoning 
behind these costs (which, instead of being the government department's 
indicative "high" level of $37,000 per client per annum is, in Robwood's estimation 
more like $50,000 per client per annum). He feels the difficulties in negotiating are 
exacerbated by the high turnover of staff in the department, and their distinct lack 
of corporate memory. I remember his comment earlier that day; that the 
department hadn't even read his full expression of interest submission, and I 
marvel at his effort to prepare more written material for them.
The department have not given permission for me to attend this meeting, so I wait 
outside for the duration -  about an hour. As they walk towards me on their return,
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Emma summarises the meeting with the words: "well, I think you can just about 
see the steam coming from Ronan's ears!"
"Oh, well, we had o very nice conversation, but I'm just agitated now" [Ronan],
"And you know, you kind of feel fo r them on their side of the table... What they 
have got is... junior people or people who are new to it and really quite aren't sure 
what to do, so it relies on a meeting where senior departmental people are present 
to move something along to its next stage" [Emma],
" Their negotiating person, who is fairly new to the department, I think she is 
probably a bit out of her depth to do that kind of analysis... so now out of a meeting 
with a senior departmental director, all that happened was that they agreed that 
the next important step is that 'we'll pass it on to our economic people to have a 
look at it ' and I think fine ' but that is it? ...Why hadn't they done that a month ago? 
They're pressuring us to take out some parts of the holistic funding model that we 
use, to take out where we've factored in the extra-ordinary costs, but I'm not sure 
that it's going to get us anywhere different, whether you take it over to the left of 
the page or the right of the page or keep it in the middle of it is still our position -  
and it still represents what it costs to do this kind of work to a level we feel is 
acceptably good quality" [Ronan],
"The interesting thing is that there was just a hint of nervousness in there, when 
they insisted 'you will tell Kaye about this discussion?' [laughing] But of course, she 
would be the first person Ronan would talk to... and how they said 'our department 
head is interested in this conversation... so we will be reporting straight back to 
them.' We know that Kaye has had a meeting with their department head about it, 
and she played really hard ball with it" [Emma],
"And in two weeks from now the department head is going to the peak body board 
meeting, which Kaye is part of, and this will be the big part of the agenda there" 
[Ronan],
"And I guess probably the minister's office is keeping a close eye on it... a minister 
makes all the difference" [Emma],
"Mmm... If we ended up walking away then all hell would break loose... There 
would be repercussions. And I'm sure they understand that" [Ronan],
We bid Emma farewell and move on to the next meeting, debriefing as we go.
I ask "So what happens now?"
Ronan replies: "I have to report back to Kaye now, and Kaye will be thinking -  'well 
did you push it enough? Did you?' I'm glad I had Emma there because I think we 
stated everything quite clearly. You can't do anything more than that... what's the 
next step? It's not like you sit there and demand that they solve this right now. I 
mean Kaye's first response was -  'we'll just walk away' but she won't. She won't 
yet. She'll want to sort it out..."
"We have a board meeting every month and Kaye was thinking -  / could see what 
she was trying to do... she said to me a week before the previous one 'you need to 
go and tell the department they must give us an answer before the board meeting
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because I want to take it to the board. And I said 7 don't think that's going to 
happen, Kaye' and she said 'no, we're going to be proactive here' and I said 'why 
this board meeting?' 'well, it's just a strategy'... She wants to create the scenario in 
the department's mind that our board might well tell them to stuff it... fa ir enough, 
so I said all that, but of course... I didn't get an answer... It'll just drag on..."
By the time I see him two days later, Ronan has sent an email to the minister's 
"minder" about his dissatisfaction with the process, stating:
"Our position on this is that while we appreciate there may be less funds available 
to the department than would adequately service all children and young people in 
care at the levels we propose -  the solution is not to do many things badly vs some 
things really well. "
We are driving to a meeting and he receives a phone call from a departmental 
officer who calls to clarify some items in the budget he's submitted. I can hear only 
his side of the conversation which goes on for some time, for example:
"...the dental stuff, that budget line is about the client seeing the dentist... yes, but 
that Commonwealth program, well, that's only for one assessment per year, that's 
not actually for any treatment, so you still need to pay for dental treatment... well, 
with orthodontic treatment, let me explain, if 50% of our service users have to get 
orthodontic treatment, that's a one-off cost of $4,500, and we've got however 
many service users, then it averages out as being the figure that you're looking at"
As we sit in the car in the car park of our destination while Ronan finishes this 
conversation, ! can see that he is getting visibly frustrated with having to explain 
everything -  he's sighing and making agitated noises. When the conversation is 
over, Ronan debriefs as we walk to our next meeting: "I now have to explain
everything in our submission to someone who has no experience in running a 
service..."
Ronan's next meeting is with two Robwood managers. The meeting will be about 
how Robwood's failure to win growth funds for their programs in the EOI process 
will affect their existing service delivery: "We have to scale down... because we're 
adamant that we want to do things well across the board in terms of quality. We 
want to... apply the same standards and quality... to where we have and have not 
been successful in winning the expression of interest.... that could be difficult... I 
spent my day yesterday preparing for this to give them a bit of a draft about what 
might be affordable... Cos yeah, sometimes, in some cases it might mean that staff 
might have to be found something else to do... Or we might just drop some things, 
and do some core stuff and maybe we'll be able to keep the same staff, but we just 
need to check."
This meeting goes for two hours; Ronan has set his computer up to a projector and 
the three of them are looking at the complicated budget spreadsheet projected 
onto the screen. Robwood contributes 4% of the funding to this program ($13,911, 
of a $350,000) from its own revenue. There is a policy in place that it will not 
increase this contribution because the program is considered a core state financial 
responsibility. The managers initially resist the idea of losing staff, and consider 
other options for cost reductions, such as losing some of the other "extra add on's, 
like consultants" -  but this is not considered a feasible possibility because of the
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quality they are seeking to maintain in their service delivery. They lament, "I don't 
see why it's so hard to give us an extra $100,000 of all that money?" However, 
they conclude, "it is a shame to be losing someone good, but the department 
haven't given us enough money." I think back to a conversation with Ronan earlier 
that morning as we travelled to this meeting, about his longstanding ethical 
dilemma with Robwood's policy on issuing its senior staff with expensive cars as 
part of their remuneration package. This policy is about, of course, attracting good 
staff. I reflect silently on the impact and morality of all these tradeoffs that are a 
part of life in service delivery. Immediately following the meeting, the senior of the 
two managers quietly thanks Ronan for his assistance in managing that difficult 
process.
When I meet Ronan the next morning, before another meeting with the 
department about a separate service issue, he has received an email and phone call 
from Kaye -  who had been interstate the previous day at a meeting, where -  in a 
passing conversation with another CEO -  she'd been lead to believe that another 
organisation had already signed all of its contracts with the department. This 
organisation is a peer of Robwood, having been established for a similar length of 
time and of a similar size and professional capacity. However, unlike Robwood, this 
organisation had newer provided this particular type of service delivery before. It 
was therefore of great concern to Kaye that they'd signed all their contracts while 
Robwood had signed none. "So that's the sort of put the pressure on, she wants to 
get on with it now, and she's really sort of incensed I suppose... it's a frustrating 
process so she wants to sort of put a bomb under it [laughs]..."
In response to this news, Kaye had drafted a letter which she'd sent on to Ronan 
for him to check the details: "there is a lot of stuff here that I'll have to edit. I did 
ring Kaye and say don't send it yet... I would feel very uncomfortable if  some of the 
things got said in there... just in the wording, that's all..." The letter contains 
reference to Robwood's long history of providing this type of service, its track 
record of providing good quality services and her concerns about the department's 
inconsistent approach. Kaye also makes some demands about the future timing 
and process for the negotiations. The letter concludes with a threatening 
suggestion that if the department should "no longer wish it to be a provider", it 
should submit a letter to the Chair of Robwood's board stating so immediately. I 
ask Ronan if he feels the letter is a "bit too assertive?" He replies: "Yeah, there is a 
bit of that... it's not like I'd been having acrimonious meetings with these people... 
I'll just sort of try and soften some of the bits, or make some of the bits a bit more 
accurate... I don't mind us saying... we're sick of mucking around... but it's a funny 
sort of thing because the department are still the people who are buying the 
service."
The following week things quieten down on the negotiation front, but Ronan 
emails to let me know that: "I resubmitted all... costings to the department 
negotiators... having done the changes arising from  the conversation on the 
phone... Anyway -  that will still be too high so we should now get to 'crunch' time 
soon."
I don't see Ronan again until the Robwood board meeting the next week, at which I 
discover that Kay had received a response from the department head to her letter 
the previous evening. Today, she and Ronan had spent some time strategising 
about their subsequent response. The letter of response from the department
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head is circulated amongst the board members and confirms the department's 
preference that "negotiations continue -  and that together we reach a satisfactory 
conclusion" however that "the unit cost that Robwood is proposing... is too high" 
which the departments states is because "Robwood is offering specialist staffing 
and professional services as part of its service model". The department states its 
need to work "within negotiated parameters... to prevent any inequity in service 
provision... which would not be possible if we were to approve a unit cost that is far 
in excess of what other service providers have already agreed to as a unit cost and 
are signing contracts."
Kaye expresses irritation that this is a "classic divide and conquer -  I'll take you into 
a room and do a deal with you... and people who thought they'd get nothing have 
done deals in order to get anything". However, she has spoken on the phone with 
the department head about it today, who was "very straight, very helpful, very 
reasonable. So we're not hitting a brick a wall... and anyone in the department that 
knows us, would hate us to leave this field. The minister's office would hate for us 
to leave this field -  I've spoken with the minister's advisor about this... As a result of 
my discussion with the department head... Ronan and I put some proposals 
together....
Kaye and Ronan's hand drawn "game plan" is circulated -  a flow chart indicating 
various courses of action. The flow chart indicates the first step as clarifying the 
parameters of service delivery scope, and is followed by a series of compromises 
and strategies including: meetings between the department head and Kaye; a 
letter to the minister from the board; research identifying the core components of 
good quality service delivery; involvement of the peak body; with the final option 
involving a media campaign and withdrawal from this type of service delivery, or as 
summarised by Kaye " if all that fails I think we are up for a big fight." It is the 
board's role now to decide on the path forward, based on the advice from the 
executive team.
Kaye provides the context for the board's decision making process. She identifies 
this type of service as the "backbone" of the organisation's work in this particular 
area, "in terms of numbers and money and sharing expertise across the agency... If 
we lost it because the price was wrong then we basically get out of this type of 
service delivery completely. And while it's tempting to walk away from the 
department... we don't want to walk away, it's been part of the agency for a long 
time and we're good at it, and if  we're not in it then we can't influence it and that's 
part of our commitment to getting a system that works fo r our clients. But we can't 
go below a level at which we provide quality services..."
Discussion ensues about where the unit cost line should be drawn. Strategies are 
suggested that involve taking the contracts at the price given by the department, 
despite its inadequacy, and seeking future opportunities to increase the funding -  
either through the department or external sources. Ronan identifies methods that 
can be used to bring the price down if necessary -  supervision and management 
structures, the impact of economies of scale, differing costs across different 
metropolitan and rural areas, reducing the number of clients -  acknowledging 
"there's no exact science with this". The board agree on their preference for 
Robwood to stay "in the game" because of its history of providing this service and 
its commitment to influencing policy and delivery for the service users. Kaye and
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Ronan agree to seek continued negotiations with the department, Ronan leaves 
and the board meeting continues.
The next day I attend and observe the peak body's board meeting -  a section of 
which is attended by the department head and one of her senior executives. About 
ten people altogether attend the meeting. Kaye is a board member also in 
attendance. On the agenda for discussion is the EOI process and Kaye explicitly 
voices her intention to stay out of the discussion about that topic, because she is 
"embroiled in a row with them". The board discuss how they will approach the 
topics on the agenda before the department head and her senior executive arrive. 
They agree that while the meeting will not necessarily remain "friendly", their 
primary agenda is to "keep engaging" [Kaye]. The meeting is indeed very tense in 
parts: at times voices are raised and even tears are shed. However, by the end of 
the meeting, a range of issues have been raised and they come to an agreement 
that the department head will continue to meet regularly with the board. Overall 
there is consensus in the room that it has been a positive interaction.
Kaye walks the department head to her car when she leaves the meeting. Later, 
Kaye tells me about their conversation: "I said to her today it feels like pulling 
teeth, I asked fo r this and you give me this, and I'm sick of it."
I ask: "What did she say to that?"
"Oh, she just smiled... and she said 'what are we going to do about it?' So I said 
'well, we are happy to keep negotiating now because is that is the decision we've 
made'... So... we do a bit more, then you go back and you do it again... we dance, 
we keep on dancing".
When I arrive for a meeting with the media and policy team at Robwood the 
following Monday, I find their office awash with excitement -  Robwood has 
featured in a large two page spread in the weekend newspaper and Kaye has been 
extensively quoted along with three other CEOs of major non-profit providers in 
the area. No one in the media team was aware that this article was due to be 
published, which is unusual because they are typically the ones who facilitate such 
a feature. The team leader suggests in passing that it's occurred because Kaye has 
"finally returned the phone calls" of the well known journalist-author of the article. 
Set within the context of a current and long-running state inquiry, the article is 
basically a criticism of the general quality of government service delivery in this 
area -  and goes so far as to describe the department as "beyond saving". In the 
article, Kaye and the other CEOs express their "profound disillusionment" in the 
department and suggest substantial changes that should occur to the department 
in a "revamped" and improved system -  changes, which I'd heard the previous 
week, were not what the department head would prefer.
I am gobsmacked. I interpret the presence and timing of this article as a clear part 
of Kaye's strategy for demonstrating to the department that Robwood is not an 
agency that will tolerate intimidation by government. I immediately email Ronan 
with a copy of this article, stating my surprise and asking for his comments about it. 
He responds:
"/ actually think this is pretty mild in the context of things and I don't see any 'risk' 
at all... for our... negotiating. The fact that all the big players are together on this...
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means we are not out on a limb at all. And the article does not get into the issues of 
this particular EOI process at all... So it's all good I think!"
Indeed, as the process continues, I observe no one involved with the EOI 
negotiation making any direct reference to this article at all, or any obvious 
indication that it has had a clear and specific impact. And in a later conversation 
with Kaye, she confirms that this particular type of service delivery is so often in 
the press, that such a tactic is not likely to make much difference with government. 
Still, I am amazed.
Ronan's negotiations continue and continue: he meets with the department 
several more times, not only this particular site's EOI negotiation, but also about a 
range of other negotiations and issues. He continues to gather information, 
sounding out peers and other players through the informal conversations during 
tea-breaks and in-between times at network and related meetings. Ronan 
eventually negotiates the "bottom line price" down to $43,500, after much 
deliberation and in close consultation with the front line staff at Robwood. 
However, this price is still considered too high by the department. During this 
process Ronan also weathers some criticism from some Robwood staff who believe 
he has been too willing to comply with the department's requests to reduce their 
costs - "and what does that then say about Robwood?" [Manager],
After the period of my fieldwork is complete, Ronan continues to correspond with 
me via email, updating me on the negotiation process. With a focus on getting 
Robwood "inside the tent", Ronan makes another proposal to the board at their 
next monthly meeting:
"There is a way forward if we are prepared to posit an 'acceptable' price and 'play' 
a number of strategies moving forward. These strategies are to negotiate an 
initially different price, for fewer service users, as the sites build to fu ll operations -  
a set-up and phase-in approach that the department has indicted will be 
achievable; that we negotiate a contract that always allows us to come back to the 
department to re-negotiate if  we find that the funding is not covering our needs; 
and that, if necessary, Robwood take advantage of the allowable 5% vacancy rate 
at any one time... to give us the flexibility to carry an official lower unit cost whilst 
still delivering service at our agreed level."
So, finally, five weeks after I had completed my month-long fieldwork placement, 
Ronan emailed me to let me know that Robwood and the department had agreed 
on an eventual $41,000 per unit price, with higher per unit prices in the two year 
initial set-up phase, summarising the outcome with "it was about getting into the 
game rather than being left out". In an email conversation with Ronan another 
month later -  more than 18 months after the EOI round was originally announced -  
he confirmed that the contracts resulting from this part of the EOI process had 
"gone up" for departmental approval about a month before, and he was waiting to 
be informed of their approval.
In this lengthy story of negotiation, all of Oliver's predictive antecedents -  and 
more than one of her tactics -  are present. One of the strongest themes in this
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narrative is the interconnectedness and uncertainty of the environment or, as Kaye 
would often describe it "we dance, we keep on dancing". The multitude of ways 
that people overlap was remarkable: at one point, Ronan and I attended a meeting 
about a completely different issue to this EOI negotiation and saw almost entirely 
the same cast of faces. This particular meeting then proved to be invaluable for 
Ronan, and he gathered very useful information during the tea breaks there.
However, unlike what is predicted by Oliver, such interconnectedness played an 
unexpected role in that it increased Robwood's resistance to the pressures. Finding 
out that the other organisation had signed all its contracts (or so she was led to 
believe) agitated Kay to take dramatic measures to seek a resolution -  although 
certainly not through acquiescence. This interconnectedness with other service 
providers, also led to a strong and voluntary diffusion of norms, which in Oliver's 
framework, leads to compliance. However, these diffuse norms were not 
consistent with the departmental norms. Indeed, in many ways, they were norms 
of resistance to the department leading to a greater propensity of organisations to 
resist. Again, this was an unexpected influence of this predictive antecedent.
Just as two main differences in Oliver's hypothesised prediction profiles for 
acquiescence and compromise are the changes in legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance -  it could be seen here how these antecedents affected the tactic 
away from acquiescence towards a more resistant strategy. If Robwood had 
complied with the requirements stipulated by the department they would have 
been worse off both in terms of economic gain and legitimacy than if they fought
for a "higher price" -  especially so because they so strongly felt the price was
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inadequate and had done so much careful work in planning to accurately guess 
what they determined was the "full cost" of the high quality service they were so 
proud of.
In this instance, despite the organisation's own substantial source of independent 
financial income, when it came to "the crunch" Kaye recognised the dependence on 
the department for funding for this "backbone" of Robwood's service delivery. As 
Ronan mentioned, the department are the ones with coercive control over this 
funding -  "they are the ones purchasing the service". In other words, dependence 
did play a role, despite Robwood's independent "wealth". Legitimacy too was an 
important issue, Robwood already having a strong and well respected status -  a 
high level of legitimacy. It was concerned about this high level of legitimacy being 
undercut by funding that would not pay for what Robwood considered a good 
enough quality of support. There were also concerns expressed within the 
organisation that if Robwood were to lower its price-per-unit too much, then this 
would possibly put it at risk of setting a precedent where it "gave in" to government 
pressures too easily, negatively affecting future negotiations, demonstrating the 
way this negotiation was not conducted as though it was an isolated event, but that 
it was embedded in an ongoing relationship with government, and would have 
implications for that ongoing relationship.
Of course, the most interesting feature of this narrative is the way it demonstrates 
the human story underpinning the experience of compromise: Ronan's frustration 
at having to explain budget lines to junior departmental staff; Kaye's anger at the
"divide and conquer" strategy; the role of leadership and initiative; the way the
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meaning of compromise is developed over the period of negotiation. What is also 
fascinating is the role of the organisation's overarching goal -  that they wanted to 
"stay in the tent", to keep providing this type of service delivery in order to being 
able to keep influencing it. These themes are explored in greater depth in 
Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 6
RESISTANCE STRATEGIES
This chapter, the second in a series of three that specifically describe the 
experiences of NPOs via Oliver's (1991) framework, examines organisational 
responses of avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. These are three 
organisational responses involving "increasingly active levels of resistance to given 
institutional demands and expectations" (Oliver, 1991, p.157). I will look at each in 
turn as this chapter unfolds. Again, I do this by using a series of field-based 
narratives selected from a broad pool of data to which I apply Oliver's framework, 
exploring the connections and seeking to understand peculiarities as an 
understanding and application of Oliver's framework expands. Following this 
analysis, Chapter 7 explores the role of each of Oliver's predictive antecedents in 
more depth.
6.1 Avoidance
As a strategic response to institutional pressures, Oliver defines avoidance as 
concealment, buffering or exit:
"the organizational attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity; organizations 
achieve this by concealing their nonconformity, buffering themselves from 
institutional pressures, or escaping from institutional rules or expectations" 
(p.154).
Concealment is pretence at conformity, "disguising nonconformity"; buffering 
includes efforts to reduce the extent of scrutiny and dependency, "loosening 
institutional attachments"; and escape is exit, "changing goals, activities or
domains" (Oliver, 1991, p.152). One example of concealment is if an organisation
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engages in a range of untypical activities specifically in preparation for a site visit 
from a government funder to give the impression of complying with funding 
requirements that it does not adhere to at other times (Oliver, 1991). Examples of 
buffering include decoupling front line or technical work from administrative 
aspects of the organisation, and escape draws on Hirschman's (1970) notion of exit, 
in which the organisation removes itself completely from circumstances in which it 
has problematic institutional expectations placed on it at all.
Oliver predicts that avoidance will occur when:
• an organisation is likely to gain low levels of legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance;
• there is a high number of constituents or stakeholders and the organisation 
is only moderately dependent on some of these constituents;
• the institutional pressures are moderately consistent with the goals of the 
organisation and there is a high level of constraint on organisation's 
discretion;
• there is a moderate level of legal coercion involved in exerting the pressures 
and these pressures are moderately diffused and accepted in the field; and
• the level of uncertainty is high and the level of interconnectedness is 
moderate.
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When reflecting on my fieldwork notes after applying the Oliver framework as an 
analytical device, avoidance was one of the most difficult strategies to identify 
distinctly. It was particularly difficult to find fu ll narratives of avoidance that 
assisted me to form a greater or deeper level of understanding of it. Avoidance 
tended more to appear fleetingly within narratives that were predominantly about 
other issues. This made me reluctant to use such narratives as distinct examples of 
avoidance. For example, avoidance played a role in Robwood's final decision to 
settle for a lower ''price per unit" (in 5.3) -  where, if necessary they would take 
advantage of the five per cent vacancy rate, effectively raising the price per unit. 
While such examples were relevant and contributed to my backdrop of 
understanding about avoidance, these isolated snippets of avoidance seemed 
insufficient for in-depth analysis.
There are a number of possible reasons for the difficulties in identifying avoidance 
organisational responses. For one, Oliver's categories of avoidance through 
concealment and the category discussed in Chapter 5 (5.3), compromise through 
pacifying overlap considerably. Both of these responses effectively involve the NPO 
doing something undesirable but simultaneously seeking to assert the opposite, 
either by covering it up or making it seem desirable. A second possible reason is a 
perceived deviousness of avoidance. Morality and ethics are strong features of 
community service NPO practice (Nevile, 2009), and the participants in this study 
may have considered avoidance an immoral organisational response. So perhaps 
even if the participants and their NPOs were engaging in avoidance, they were not 
keen to let me know or see it.
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My observations also could have been naive, choosing to interpret what I saw or 
heard about not as avoidance, but instead as compromise or another type of 
response. As I discussed in Chapter 3, I was always grateful to be welcomed into 
each organisation for fieldwork, and perhaps I inadvertently and unconsciously 
reframed any instances of avoidance in another light. Perhaps, also, I was aware 
that the participants would be reading my accounts of their work and I was keen to 
understand their work in a morally positive light as much as possible.
Despite these difficulties, my fieldwork at the PCC with Kelly was the most fruitful in 
providing full and holistic narrative episodes of avoidance. Here I both observed 
Kelly intentionally using it as well as describing its use to me. The following 
narratives illuminate two examples of her experience of avoidance: responding to 
the changing characteristics of a nearby small town (Doberon) and Kelly's 
description of “giving the money away".
“Structural changes" at Doberon
As we drive from one meeting to another Kelly and I are talking about her 
experience of applying for a particular stream of funding. She laments:
"That was something we talked about yesterday in the supervision meeting I had 
with the workers... the funding will end in June... and if  there is an opportunity to 
apply for another round of that funding / would, if  I was them, negotiate not to 
keep the program just to Doberon, a nearby regional small town, because what's 
happened is since when we started working at Doberon, all those years ago, the 
demographics of that community have changed, so, young families are no longer 
moving out to Doberon, because there's no housing out there, so in fact the 
children are growing up, and it's actually harder to do the work that we do with 
families with young children... there's less need, but we're kind of locked in to this 
Doberon program.
And there's been another structural issue, we used to run all our programs out of 
the school, but this year they've introduced a new school program out there so that 
room is no longer available, so there actually is not a physical space where our
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worker can run her programs out of anymore that's a safe space for children. So 
that's been an issue fo r us, because she's meant to run a parenting course or 
something down there and we haven't been able to do it this year... she knows she 
needs to do one, but she can't actually find a venue."
I ask: "So how are you navigating your way through that?"
Kelly replies: "Not very well... I think our worker feels that she hasn't exhausted all 
possibilities for finding a location to deliver the service at this stage, and she needs 
to meet the new principle at the school...
"Have the department who fund you for the parenting program given you any 
support through that?" [Alison]
"Nup, no, we're just hoping they just avoid us [laughing]. But when it comes to the 
next funding round I just hope they'll negotiate for more flexibility. Really what we 
should probably do is a serious needs analysis... the funding is prescribed to a 
sufficient level that there's not a lot of flexibility so, and you don't get the 
opportunity to renegotiate performance measures in mid-project. And at this stage 
we haven't given up hope that there are no locations available for the work to be 
done there..." [Kelly]
"Have you spoken to the department about this?" [Alison]
"No." [pause] "No." [pause] [Kelly]
"Are you concerned that they'd come down hard on you?" [Alison]
"Yeah, [pause] yep. The government officer for that program is a very in-the-box 
bureaucrat. A don't-deviate-from-your-service-plan type person. We've been 
working with him for a few years now, and in fact... we went against his advice 
before when he told us we should be doing one particular thing, but we knew from 
the head of our national network that we should be doing a different thing to 
position ourselves well for future funding, and she was dead right. I think 
sometimes these state based federal public servants... they hear things after we've 
heard them, you know what I mean, they don't have a very strong communication 
link with their head quarters obviously... So the fact that we went against our guy 
and just kept following our gut was what got us the funding."
A few months later, during a subsequent follow-up fieldwork visit to the PCC, there 
is a meeting between Lydia (the PCC worker who is responsible for the program in 
Doberon) and the government contract managers. I speak with her immediately 
after the meeting about how it went. Half-joking, she laughs, saying:
"I must have been nervous, I can't believe it, I was sweating! I was nervous they 
were going to ask me questions about information that wasn't in my head. I 
showed them lots of photos and just tried not to let them get a word in edgeways 
to kill as much time as possible until they had to go [laughing]!! I told them lots of 
good news stories about things that were happing for the mothers out there, 
describing the community and the work I do there, to gear him up for the fact that 
the outcomes I'll be describing in the report are different to what he's expecting -  
but they are still outcomes. He wants more from it than what he's getting, but it 
was an ambitious project proposal and it's a complex community. Unfortunately
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the report is three months late, and I feel terrible about it, normally I like to be 
thorough, but because it's so late now the numbers keep changing, I just find all 
the administrative part so difficult and incredibly tedious... I mean, we only get 
something like $10,000 p.a. for this program, but we still have to fill in the same 30 
page report as organisations that get $250,000 for the program, it's frustrating."
Later during that same fieldwork visit, Kelly and I have stayed back late into the 
evening at the centre. We are working to develop a range of policies and 
procedures for the PCC. I am taking the opportunity of few interruptions to ask 
Kelly countless questions, following up on issues from my first visit. One such 
question is how she feels about how things are going with Doberon. She replies:
"The funding will finish in May, absolutely, we won't get refunded fo r that grant, 
and look, to be honest with you even if there was another funding round... the 
need... has changed...
I ask: "So what will you tell government when they ask 'what have you been doing 
with the money we've been paying you?"'
She replies: "Well we're not not doing things, our worker does go down there and 
visit regularly and does most of what's in the service agreement and there's no 
benchmark, no one's saying you have to see X number of people in the year"
Our conversation moves to the broader issue around the PCC "doing its own thing 
in an environment with accountability requirements that are going to keep on 
increasing." As always, Kelly's response is candid and honest:
"Oh, we fly under the radar a bit too, we're not a very big organisation our work 
isn't controversial... We do good work, we actually do good work, and no, we're not 
doing everything that we could possibly do, but the stuff we do, we do it very 
well..."
I interpret avoidance occurring here in a variety of ways. First and foremost, Kelly 
does not actively choose to consult with the department when the "structural 
issues" mean that the PCC is not on track for delivering the requirements stated in 
the service agreement, indeed she hopes the department will "avoid" the PCC. In 
this way, the PCC flies "under the radar". However, when a representative from the 
department does come to visit during my subsequent visit to the PCC, Lydia admits 
she "just tried not to let them get a word in edgeways". Instead, Lydia filled the 
meeting with positive personal stories about the sub-set of activities that were 
occurring in Doberon, concealing that these "good news" stories did not report on
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the full range of activities contained in the service agreement. Kelly initially sees 
the only future strategy for dealing with this problem as exit -  negotiating instead 
"for more flexibility" and to change the service agreement completely so that in the 
future it no longer covers only Doberon. On my subsequent visit to the PCC, exit 
appears to be likely, with Kelly expressing certainty that the PCC will not "get 
refunded for that grant".
This narrative of avoidance is closely intertwined with a series of contextual factors, 
including a range of Oliver's (1991) suggested predictive antecedents. Constraint, 
coercion, dependence and economic gain all play a role in determining Kelly's 
response of avoidance here. The PCC's dependence on government for funding this 
program and the likelihood they might lose funds for the remainder of the program 
initially raise Kelly's level of concern about it. Overall, my interpretation of this 
narrative and event is that Kelly perceives the work of PCC as heavily bound by 
features of the context. For example, Kelly sees the rigidity of the service 
agreement as constraining the PCC's flexibility in delivering the program to where it 
is most needed rather than arbitrarily still in Doberon, despite the diminished need 
there.
The "in-the-box" nature of the government officer who administers the program 
increases the level of coercion Kelly experienced in this episode. This was not the 
only time Kelly referred to an "in-the-box" bureaucrat, and her descriptions of 
these "dot-the-i, cross-the-t" workers implied not only that they were officious and 
focused on strict paperwork compliance, but that this focus detracted from the
flexibility required for suitable and appropriate service delivery. In this way, the in-
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the-box nature of the government worker could potentially be obstructionist to 
Kelly's desires for the work of the PCC. In this circumstance of avoidance, the 
bureaucrat's inflexibility, his in-the-box-ness -  especially combined with Kelly's 
negative experiences about him in the past -  was one of the factors feeding the 
response of avoidance here.
Yet, how do these factors lead to avoidance here instead of to another tactic? I 
believe that while these features of the institutional pressures are important to 
some extent in influencing the PCC's organisational response of avoidance, broader 
features than just these elements set the "scene" for avoidance. This narrative of 
avoidance gives the impression it is a strategy of last resort -  no other tactic seems 
feasible or practical. Kelly perceives that the "structural" circumstances make 
acquiescence impossible because of the changed demographics and infrastructure 
in the town. She also believes she is unable to compromise because of the rigidity 
of the contract and the bureaucrat who administers it. She is unable to openly defy 
the department because she fears losing the funds. The history of her relationship 
with the government worker does not compel her to be completely open and 
transparent with him. She anticipates these funds will expire soon anyway, 
meaning there is little point in manipulating or fighting for the contract conditions 
to change. This leaves her with avoidance as her only remaining tactic.
I also believe that Kelly partly chose this tactic of "avoid" -  flying "under the radar" 
-  because she could. The funding for the Doberon program was small and from a 
federal government department. Therefore, to the department, the size and profile 
of the PCC's program is insignificant, making avoidance appear to be a viable tactic.
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My conviction that "because she could" is an accurate assessment, in part, of why 
avoidance was used is affirmed by comparing this example with another from the 
PCC. On another occasion, the PCC was having difficulties in implementing a 
program where external factors had changed. In this instance, the state 
government funded the program and the PCC was therefore a higher profile 
organisation amongst the network of providers. Kelly responded here 
predominantly through defiance and manipulation instead of avoidance. This 
capacity of a smaller organisation to fly under the radar could therefore also be one 
of the reasons that the PCC demonstrated more avoidance than at the other two 
NPOs I observed, which were much higher-profile organisations. It could also be 
argued that larger organisations may have more sophisticated and better concealed 
mechanisms of avoidance.
Giving the money away
"A little while ago, some money had come into the region for DV (domestic 
violence) services... and there was no existing service of this particular type in the 
area -  there were a few things around, some refuges and the PCC provided 
counselling, but that's it, there wasn't a lot of infrastructure. And to decide on who 
would apply for the funding, the DV network which the PCC hosted... used a really 
good process of working out who, which service, would apply fo r this funding... 
Eventually an organisation nearby put their hands up and said that they would like 
to apply fo r it... and they got it... and they went off to start their service."
"Well the next logical step, and this is where PCC really had to put its money where 
its mouth was, I went to the committee, and said 'well, guys, we've also got a 
regional DV service, but we are a community centre, we shouldn't be doing DV 
work anymore, we should give our money to the other organisation who had 
received the funding.' And that was a challenge, because organisations don't like to 
give away money, and I had to say to the management committee 7 guarantee...' 
and this was me being a bit... I dunno... I didn't really know... I was bluffing a bit, I 
don't do that very often, but I had a very strong intuition and I was right -  I said 7 
guarantee that if we give this money away I will quadruple that in community 
development grants, you just have to trust me on that' and they did and I did."
"Because what was happening was the domestic violence counsellor was at court 
fo r one day per week, and two other days a week was counselling. And for the rest
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of the time I was the pseudo DV counsellor because we were known as the DV 
service, right... it's that black hole stuff... while you're doing that type of work it 
sucks you in... you absolutely have no time to do development work while you're 
doing crisis work, and you need time and space to do development work, so really, 
from a development perspective, it was essential that we got rid of that program..."
"If I was just the front-line worker, I doubt very strongly I would have been able to 
get my coordinator or my manager and my committee to agree to that, and in a 
way that's why I think to bring about significant change to an organisation, to 
reorient yourself to a particular style of professional practice... you have to be the 
coordinator. I've seen... workers... try and do it in their organisations, but if they 
don't have the ear of their committee, if their boss isn't supportive, that's a barrier 
for them. Whereas, my committee are as enthusiastic about this style of practice 
as I am. They're all sold on it, they've all been to my courses about it" [laughing],
"So we gave away the money on the proviso that they put a DV worker at our 
centre one day per week which they do... we still want DV counselling, because 
there's a need, but we didn't want to be managing it anymore. Which we don't... 
we've got an MOU with that organisation about it."
This narrative of Kelly "giving the money away" is a relatively straightforward, albeit 
strong example of the importance of consistency between organisation goals and 
institutional norms, as well as the significance of pressures constraining her work, in 
influencing Kelly's decision to escape, to exit and avoid. Here the institutional 
pressures relating to the ongoing provision of a "crisis" service were irreconcilably 
inconsistent with Kelly's goals for the PCC to be a broader, more indirect 
community service. As far as she was concerned, this had a significant impact on 
her capacity to do the style of work to which she was committed. Indeed, it is the 
strength of Kelly's experience of inconsistency and constraint that appears to 
override the otherwise relatively poor match between Oliver's other predicted 
antecedents and the tactic of avoidance. For example, the potential economic gain 
from fuily complying with the pressure to keep providing the service was high, 
instead of Oliver's predicted "low". The PCC was highly dependent on the 
department for the funding, and to "give the money away" was a high risk activity -
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again, suggesting, according to Oliver, a less resistant response. However, it was 
the strength of Kelly's commitment to professional purity that enhanced her 
willingness to risk this financial stability.
What is particularly interesting about this narrative is the light it sheds on the 
process of developing such a strong value- and goal-set within an organisation: so 
strong that it could over-ride other factors predicting a different response. The way 
that Kelly has her board "sold" on her style of practice and her bold leadership are 
powerful precursors to this story of avoidance. Again the themes evident in the 
other tactics are echoed here despite this small pool of examples from which 
analysis could occur: the role of personal history, relationships and experience as 
well as leadership indicate again that while Oliver's framework is useful, it is not 
exhaustive.
In summary, while the opportunity to explore the mechanics of avoidance through 
this research is weakened by full episodes of avoidance only being detected in one 
of the three field sites, it is also potentially strengthened by what is learnt in this 
phenomenon: that organisational size and profile can make avoidance more or less 
viable as a response to institutional pressures. However, such findings are tentative 
considering the limitations acknowledged above at the beginning of this section. A 
lack of detection of avoidance based on my observations certainly does not mean it 
did not occur in the other two sites. Indeed, the argument could be made that it is 
relatively easier for a large NPO to decouple its front line work from its 
administrative reporting and through that mechanism to conceal and avoid.
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6.2 Defiance
An "active form of resistance" (p.156), defiance is understood by Oliver (1991) as 
consisting of dismissal (ignoring rules and expectations), challenge (an "active 
departure from rules, norms or expectations") and attack (a vehement and intense 
form of challenge). Oliver predicts that defiance will occur when:
• an organisation is likely to gain low levels of legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance;
• there is a high number of constituents or stakeholders on which the 
organisation has a low level of dependency;
• the institutional pressures have a low level of consistency with the goals of 
the organisation and there is a high level of constraint on organisation's 
discretion;
• there is a low level of legal coercion involved in exerting the pressures and 
these pressures are not at all broadly diffused and accepted in the field; and
• the levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness are low.
Across each field site, participants were keen to describe practices of defiance to 
me. These were some of their organisational defining stories and professional 
experience of which they were very proud, although often tinged with elements of 
disgust that they should find themselves so at odds with the government that
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defiance was necessary. Somewhat ironically, however, the clearest experience of 
defiance that I directly observed -  where Kaye took part in the two page newspaper 
article criticising the department only days after a meeting w ith the department 
head (in Chapter 5) -  was later described by her more as a run of the mill tactic 
rather than the dazzling act of defiance I understood it to be at the time.
In those instances described to me by the participants in this study, defiance often 
arose as a response to pressures which were experienced as an encroachment on 
their professional discretion or ''ownership" of the service delivery. As with the 
lengthy narrative of compromise in Chapter 5, there are elements of compromise 
and avoid which can be seen in the following narratives. However, they are 
presented here because of the prominence of defiance as the key underpinning 
tactic.
"I told him off" -  Kelly and the "big stick" approach
Kelly collects me about a 40 minute drive from where we're going for our first 
appointment of the day. We are chatting about all sorts of things when Kelly is 
interrupted by a phone call from the department: I can hear them discuss, amongst 
other things, the department's upcoming annual reporting visit. She's surprised to 
hear that the department officer is bringing a second person with her to sit in on 
the meeting. When Kelly is finished on the phone she sighs and says to me:
"And so now the deportment wont to bring another person along to the reporting 
meeting os well: it's oil about them, you know..."
I respond, with a "red herring" question: "Well, they do pay fo r you..."
Kelly, quick as a flash, says "no, they subsidise us."
I ask "what's the difference?"
"When they're using the big stick approach, they say they fund us... but when we 
say 'well, you don't fund us adequately' they say 'ah, we give you a subsidy'... 
Whatever suits their purpose, that's the discourse they use... Like, one time my first 
department area manager came to talk to the PCC chairperson and I about the fact
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that we only opened the centre from 9 til 3, right, because they fund us fu ll time. 
We get funding for one... full time equivalent position at level 5 wage. But I'm paid 
at a higher level, 6, because that's the level of responsibility I have to take... a level 
5 wage at 38 hours per week is a level 6 wage for 32 hours per week... So he came 
to read the riot act about the centre's opening hours and I had to say 'no, hang on a 
sec, we only open the information and referral part of the organisation from 9 til 3, 
but the rest of the centre and the rest of the programs operate any time, night 
times, weekends'... That's why if  you ring the PCC phone line now, the answering 
machine says that the centre is open from 9 til 3, however appointments can be 
made outside of those hours... that was a little strategic thing, me prodding them 
basically. Because the community know we're there fo r them, they just come and 
knock on the door after three o'clock, it's just that the phones aren't staffed after 3 
o'clock. And they don't even fund that anyway, they only fund me, and what am I 
supposed to do, sit on a phone from 9-3. I mean it's so ridiculous this stuff, it's 
absolutely ridiculous... I told him off. I said 'no, excuse me; you get more value for 
your dollar than you could ever imagine, what we put in, what we self fund... back 
off mate' and he did. He backed down."
This narrative again demonstrates the importance Kelly ascribes to the consistency 
between organisational goals and institutional pressures and the PCC's autonomy. 
In a similar way to the over-riding impact these factors had in the exit and 
avoidance "giving money away" narrative above (in 6.1), here again Kelly is wiiiing 
to defy a government officer's requests, with the associated risks of economic loss 
from the small number of constituents (the government department represented 
by the visiting officer) on whom the PCC is highly dependent. This is because she 
sees the pressures to keep the PCC building and phone line open from 9am to 5pm 
as irreconcilably inconsistent with the organisation's goal to be a flexible 
community service. The requirement for Kelly to work full time, taking on fewer 
responsibilities is also irreconcilably inconsistent with what she understood as the 
organisational requirement to have someone in an overseer and coordinator role.
Why is it that in this instance Kelly defies instead of avoids, like she did with "giving 
the money away" (in 6.1)? Oliver's remaining categories, legal coercion, diffusion
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of pressures and the levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness do not play 
strong roles in either narrative, so I am not convinced that an answer lies in those 
factors. Perhaps the "because she could" element suggested in 6.1 was also not a 
feature of this episode -  Kelly may have judged that the PCC was unable to avoid 
the watchful eye of the department area manager. However, I do not believe this is 
the case. Based on Kelly's narrative of the event, she was just not interested in 
avoiding the department here. After all, the message on the answering machine 
about the PCC's opening hours continues, and is described as a " little strategic 
thing", obviously seeking to prove a point to government. Instead, I interpret this 
narrative as an example that Kelly truly believes the suggestion for the opening 
hours and working level is unreasonable and inappropriate for the style of service 
delivered by the PCC.
Again, comparing this narrative to the avoidance narrative in which Kelly gives the 
money away, it is interesting to understand these examples by looking deeply at 
the role of legitimacy. In both instances the potential for gains in legitimacy from 
the government was high -  if only they would just continue providing the domestic 
violence service, or if only they would comply with the prescribed service 
requirements of full time operation, then the government would have been 
satisfied. However, the critical difference was about what Kelly defined as the 
legitimate work of the PCC. In the avoidance narrative she believed that the DV 
work was more legitimately provided by the other service, and in the defiance 
narrative that the community work was more legitimately provided by a worker 
taking on a higher level of responsibility and working fewer hours. In the first
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instance, the solution to the dilemma of legitimacy was avoidance and in the 
second the solution was defiance and justification. In this way, the role of 
legitimacy was important in leading to what Kelly judged to be the appropriate and 
suitable organisational response and is discussed further in Chapter 7.
This finding sheds more light on the role of leadership, raised already in 
acquiescence, compromise and avoidance. In particular this highlights the role of 
leadership in defining the legitimate work or goals of the organisation. Kelly defies 
the government worker because she believes it is "ridiculous" to comply with them. 
Again, the contested and socially defined features of work in this sector allow room 
for such differences of opinion.
"Everything comes back to your identity" -  Eddy and the Church at Mission
One of Eddy's favourite stories to tell was about the time she and her colleagues 
directly defied a minister who was looking for their support in a controversial 
government announcement:
"Three other heads of the church national bodies fo r community services and I got 
called into a minister's office at a critical time before a big announcement -  and the 
minister basically said 'we just want to give you a heads up, we are about to 
announce that we'll be changing the arrangements around some big service 
delivery programs.' Now these changes they were planning were very 
controversial indeed, and I got kicked on the ankle by somebody else who was 
there, and I think, 'oh, fantastic, I've gotta speak' so I said 'look... we can't do that' 
and the minister immediately said 'oh, you mean you won't' and I said 'not won't -  
although we won't -  won't is second order, first order is can't because of who we 
are'. Then I said 'you know you are relating with us and you keep persistently 
relating with us as if  we are service providers, that's what we do, but who we are is 
churches at mission... we have resolutions on our books over this specific issue, we 
are unable to make a decision anyway, we are bound by our own churches to not 
carry out your policy, that won't be happening... So that was really interesting, and 
that to me is about how... the churches can stand very clearly often because we say 
'this is what we believe it is to be human, this is how we believe humans best 
aggregate and work together'... We've got a whole swag of public and contextual 
theology around it... We want to create a network where our agencies, our 
organisations on the ground are deeply embedded in those communities, they're 
not just...delivering services to those communities, they're working with
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communities, and it's as much about community engagement and community 
development as it is about the delivery of a service..."
"I reckon everything comes back to your identity, right, so you come back and you 
say, "we are the church at mission, we are partnering with the state"... So you can 
think, Minister, and you can think, departmental secretary, and bureaucrats, you 
can think that you're our life blood but all you give us is money. You don't give us an 
imperative to do what we do. You don't give us embeddedness in and commitment 
to our communities. You don't give us thousands of volunteers who work with us 
because they share our vision of transformed lives and communities. You need to 
realise you're not merely purchasing the human services we provide, as you would 
buy goods at a supermarket, you're investing in us to provide these services, in the 
communities that we are a part of. You are partnering with us..."
"If we accept funding fo r a service then it's a Faith Aid service. We're very, very 
clear on that and I think that government are not always very clear on that. We will 
only take money to run services that f it  with our identity, with our mission, and with 
our strategic goals, Faith Aid doesn't just pick up services for the sake of it... 
Government needs to understand: it's not just you guys who determine what 
happens..."
As with the PCC example above, this narrative o f defiance pivots around Eddy's 
definition of what is legitimate work for the Faith Aid network -  leading to the 
major disparity and inconsistency between what were the government-exerted 
institutional pressures compared with the organisation's goals. Again, the potential 
for economic loss, the low number of stakeholders and high dependence on them 
for funding, all configured to suggest that a more compliant response could be 
predicted. However, the strength of the inconsistency and Eddy's conviction about 
what was legitimate work for the Faith Aid network led to defiance instead of 
another type of response. Eddy's distinction between can't and won't, or " who we 
are" and "what we do" in this instance is particularly illuminative of the depth of 
her conviction about what was and was not legitimate work of the Faith Aid 
network. It was not a simple case of -  we will not deliver your program because it 
does not align with the goals o f this organisation -  it was "we can't because o f who 
we are".
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While Oliver's explanatory and predictive categories focus on the features of the 
institutional pressures as pivotal in determining the tactical responses of 
organisations, clearly here it can be seen that features of the organisation itself, 
and the network to which it belongs, are also pivotal. Especially considering Eddy's 
view that when the service delivered by an organisation in the Faith Aid network is 
"a Faith Aid service", adding to the importance and significance of consistency and 
legitimacy as an over-riding factor for the organisation, determining its tactical 
response. I discuss such features in Chapter 8.
It is interesting here to consider also the potential impact of Eddy's unity with the 
three other church body heads. Such strength in numbers possibly bolstered her 
confidence in taking a defiant standpoint. Flowever, this is unclear. Eddy does not 
say if there had been previous discussion and decisions made amongst the church 
heads in anticipation of such an event. Nor did she suggest a different outcome if 
there had been disagreement amongst this group.
"Governments are taking advantage of us" -  Stan and the peppercorn rent
In an interview with Stan, the Chief Financial Officer of Robwood, he described a 
defiance experience:
"One of the things I said when I came here was that governments are taking 
advantage of us. This may not be a popular view, but / believe the sector should 
form a cartel and say we will not tender fo r services with government unless we get 
a fairer administration component to cover our real costs... For example, when I 
arrived here I reviewed all of the investments that were here, just to gain 
familiarity. And I discovered that way back well over 70 years ago, a public school 
was built on our land, and the department of education payed only a peppercorn 
rent for it -  because of an idiosyncratic arrangement which was relevant at the 
time. But the basis of this arrangement has long since been obsolete, and the 
school is predominantly a public school. But the department were still paying -  it 
was pitiful the amount they were paying -  when I arrived here they were paying 
$5,200 a year rent. The property, I had it valued, was worth six million dollars. We
Page I 166
Chapter 6: Resistance strategies
were paying $5,500 a thousand in insurance on the property. It was costing us 
$300 a year fo r the state government to have this property..."
"So I went in and looked at the lease and I started writing to the Department of 
Education and it took me two years of negotiation to force them to the table to 
then say 'you need to be paying us a commercial rent on this, this is now a public 
school, the original intent of the lease has fundamentally changed'. I got a legal 
opinion on that, stating that I had a right to demand commercial rent and that the 
lease had changed, but the Department of Education wouldn't acknowledge it 
because they knew it was going to cost them money. So they then offered as 
$150,000 a year rent, and our CEO was very excited by this because it was a lot 
more than the money they'd previously been paying... But I said no, that is 
unacceptable, the market rent is what you have to be paying us. So they now pay 
us $380,000 a year rent on a recurring basis, adjusted every year to the market 
because I said, 'well, we'll have to go to the media. I've put this to our board and I 
said my view on this is that we are effectively subsidising the state government... 
and you are benefiting from historic arrangements that have fundamentally 
changed,' I said 'it's immoral and indefensible and I wonder what the media would 
make of this, although we don't want to go down that way.'"
"We had already in that same year closed a program... because... post September 
11, the market crashed and we lost $3.8 million of the revenue we anticipated we'd 
receive from our stock market investments in that year. So we are closing a 
program... at the same time the state government is basically taking advantage of a 
historic arrangement... I don't think so... I stared them down and said 'no, it's 
unacceptable, I'll go to my board and we will have to go public about this it's just 
untenable'. I said 'we cannot close a program and have you getting away with 
this'. They immediately realized, oh crap, and we got our money, but what a 
disgusting situation to be in to have to stare them down... They were so terrified of 
this, because it was at a time when they were worried about the state election... So 
we now fund a program through the income we get from there..."
"Before I started working here it had just slipped under the radar. It's only when 
things got tough, a new person -  me -  came in and the year after we had the post 
September 11 change where things got really tight fo r us that forced us to look at 
everything and I did, and it came out, oh no, we've got to deal with this."
One of the key features of the previous two examples of defiance was the impact of 
contested and socially defined benchmarks and baselines of legitimacy -  and 
therefore the participant's leadership role in defining legitimate work for their 
organisation or network. Disagreement over what was legitimate practice or 
organisation function fertilised the soil from which defiance sprung. So it is 
interesting to reflect on this episode described by Stan, involving much clearer
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market-driven benchmarks and baselines. In this instance, having a "market rate" 
benchmark -  a clear and distinct legitimacy baseline -  bolstered Stan's sense of 
legitimacy, feeding his defiant response.
This narrative demonstrates a good fit for Oliver's predicted relationships between 
the level of resistance demonstrated and the low levels of legitimacy and economic 
gain to be made from compliance. Robwood was not dependent on the 
department for a majority of its funding, and so Stan was not concerned that 
Robwood would experience retribution from his defiant stance. I find it difficult to 
make a judgement about the level of constraint on the organisation's discretion 
that existed in this circumstance. Receiving $380,000 per annum certainly enabled 
Robwood to have much more discretion over its activities than when it received 
only $5,500. However, the pressures involved had not before been actively 
imposing upon Robwood's discretion. Still, because of the potential for resistance 
to lead not only high legitimacy and economic gain, but gain in discretionary 
freedom, I consider Oliver's category of "discretionary constraint" to be high. This 
is also consistent with Oliver's prediction. These factors, as well as having received 
legal advice confirming the legitimacy of his position, worked together to give Stan 
a clear sense that his argument was valid and therefore open and overt defiance 
were a suitable and appropriate response to the pressures from government to 
maintain the peppercorn rent arrangement.
Here, the clearly defined "market" benchmarks in this narrative are another way of 
describing what Oliver defines as "widely diffused norms". In some ways this 
narrative illustrates the interplay of Oliver's "diffusion of norms" and the role of
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legitimacy. In the previous two narratives, there were contentious definitions of 
legitimacy -  whereas in this narrative there are more clearly defined benchmarks. 
Yet, all three narratives describe resistant and defiant responses. So, perhaps what 
this narrative demonstrates is simply that while there are examples of defiance that 
are not as Oliver predicts, there are still those which are. Also, while there are 
examples where contentious norms can lead to increased resistance (such as in 
5.3's EOI negotiation, where a large part of the negotiation was about defining the 
benchmark pricing), there are also still examples where norms are diffuse and 
widespread, yet organisational response is still defiance. Even here, defiance alone 
was not enough to bring about Stan's desired response. Stan also needed to 
employ manipulation tactics -  suggesting media involvement -  to achieve the 
compliance response he sought from government. In other words, features of the 
context -  broader than Oliver's uncertainty, were also important.
In conclusion, underpinning each one of these narratives is the fundamental 
assumption held by the leaders that these organisations should not have to comply 
with the expectations of their environments if they judge these expectations to be 
unreasonable and inappropriate to either their philosophical or pragmatic stance 
on service delivery. Such a judgement can be bolstered by, for example, diffusion 
of norms or a strong sense of legitimacy, but inevitably must be initiated and 
interpreted as important by the NPO leaders who dare to initiate the defiance -  
often with a levei of risk to their organisation.
The issue of each of these narratives being described by the participants rather
than observed is one which is disappointing in that the "reliability" of such
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descriptions cannot be triangulated and a more holistic picture cannot built through 
incorporating observation or document review. However it also illuminates two 
things: that defiance was probably not a common experience, even in the most 
troubled organisational field; and yet that narratives of defiance were definitive. 
Each participant was not shy to define their organisations, through their selective 
use of story-telling, as autonomous agencies -  organisations which would not be 
told what to do, which had their own sense of sovereignty and identity. In many 
ways, these were the definitive legends on which the character and culture of the 
organisation was built.
6.3 Manipulation
On the continuum of least to most “ resistance", Oliver (1991) sees manipulation as
the most active response... because it is intended to actively change or exert power 
over the content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to 
express or enforce them. Manipulation can be defined as the purposeful and 
opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or control institutional pressures and 
evaluations (p.157).
According to Oliver, co-optation is the process by which an organisation seeks to 
neutralise institutional opposition and bring its opponents or potential opponents 
on side, including using "coaiition-buiiding processes and the strategic use of 
institutional ties" (p.158). Influencing focuses on bringing generalised change to 
institutionalised values, expectations and acceptable practices, "because 
performance in institutionalised environments is itself institutionally defined and 
prescribed, the actual definitions and criteria of acceptable performance are often 
open to strategic reinterpretation and manipulation" (p.158). Controlling involves
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"specific efforts to establish power and dominance over the external constituents 
that are applying pressure on the organization" (p.158). Oliver's definition of 
manipulation implies the "artful skill or deviousness" of a standard dictionary 
definition of manipulation "to adapt or chance... to suit one's purpose or 
advantage" (Macquarie Dictionary, 2006, p.488).
Just as with defiance, Oliver predicts that manipulation will occur when:
• an organisation is likely to gain low levels of legitimacy and economic gain 
from compliance;
• there is a high number of constituents or stakeholders on which the 
organisation has a low level of dependency;
• the institutional pressures have a low level of consistency with the goals of 
the organisation and there is a high level of constraint on organisation s 
discretion;
• there is a low level of legal coercion involved in exerting the pressures and 
these pressures are not at all broadly diffused and accepted in the field; and
• the levels of uncertainty and interconnectedness are low.
There is no difference in Oliver's prediction profile between defiance and 
manipulation -  for which neither Oliver nor any subsequent research on Oliver's 
framework provides an explanation. The findings from this study suggest there is
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indeed a complete overlap between instances of defiance and manipulation. 
Considering the paradigm of response in which Oliver situates her "strategies" of 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation, the episodes of 
responsive manipulation -  co-optation, influencing and controlling -  appeared as 
fleeting but inherent and intertwined aspects of defiant responses.
However, like avoidance, it was difficult to identify fu ll narratives where responsive 
manipulation was the centre point of the narrative. For example, consider the 
defiance narratives described above in 6.2. Kelly's defiant response of "/ told him 
o f f  when the department area manager came to " read the riot act" was 
intertwined with her simultaneously seeking to influence this area manager's 
opinion about what was the correct level and type of funding. Kelly seeks to 
manipulate by influencing at the same time as defying:
"/ had to say 'no, hang on a sec, we only open the information and referral part of 
the organisation from 9 til 3, but the rest of the centre and the rest of the programs 
operate any time, night times, weekends'" [Kelly].
I believe in this episode, Kelly also sought to manipulate by exerting control 
(according to Oliver's definition) inasmuch as she sought to employ "specific efforts 
to establish power and dominance over the external constituents that are applying 
pressure" (Oliver, 1991, p. 158) when she said to the department area manager:
"'no, excuse me; you get more value for your dollar than you could ever imagine, 
what we put in, what we self fund... back off mate"' [Kelly].
Similar momentary flashes of Oliver's manipulation can be seen in Stan's 
description of his response during the peppercorn rent narrative (in 6.2). In this
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instance, Stan seeks to reinforce his interpretation of the suitable benchmark for 
rent by referring to standard market rents and gaining a legal opinion to back up his 
claim. He uses this information to try and influence government's approach to the 
situation, however when this doesn't work, he resorts to controlling techniques 
when he pressures government, saying "'I wonder what the media would make of 
this?"' [Stan]. Again, manipulation is embedded in, and intertwined with defiance. 
In a similar way, during the EOI negotiation narrative (in 5.3), Kay's letter to the 
department in which she makes defiant demands about the negotiation process 
also contains her suggestion: “that if the department should no longer wish it 
[Robwood] to be a provider, it should submit a letter to the Chair of Robwood's 
board stating so immediately''. Viewed through Oliver's (1991) lens, this letter is 
defiant and manipulative part of a broader, long-term narrative of compromise.
The example above (in 6.2) in which Eddy describes FAA's defiant response to the 
controversial government announcement again demonstrates influencing, where 
Eddy seeks to educate government about the Faith Aid network:
"/ said 'you know you are relating with us and you keep persistently relating with 
us as if  we are service providers, that's what we do, but who we are is churches at 
mission...'" [Eddy].
I believe also that this narrative demonstrates co-optation. It is not so much co­
optation in the strict Selznickian sense of the word, in which an organisation brings 
its opponents onto its side (Selznick, 1949). Instead, it is co-optation in the sense 
used by Oliver, a “coalition-building processes and the strategic use of institutional 
ties'' (Oliver, 1991, p. 158). This is because of the presence of the other network 
representatives in her narrative, possibly contributing to a sense of strength in
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numbers for Eddy. Kaye exercises a similar coalition-related process when she is 
quoted alongside the leaders of other large providers in the newspaper (in the EOI 
negotiation narrative in 5.3).
Another example of the organisational response of manipulation via co-optation, 
influencing or controlling can be seen in the "day in the life" narrative of Kelly and 
the PCC described in Chapter 4. In this narrative, Kelly and I are on our way to a 
meeting in which a range of workers are gathered from across the state, all 
connected to a common program. Kelly describes difficulty experienced by the 
worker at the PCC in reporting her work as a part of the program, because
"the reporting isn't in line with what we said we'd do in the original application, 
instead the reporting is in line with what they want to see... and there is no process 
for Noni to report on the things she does in her reporting mechanism. So she's had 
to kind of make it up in a sense" [Kelly].
In many ways, Kelly's response to the PCC's relationship with government here is a 
story of defiance. Kelly takes the approach that "we are her employer and we say 
what she'll do''. Kelly has been invited to speak to the group of workers who are a 
part of this program about the style of professional practice used at the PCC, "to 
help the network 'get a common language, a common understanding o f community 
development work"'. I interpret this as Kelly seeking to influence the 
institutionalised values, expectations and acceptable practices within the program, 
to be more aligned with the work of her colleague at the PCC. Again, influencing is 
an integral feature of defiance.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of Oliver's set of predictive antecedents on each 
of these fleeting occurrences of defiant manipulation. Each shares a "prediction
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profile" with the defiant narrative that exists alongside it. Re-analysing these brief 
flashes of manipulation according to the same profile of antecedents would add 
little here. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain what lessons can be learnt about how 
manipulation operates from these examples, other than to suggest it is often an 
integral part of a defiant response. There were, however two other useful 
examples of manipulation as a direct response to pressures, where it did not 
otherwise occur specifically and clearly intertwined within a context of defiance.
The first is in Robwood's EOI narrative. In this narrative, one of the first things 
Ronan does in response to hearing from the department that Robwood's costs are 
too high, is to prepare an explanatory paper explaining why these costs are as they 
are. In some ways this response fits with Oliver's definition of influencing and could 
be seen as responsive manipulation that is not intertwined inextricably with a clear 
act of defiance. However, I wonder if, for a non-confrontational pragmatist such as 
Ronan, education and influence was his own personal leadership style of defiance. 
This theme is discussed further in Chapter 8 which looks beyond the Oliver 
framework at explanations for NPO responses.
The second example is described below. This was one where Kelly and the PCC 
sought support from state and federal members of parliament, and specifically how 
she and a colleague approached the minister responsible for funding a program 
when this funding was due to expire in response to what she believed was the 
imminent de-funding of the program.
"What was the go with the visit to that minister -  whose portfolio covered the
department who funded one of your programs?" [Alison]
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"Well, our funding was going to run out in June of this year..." [Kelly]
"You lined it up through your local member?" [Alison]
"Yeah, he lined it up fo r us" [Kelly].
"You contacted your local federal parliament member and said, 'our funding's going 
to run out'?" [Alison]
"Yeah, we contacted him towards the end of last year and just flagged it, and he 
said ok... we see him about yearly. We have a relationship with him... so the year 
before last we'd been to see him just for a visit to let him know what was going on... 
At that time / said 'would you consider being the guest speaker at our AGM this 
year?' and straight away without batting an eyelid, he said 'I've got something 
better than that, let's get the parliamentary secretary for your sector to come and 
be your guest speaker' [laughing] And we went 'OK', and he organised it, he made it 
happen... it was great... We put on a forum... we don't just keep these people all to 
ourselves... we put on a forum in the afternoon and we invited all the federal 
government community services department funded programs in cooee of us and 
they all came and anyone else that was interested in family issues... So we had this 
forum and that finished at 5 and then we had a little break, a drink, and started the 
AGM and straight away the chairperson opened the meeting and the parliamentary 
secretary was our first guest speaker and then left, she didn't stay at the meeting... 
so in the break she had come up to me and said 'what do you think I should talk 
about?', and I said 'just tell us a little bit about yourself, tell us why you became a 
politician, and why you love governance and all that' and so she did, she was a 
farmer, and she flies planes... So that was good. Yeah. So that was two years 
ago... so then I rang our local federal government member again at the end of last 
year and said 'ourfunding is going to run out in june next year, what do you think?' 
and he said, 'Ok, we'll look into that next year. It's too early. We'll do that next 
year'" [Kelly].
"Did you actually talk to your local member himself -  like, you just call your local 
member and your local member chats away with you... ?" [Alison]
"No, he won't talk to you on the phone, but if  you see him he'll talk to you. But you 
see I have an intimate relationship with Lorraine, his secretary-p.a." [Laughing] 
You have to. These are the gatekeepers. You have to get to know the Lorainne's of 
the world... yeah, and so, he came and saw us and we talked strategy and at that 
point we were trying to get the minister to come to the centre, that was the original 
thing... but then... we went to him. Although, it was really frustrating, we were 
turning ourselves inside out worrying about the funding, and we got an 
appointment to see him just weeks before the program funding was due to expire, 
to put our case forward for more funding and when we walked in the door he 
looked at us and said 'you've got twelve months of extra funding so what are you 
doing here?' And it was just like [she rolls her eyes and sighs]. We didn't even know 
until we got down there, after spending I don't know how many hours worrying 
about it. And the support person for him said 'oh, yeah, sorry we only got 
notification this morning', and we thought 'gee, we've been freaking out about it'. I 
was just so gobsmacked, we put so much emotion into it thinking our jobs are 
really on the line here. And then we get another year so we've got to do it all again
Page I / 76
Chapter 6: Resistance strategies
before the 30th of June so, yeah, there's just so much insecurity. Maybe that's just 
how it is" [Kelly].
Here manipulation does not occur within a context of direct defiance. Kelly's visit to 
the minister was still a responsive manipulation activity, done in direct response to 
what she perceived was a looming threat that the funding for that program would 
expire. In this instance, the manipulation activity was specifically focused on 
addressing this one particular issue. The PCC was at imminent risk of losing its 
funding, which would completely cease the organisation's ability to keep running 
the program. This led to Kelly resorting to using the contacts in her highly 
interconnected environment to facilitate the extraordinary strategy of visiting the 
minister.
Comparing this to Oliver's prediction profile for manipulation suggests that there 
were some close matches in the predictive antecedents in this episode with that of 
a highly resistant response. For example, the consistency of pressures with the 
goals of the organisation was low and there was a high level of discretionary 
constraint. However, there were many poor matches between this episode and 
Oliver's predictions, including for the number of constituents (low instead of 
Oliver's predicted high), the level of economic gain from compliance, dependency, 
interconnectedness and legal coercion involved (high instead of Oliver's predicted 
low).
Curiously enough, it was some of these poorly fitting antecedents which were also 
some of the drivers behind the choice of manipulation as a response here. For 
example, Kelly targeted the minister for "manipulation" because of the PCC's
Page I 177
Chapter 6: Resistance strategies
dependence on the department for funding. Overall, I believe the lesson from this 
narrative is that Kelly did not view this form of manipulation as a highly resistant 
tactic at all. While it was seen of as a fairly extreme response -  in that it was very 
untypical -  Kelly saw it as a legitimate, democratic, suitable and appropriate 
response to the problem at hand. This theme -  that manipulation was not 
necessarily the most resistant tactic employed -  was also common in the many 
narratives about proactive manipulation.
From my observations, it was clear that manipulation -  as defined by Oliver -  
played a far broader role than being simply responsive. It was a commonly 
employed proactive strategy -  by which I mean simply that it was initiated by the 
NPO not in direct response to a particular pressure from government, but as a 
generic act of lobbying or advocacy (Casey & Dalton, 2006). Across each field site, 
the participants all devoted a significant amount of their personal and 
organisational resources to activities -  which were not in direct response to 
particular pressures from government. These were activities which fall within 
Oliver's broad definition of manipulation, but outside her paradigm of responsive 
strategies. Unlike the Machiavellian connotations imbued in Oliver's 
"manipulation", the experiences of the participants in terms of proactive 
manipulation were much more ordinary. In the words of one participant, such 
activities were simply about "appropriately using influence, just like everyone else" 
[Julie, Robwood]. I therefore use the term "advocacy" interchangeably with 
"proactive manipulation" for the remainder of this chapter.
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The examples below describe the advocacy activities of the NPOs in this study and 
demonstrate how while they involve co-optation, influencing and controlling, it is 
impossible to analyse the narratives in comparison to Oliver's manipulation 
prediction profile because of their proactive, rather than responsive nature. I 
report on this group of activities despite their ill-fit with the Oliver framework, 
because I believe they are an important aspect of the nexus between governments 
and the NPOs in this study. They were considered important aspects of the 
participant's work, and took up significant time, resources and effort in their daily 
working lives. I also believe these activities form an important part of the process 
of implementation.
The range of activities across my field sites which could be interpreted as advocacy 
included attendance at reference groups; association and involvement in peaks or 
professional support groups; appearance in the media; meeting with ministers or 
members of parliament to exchange information and advocate for change; 
developing a common brand identity across a network; maintaining a branch of the 
organisation dedicated to "social policy and research"; and making submissions to 
enquiries or from their own initiative. Because of this large range of activities, I 
report on advocacy activities at each field site separately below. Many of these 
activities encompassed broader goals than just advocacy -  they were also about 
professional support and service coordination.
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Advocacy at Robwood
Advocacy and manipulation activities at Robwood were broad and extensive. The 
organisation had an entire unit, the Research Policy and Advocacy Unit, dedicated 
to what was described as both "proactive and reactive” [Julie] activities, including 
activities related to research, media, government liaison, advocacy and policy. The 
women in this branch worked on preparing submissions to the range of enquiries 
occurring at any one time. They also prepared position papers, background papers, 
developed materials for advocacy campaigns, acted as a liaison between the media 
and Robwood's clients and staff, developed and disseminated organisational 
newsletters, service models and information, wrote letters to government and 
arranged parliamentarian visits, coordinated and prepared media releases and 
monitored the media, coordinated and monitored client information databases and 
represented the organisation at inter-organisation advocacy events and conference 
presentations. Robwood covered most of the cost o f this branch from its own 
income sources (investment returns).
For example, I attended a monthly "advocacy planning" meeting held between 
senior workers in this branch and Kaye, the CEO, at which they shared 
"intelligence" and Kaye gave direction about both the proactive and reactive work. 
They discussed recent government announcements at a federal and state level, 
identifying fo llow  up opportunities -  particularly the names and positions o f specific 
people in government, both the bureaucracy and political arms -  who might serve 
as gatekeepers to  opportunities to influence policy.
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The women discussed future events and launches, considering how they would 
"position" such things (such as national or state based, crisis care or preventative 
early intervention). They discussed developing scripts around specific messages 
they wished to convey -  to be produced, laminated and dispersed across the 
organisation. They identified potential allies, patrons and sponsors who could be 
associated with their work, being careful not to "muddle" or overload existing allies 
with too many messages. The pace at which this meeting ran was fast, ideas flew 
quickly and a broad range of topics was covered. At one point Kaye reminded the 
group that "rather than trying to do all things to all people, we have to focus, 
what's the most constructive thing to do?"
Manipulation and advocacy activities at Robwood were not restricted to the 
operations of this branch. Across the whole organisation, a large portion of 
Robwood's advocacy activities were what I called "planting and pitching” -  where 
programs were initiated and planted with Robwood's money for a period of one or 
more years, then when they were established and working well, these programs 
were pitched to other stakeholders for ongoing support. For example, during my 
month there I observed meetings about three completely different entirely self- 
funded projects that Robwood had initiated over the past five years because it 
perceived a need for such a service. I observed several meetings where different 
Robwood staff were "positioning" these three different programs to "pitch" or 
"sell" to government.
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I followed one such narrative throughout the course of my fieldwork, returning 
after fieldwork had ended to attend a meeting at which the "model" was pitched to 
a visiting minister. I narrate this example, in great abbreviation, below.
Early in my fieldwork with Robwood, I'm invited to attend a meeting about 
preparing an EOI for a government initiative. The initiative provides capital funding 
for infrastructure development and some of the senior Robwood workers are 
considering preparing an expression of interest for funds to build a centre. The 
announcement of this initiative has come at a very advantageous time for 
Robwood, who've coincidentally been working for nearly two years with an 
architect to develop plans for a similar type of centre -  an "integrated" centre for 
families with children. It is also synergistic because some Robwood-owned land 
has recently become available for development.
The first meeting I attend is to determine if Robwood's prepared model and site 
are suitable for this EOI process. The senior workers review the detailed EOI 
information from the department and perceive a disparity between this 
departmental wording and the wording of the minister's original announcement 
speech and media release. The wording of departmental information indicates the 
funding is specifically for a more limited and specific type of service delivery. The 
wording of the minister's announcement indicates it is a more generalised style of 
service, the kind that could be more suitably provided for Robwood's more 
disadvantaged client group. The model they have already developed is very 
specifically for the latter, not the former.
Indeed, the difference between their model and the model described in the 
department's EOI documentation means that Kaye, the CEO, won't even consider 
the proposal when they approach her with it at a meeting later that day. "No, no, 
no, no!" she says, adamantly. She is concerned that if the proposal is made and the 
venture is entered into, then the land Robwood owns could end up being used by a 
different and possibly less disadvantaged target client group. It is only when 
someone mentions how this may be an opportunity to build the flagship 
"integrated" model they've been working on that Kaye's fixed stance begins to 
waver. She pauses for a moment's thought, and then agrees to consider it further.
In the end, Robwood's model does not fit the departmental criteria closely enough 
and the EOI is not followed through. The group decide instead to address their 
concern that the model for which government are seeking EOls does not 
adequately target or cover disadvantaged groups. They do this by preparing to 
"pitch" the model directly to the minister as a solution to this identified policy gap 
-  a gap they believe the minister particularly is concerned about based on her 
recent speeches in response to media attention. The minister coincidentally has 
proposed a visit to Robwood in one months' time, in part to promote the 
announcement underpinning the EOI round for which Robwood are no longer 
placing a submission. Robwood decides to use this opportunity to highlight the 
policy gap and their model as a solution.
Preparation for the "pitch" meeting moves into full swing. Another member of 
staff now becomes involved -  Julie, a senior manager responsible for government
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relations. I observe two more meetings as the team prepare for the pitch. In the 
first I observe Kaye and Julie discuss the minister's visit, planning the specific 
message they will pitch, what angles it will cover and the level of detail to include. 
Kaye is particularly concerned to specify what kind and how much funding they will 
pitch for. Kaye has already discussed this idea with a colleague in another 
organisation with whom she hopes to increasingly align Robwood, Rhonda. 
According to Kaye, Rhonda has a good working relationship with the minister. Kaye 
has invited Rhonda to attend the minister's Robwood visit to demonstrate the 
allegiance between the two organisations -  "she's a really, really good operator so I 
think her feedback and involvement is valuable" [Kaye]. Rhonda's organisation is in 
a field where there has been a lot of recent government interest.
I next observe Julie discussing the model with the senior Robwood workers who 
developed it with the architect. Her questions to these women as they prepare 
their "pitch" are:
"We have a compelling case for why... but the thing I feei unclear about is what we 
want next? What is the thing we want to government to do to support us, what is 
the first step, when the minister walks away from the meeting, what do we want 
her take home message to be? The other thing is why us, what is it about us? Why 
us, when there are other models out there? What's special about what we're 
doing? What is our point of difference, the thing that set us apart? Also -  what are 
the policy frameworks we will be fitting this into and what is this minister 
responsible for, what can she actually do about it? Does this fit in with models in 
other countries like the UK?"
Other members of the team respond to Julie's questions, pointing out issues like 
the Robwood's history as an innovator, a best practice organisation, and its 
demonstrated commitment to research, evaluation, collaboration and 
partnerships. They emphasise the desire to build and demonstrate best practice 
models that work best for their service user group. They discuss branding for the 
model.
A team member clarifies: "we only talk about this in the context of disadvantage?"
Julie replies: "yup, that's the Robwood approach... and rather than just getting sites 
up for ourselves, we want to influence the policy agenda saying it's not just about 
unmet need for XX but also for YY... it's for the greater good, this is the message 
Kaye wants to push... but that also gets us into trouble. We cannot be afraid to say 
that Robwood is the best to do this, not just any generalist service provider who 
has no interest in disadvantage... this is Robwood's model, and Kaye's been clear 
about that. But we don't want to get into too much of that detail."
As Julie continues to prepare for the minister's visit, she liaises with the minister's 
office. She provides an agenda and "what we are presenting" to the office so that 
the minister "is expecting us to pitch the ICFC model" [Julie]. She agrees with the 
minister's office that no media announcements will be released about this visit. 
Julie also prepares an extensive briefing and "speaking notes" for Kaye, who has 
"been clear that she wants to lead it" [Julie]. Kaye is away on an overseas holiday 
until the weekend before the minister's visit.
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On the day of the minister's visit, my initial fieldwork stint has finished, however I 
have returned to Robwood to specifically observe this visit. It is a Monday and I 
arrive at the location of the visit 45 minutes before the minister is due. The visit is 
to occur in one of Robwood's service centres -  the room is covered in artwork by 
young children and looks out onto a playground. Some of the others are already 
there and have set up a circle of chairs and a projector screen for their 
presentation. The scaled model of the service, constructed by the architect, is on 
display. One of the team arrives bringing the latest "artist impression" pictures 
from the architect. These are beautiful large posters displaying what the centre 
might look like. However, panic strikes: the women discover a spelling error in the 
labels on every poster -  these have the word "intergrated" instead of "integrated". 
Rapidly, someone prints out alternative labels and we carefully paste these over 
the top of the existing ones. They are disappointed that the result looks 
unprofessional, but it will have to do.
By the time the minister arrives at about 9am, there are about 15 of us present, 
including the local MP, Rhonda and an uninvited but familiar representative from 
the minister's government department. The minister is welcomed, given a tour of 
the centre and ushered into a seat next to Kaye, who leads the 25 minute 
presentation -  using the slides and speaking notes developed by Julie.
Kaye's presentation covers the following topics:
• Information about Robwood -  its size, scope, target group, its research 
capacity, its professional approach, the programs it runs and how these are 
located in the spectrum of services for the target group.
• Information about the model they are advocating: a description of the 
model, research and experience that supports it, the target groups for 
whom it works especially well.
• Niche advantages of the Robwood model: that it is an established provider 
with a developed model and a suitable site, it brings together existing 
services, has established research partnerships, Robwood's leadership 
capacity mean the model could be "rolled out" to other locations.
• The model's alignment with government policy -  and that it is a 
progressive extension of this policy which can effectively target and 
support disadvantaged groups.
• What Robwood are looking for: "A partner to provide capital assistance to 
put the first Centre on the ground."
The presentation is followed by a discussion and morning tea. One of the front-line 
program managers provides an excellent example of her work, a description of how 
Robwood has "reached out" to a vulnerable and service-resistant client. During the 
presentation the minister asks several relevant questions and makes comments 
that convey a thorough understanding of the topic. She reveals that she has 
already had a conversation with one of Robwood's peer organisations about this 
issue. She recommends that Robwood continue to pursue this model and to 
consider presenting it at an upcoming conference. The entire length of the 
minister's visit is scheduled to last for an hour and a half. The minister and MP
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present are given a one-page confidential briefing note with the key messages to 
take with them when they go. Kaye walks the minister to her car as she goes to 
leave and has a conversation which she later tells me didn't contain "anything of 
great significance," just that she reaffirmed that Robwood are keen to use their 
expertise to be of assistance to the minister.
After the minister and visitors depart, we all debrief together. People are visibly 
relieved -  the visit has gone relatively well. While the minister has not agreed to 
work in partnership with Robwood to "put" the centre "on the ground" or even 
given any guarantee that there will be any follow up on this, she did respond 
positively to the model and suggested to the local member that they meet with 
another minister and the local Mayor about it. Kaye kicks off the debrief by 
thanking and congratulating everyone for their input. She asks: "Where do we go, 
what do we want to say now? What did we learn from this?" General discussion 
ensues and quickly focuses on things they could have improved on.
Kaye suggests:
"We need to do more work about what we would expect, and we might need to 
write the script so we all have the paragraph and the three points... We need a 
think tank about what we want to plan so if the opportunities arise we are ready 
and we have the relationships there, 'cos I think it wiil come, but I don't think it will 
be now... We need a paper that we can use in all sorts of circumstances that you 
can hand people... We've got to be up there ready, there will be others up there 
bidding and lobbying, but we've got to be ready. And at the same time we need to 
try and influence the policy parameters around what this looks like. We need to 
consider the other organisations who are pitching this kind of model and think 
about possible allegiances there -  especially with others who are close to us in 
their professional style of work. We need to consider a game plan about when and 
who to ring, when we remind the minister, what buttons to push, and then there's 
a paper to be written, and a bigger picture about what we want to happen... And, if 
we've achieved nothing else then at least the minister recognises us and she 
remembers us."
This narrative shows how manipulation/advocacy incorporates a combination of 
responsive as well as proactive strategies, as one strategy morphs into another. In 
part it was a reaction to what they interpreted as an inadequately targeted 
government policy supported by nearly two years worth of proactive work that 
Robwood had already done on their flagship model. As Kaye explicitly says, "we've 
got to be ready". I interpret the opportunistic pitching of the model to the minister 
during her visit as an instance of co-optation through "the strategic use of 
institutional ties" (Oliver, 1991, p.158). The presentation's content -  in which
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Robwood sought to highlight how the model addressed disadvantage in a way that 
was not already addressed by the government initiative -  was one example of how 
Robwood sought to influence the broad values, expectations and acceptable 
practices. Robwood's emphasis on its size, expertise and ownership of the model 
were a part of its efforts to "establish power" (Oliver, 1991, p.158).
As mentioned above, such an example of proactive manipulation, advocacy, is 
virtually impossible to compare to Oliver's list of predictive antecedents for 
responsive strategies. For example, here it is difficult to determine the number of 
stakeholders involved. From one perspective, the stakeholders involved consist just 
of the minister, the department and Robwood. However, if I include Rhonda, the 
local MP, the peer organisation who have also pitched a similar service, as well as 
the plethora of potential avenues for support they consider pursuing during the 
range of meetings, then the number of stakeholders is high. Oliver poses a 
relationship between a high number of stakeholders with a high likelihood of 
manipulation. Yet Robwood seek to keep the number of stakeholders low as they 
go about their advocacy activities -  I get no sense that Robwood would be likely to 
manipulate more if there were more stakeholders, just because there were more 
stakeholders.
One antecedent does, however, appear to play a clear role. One of the driving 
forces behind this advocacy activity is the inconsistency between the institutional 
norms (to provide a service that is targeted but not aimed at disadvantaged people) 
and the organisation goals (to support service users who are disadvantaged). It is 
this inconsistency, what Julie describes as the gap in the policy targeting which is
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the main aspect of the "pitch" to the minister. Bringing the focus onto Oliver's 
antecedents, I discuss the importance of consistency between institutional norms 
and organisational goals further in Chapter 7.
Overall, this narrative is particularly interesting in that it demonstrates the extent to 
which Robwood clearly does not see itself as just a provider of services, but as an 
organisation with something to say about policy -  a theme which is discussed 
further in Chapter 9. Through identifying (arguably even generating) a policy gap 
relevant to its service users -  people who are disadvantaged -  Robwood seeks to 
influence the policy agenda. It uses a combination of proactive and reactive 
strategies to pitch its solution to this policy gap.
Advocacy at FAA
Being the national body for the network of Faith Aid service providers, one of FAA's 
key objectives and functions was to lobby government and "to exert influence over 
social policy". Advocacy was a key deliverable for the women of FAA, a critical part 
of how their success both individually and as an organisation was judged. Drawn 
from its range of foundational documents, other organisational goals included, but 
were not limited to:
• To inform politicians and decision makers about the strength and depth of 
the Faith Aid network.
• To involve the network in the advocacy of FAA.
• To inform the Faith Aid network about the work of FAA.
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Because advocacy played such a central role, it was sometimes difficult to separate 
it out from other strategies -  falling into the problem of ubiquity where because it 
was everything, it was also nothing. For example, during my fieldwork at FAA, the 
staff were joined by Margi, a media officer on secondment from a Faith Aid service 
provider organisation interstate. For 12 weeks, this service provider organisation 
paid for Margi's wages, travel allowance and accommodation while she worked 
with the women at FAA. This was seen by the CEO of the service provider 
organisation as an excellent investment in Margi's skills in dealing with government 
and getting a better perspective on the Faith Aid network as a whole. The women 
at FAA were delighted to have Margi's support -  especially during the federal 
government budget announcement -  her skills and experience in media relations 
were very useful.
In some ways having Margi present at FAA was a part of FAA's broader advocacy 
strategy -  in that she assisted the women at FAA to prepare media releases in 
response to government announcements, to communicate government 
announcements to the Faith Aid network, and generally to support the advocacy- 
focused work of the office. Flowever, I am not convinced that Margi's presence at 
FAA was specifically and solely a demonstration of "manipulation" as Oliver has 
defined it. While she contributed to organisational responses that sometimes 
included manipulation and advocacy, her presence in and of itself was not a specific 
organisational manipulation/advocacy response.
In this way, there were many instances where the narrative episodes from FAA -  as
they worked on developing their website, as they put forward requests to the
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governance committee for increased funding, as they worked hard to achieve 
common and consistent branding across the network -  were about advocacy, but 
only in as much as they were about the general work of the organisation, which was 
often about advocacy. Therefore, I have not analysed each and every one of these 
narratives as a part of developing my understanding of manipulation. Instead, 
these narratives are a part of the backdrop to the general picture of organisational 
function I gained during fieldwork at FAA.
Despite this overlap of activities, there were of course, many direct, explicit 
examples where FAA sought to lobby government. For example, FAA hosted 
regular meetings with senior executives from key organisations across the Faith Aid 
network -  grouped according to the service users they worked with (such as 
children and families, people who are ageing, people with disabilities). These 
meetings provided the service providers with an opportunity to network, share 
information and have input into the direction of the work of the FAA office.
One of the pivotal events, which occurred during my fieldwork with FAA, was what 
they described as a "parliamentary forum" -  a daylong event in which particular 
members of the Faith Aid provider network interacted with ministers, shadow 
ministers, members of parliament and senior departmental staff about service 
delivery issues in one specific field of social policy implementation. I describe this 
event below, in the voice of the FAA women, based on a group discussion with the 
participants in the days following the event.
"The forum was held at Parliament Flouse, in one of the private dining rooms.
We'd prepared a careful seating plan and around the table sat representatives
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from the large Faith Aid aged care service providers -  nine men and seven women 
-  who were all responsible for covering their own costs to attend the event, and 
four of us from the office. The event ran from about 9am to 4pm, although we 
were there from about 7.30am til 6pm. It was all carefully choreographed, we'd 
written a detailed running order for the day and we'd spent ages preparing the 
room and doing a walk-through before the meeting started; there was a person 
who was designated to usher visitors in, and another to usher them out -  someone 
was even responsible for taking photos and providing glasses of water for the 
visitors."
"We had prepared a kit for each parliamentary and departmental visitor to take 
away with them, showing the size and scope of the network through having 
biographies of the people in the network. It was carefully worded, introducing the 
participants as leaders of their own services in the Faith Aid network. We'd 
highlighted things like the percentage of the aged care market that our network 
covers and we had visionary statements like "People matter" and "Together we can 
make a difference" scattered throughout the booklet. In the booklet we'd 
prepared for the Faith Aid network participants there were biographies of all the 
visitors, extracts from their first speeches and information about their most recent 
media releases. We had our banner up in the corner of the room and all the 
nametags and information was meticulously badged with the Faith Aid network 
brand, as well as acknowledging the specific names of the services that the 
participants were associated with. The badging was great -  it was a visual cue for 
people in the network to operate as a group, it was very professional looking, the 
badges, the brochures, the mission on the back of our name plates, the co-branding 
with the Faith Aid logo, and the person's organisation name too."
"We were a bit disappointed that some people, including the Prime Minister, the 
Treasurer and some members from the minor parties -  all who'd initially accepted 
our invitation -  could not attend in the end, but it was still good to have all the 
people we did have. We'd let the PM know that we'd be willing to be as flexible as 
possible, to move anything around or cancel breaks in order to have him address 
the forum. Each visitor had an approximate 30-45 minute time-slot which 
encompassed an introduction to the event by Eddy, an introduction to the issues of 
concern for the network by a delegated network member, a presentation by the 
visitor, and general discussion. During Eddy's introduction she talked about FAA, 
who we represent, the size of the network, its scope, who's around the table, the 
basic rundown on what Faith Aid Australia is, and how FAA is different to other 
groups -  being a faith based organisation, standing alongside people who are poor 
instead of just being a provider representative group."
"While we'd set specific and short time frames for each segment, things tended to 
go for longer than intended so there wasn't much time fo r questions, which isn't 
necessarily bad, because it prevents going down a rabbit hole of one person's issue 
and meant it was less likely for any one person to hijack the discussions or go off on 
one dimensional questions... We were saying that we're a national network, and so 
we're not so interested in one particular state issue, and the network people 
wanted to hear where the politicians are at, hearing the language used by the 
politicians. People were disappointed that they'd come all this way to see the 
Wizard of Oz, only to find he had no vision for the sector."
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"We had prepared for the meetings by caucusing in a meeting just couple of days 
before -  it would have been good to have allowed a bit more time in between 
really. We would've liked to have... informed them, the departmental visitors, more 
closely about what we wanted them to talk about -  which is hard because you have 
to go through so many staffers... you're never talking to the minister before they 
come and talk. You don't know how many versions the info will go through, what 
lens the advisors are putting over it. In the invites we'd said 'we have designed the 
forum to facilitate high level discussion on the issues involved in aged care today 
and into the future. We will be operating under Chatham House rules and 
anticipate vital conversations identifying policy and service issues and solutions.' In 
part this was because we'd only got our final, complete confirmation of the issues 
we wanted to discuss at the meeting we'd had only a few days before: we had 
decided on discussing the impacts of the system on four broad issues like the 
availability of staff, ageing population and so on.
"The Chatham House rules were appreciated by the shadow minister, who used the 
opportunity to float a range of policy ideas -  a demonstration of how the shadow 
minister trusts the group, because there is already a relationship there. We are 
firmly committed to acting in a bi-partisan way, but we've found that it tends to be 
the opposition who are more interested in talking to you in a policy sense, and so 
you tend to build more of a relationship with them, maybe it's just because they 
don't have as many people working for them so they need to seek outside sources 
for their information. Whereas the minister was clear to state while they'd be 
open in their discussion with the group, they'd been in politics for long enough to 
not trust Chatham house rules."
"The meeting with the department's senior executive person involved discussion 
about policy at a more detailed level -  which was what we'd asked him to do... He 
also gave some advice about how to engage with government, which was not only 
advice fo r our benefit, but that was intended also to make his life easier -  making 
the road between government and the community sector easier. His advice was: 
have an agenda, get us back around the table, with a place where you want to get 
to, have a point, don't just campaign on general stuff, but have some ideas for 
them, have some solutions."
"On reflection, he might have fe lt he was a bit railroaded... it was a bit 
overwhelming... There were a lot of us, he had a nervous look on his face when he 
came into the room, but that was gone by the end, because our people 
demonstrated that they were open to discussions and weren't going to bash him 
over the head first... He would have liked to just do his spiel, but we wanted to talk 
about more in depth issues, which was just not what he was expecting. He came by 
himself, which was unusual; it had been hard to get hold of him through the week 
to ask 7s there anyone you want to bring with you?' and when we did finally talk to 
him about it he said it was a bit late to organise it... I would've thought surely he 
would have wanted to take someone with him, even just to be exposed to that as 
professional development... I would've thought he'd bring someone to at least take 
notes... He has met with various people in our network before, but whether he 
knew they were from the same network, I don't know. I guess I was a bit 
disappointed he didn't see it more as an opportunity, giving it a bit more thought or 
preparation."
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"Having it in Parliament House was important for both the politicians who couldn't 
leave Parliament House and good for the network to see Parliament House... to see 
where we work... you know, even little things like having lunch in the staff dining 
room, we saw one minister's chief of staff and all sorts of people. The challenges of 
the day were about gaining and retaining leadership of the session -  you know, the 
minister expects to be able to talk and then go -  and retaining a national focus, 
retaining a unified message and a unified network... just by being there, the 
willingness to come together, and that we can show that we're responsive and 
available... So there'll be even more willingness to speak with us again next time. 
We've proved ourselves not to be wild and crazy, but to be professional and issues 
focused..."
"It had been a challenging process negotiating and deciding who would be there. It 
related to our objectives for the day... one possibility would have been to invite 
everyone and have one particular type of interaction. But we wanted to have 
influence. There's a finite number of people who can be heard, who can f it  around 
a table, so then you work backwards from there; who are your really cluey people... 
the leaders in the network, who can talk from a visionary level, and who runs a 
service that exemplifies quality or a niche market... you want them there every time. 
Then it's about refining the list... map where are the holes... to present a national 
network... Each CEO bought with them their Chief Financial Officer, we figured, we 
might have questions asked of us with the kind of detailed information that these 
people could answer -  although this level of detail wasn't really discussed in the 
end. It depends on your purpose. If you want to have a really detailed discussion 
with a minister, you'd try and get them for half a day, but then try and get past 
their diary staff. It all comes down to what you want to achieve. You have to be 
clear about that and structure it accordingly."
"Overall, considering our goals for the day -  getting the network access to the 
people who were leaders in government and to get the issues to the politicians -  it 
was a very successful day. The goals of the day were about exposure, to expose 
politicians to the network, and to expose the network to the work of the national 
office. It was a success because people enjoyed being exposed to that national 
focus, they believed it was relationship building, and they found the breadth useful, 
meeting with government and opposition and the department. We have had 
comments back, like 7 never would have had access to these people at that level', it 
was good to see everyone come together to talk as one group. It was also good for 
the network to be reminded of why it's good to be a part of the network. After it 
was all done, we put the photos and a story about it on our website and in our 
newsletter."
This narrative is an interesting example of advocacy, demonstrating the importance 
o f strategic positioning as an advocacy technique for FAA. I interpret this narrative 
as demonstrating an example of Oliver's co-optation via coalition building, with the 
FAA network seeking to form or strengthen existing alliances with the government
and opposition as well as the bureaucracy. The presence of each organisation's
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Chief Financial Officer indicated their hope that there would be scope for 
influencing some of the "detail". I interpret their efforts to demonstrate the size 
and scope of the Faith Aid network as a control action which sought to "establish 
power" (Oliver, 1991, p.158).
It was interesting to see the extent to which the forum was as much about internal 
network cohesion and unity as it was about the pressures exerted on government. 
The careful choreography, the departmental and parliamentary visitors take-home 
kit (all about promoting the clout and professionalism of the network), the badging 
and branding, positioning the network as different to other groups and the 
network's "willingness to come together" -  all show that in this instance, for FAA, 
advocacy was more about proving themselves as an important player, rather than 
the particular points they were seeking to prove. Such a focus points towards the 
impact of the organisation's life cycle, or point in its strategic development, on its 
choice in tactics (Boin & Christensen, 2008; Selznick, 1957).
While this episode occurred within a broader context of a new policy initiative 
having occurred, it was not in direct, specific and immediate response to a 
particular announcement or initiative. As with the Robwood example above, 
considering this narrative in comparison with Oliver's prediction profile for reactive 
manipulation shows it to be a relatively poor fit. For example, here, FAA and the 
Faith Aid service provider network's dependence on government (for both funding 
and legitimacy) as well as the coercive and diffuse influence of government are all 
high in this example instead of Oliver's predicted low. If anything, this narrative
demonstrates the importance, once more, of the organisation's overarching goal in
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determining their actions. Here FAA's goal was "exposure" and "access", and it was 
clearly the driving strategy in the day's events.
Like Robwood, FAA was seeking to be an organisation with policy input. Unlike 
Robwood, however, this is not in the slightest bit surprising, considering it is an 
organisation specifically charged with key deliverables related to advocacy. What I 
find interesting about this narrative instead is that it demonstrates such a strong 
theme of FAA and the Faith Aid network seeking to prove its advocacy is worth 
listening to -  clearly, merely establishing itself as an advocacy organisation does not 
automatically mean its voice is heard.
Advocacy at the PCC
For an organisation so small, I was surprised to see such a range of advocacy 
activities occurring at the PCC. Kelly regularly presented at forums, workshops, 
conferences or network meetings -  seeking to influence the baseline expectations 
and values of the environment. There were also many other activities that were 
not specifically designed for the sole purpose of supporting advocacy activities, 
however had the potential to lead to advocacy. For example, the PCC regularly 
hosted steering committee reference group meetings for each of its programs, 
where providers or stakeholders with an interest in the work of the program were 
invited to share information, experiences and to network. It would have been easy 
for these meetings to generate a groundswell of agreement amongst the group that 
particular course of advocacy should occur to address a systemic problem -
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however I did not observe such a groundswell during my brief one month visit with 
the PCC.
The PCC were represented on the state-based Community Centres Association 
(CCA) of which Kelly was a past president. Kelly put substantial work into preparing 
a "social policy submission" on behalf of the CCA. The general gist of this 
submission was that the work of community centres was important and while, at 
the moment, each centre received funding for one position (that of a community 
worker), each centre also needed funding for a centre co-ordinator, to provide 
leadership, direction and coordination for the centres. I observed the amount of 
time Kelly invested into preparing this, I read drafts of it and listened to her discuss 
it with colleagues. One day during fieldwork I asked her about the feedback she 
had received about it earlier that day from a well-connected high-profile peak body 
CEO colleague:
"She said the arguments are good, but who cares, they're not going to care about 
all the touchy feely arguments... nobody cares... in a way, people don't really care 
about social justice, at the end of the day, this is an economic argument, this is an 
efficiency argument. She says I went into too much detail about the history of our 
organisations and our type of service. She also said to think strategically about 
what to actually ask for. Like, if we would include unfunded centres in the scope of 
the submission. But the CCA can't lobby for everybody."
I saw Kelly present the submission to the CCA Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
There was a senior government official in attendance at a part of this AGM whose 
department provided key funding to the PCC and other community centres. She 
had been invited along to tell the group what was happening in government and to 
hear about what was happening for the community centres. Kelly felt it was good 
to hear her feedback about the submission. She described things like the
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appropriate time of year to make funding submissions -  Kelly later mentioned that 
she did not realise this was so far in advance of when a budget is being prepared.
The government official also mentioned some key words and catch phrases -  like 
"service system enhancement" -  of which Kelly was quick to take note. She also 
reminded them that the submission needed to be pitched in a way where it could 
win over people not just in her department, but in Treasury, who may not know 
anything about the work of community centres, and who were comparing the CCA 
submission with submissions related to agriculture, schools, water and other 
priorities. The daunted look on Kelly's face in response to this comment was clearly 
visible.
Later I asked Kelly why she was writing the submission?
"Why am I writing it? Well, because there's no one's writing it, I was the past 
president of the network, so I agreed to do it. It needed to be written so I thought I 
should do it. I mean I could've waited, Alison, I could've waited til I finished work, 
and I could've gone to them and said "you need a social policy submission written 
for you, I'll write it, pay me", I could've done that... but, I dun no, I guess the fire's in 
my belly now. To write it, the arguments are all there 'cos they're real for me now 
and it's kind of ok, because, well, my workplace paid fo r that... Yeah, I'll claim the 
time in lieu... I'm having that time off, / just made that decision... but that's right, 
that's why nothing's been done before, because no one's been willing to give up 
their frigging weekend and write the document in the past."
As was often the case with Kelly, her candid responses illuminated themes which 
were otherwise not as visible or apparent. In this case, I interpret such a response 
as demonstrating the importance of Kelly's agency, initiative and leadership, the 
"fire" in her "belly" -  which I discuss further in Chapter 8.
Kelly was also quick to share information with her networks of allies -  consider the 
narrative in 4.3, where Kelly meets the "new world order" bureaucrat. In this
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instance, she mentions this experience to a colleague and ally later that same day, 
warning him of this new bureaucrat's officious working style. She was quick to 
email or inform her colleagues when she had experienced new practices from 
government. She had shown me an email she sent to a network of allies, after a 
meeting with a worker from another government department in which this worker 
had attempted what Kelly interpreted as a "sneaky introduction of benchmarking 
into the work plans that accompany the service agreements":
"They said 'see here on page six where you talk about the families, let's put the 
number of families to target for next year's outputs" -  outputs are part of a fucked 
marketised, managerialist agenda that doesn't reflect the good work we do 
adequately. We need to come up with tools that can more meaningfully reflect the 
work. So straight after this meeting I sent an email to my colleagues in the network 
to warn them this was happening."
These forms of networking are partly about co-optation using "coalition-building 
processes" (Oliver, 1991, p.158). I think such examples of sharing information 
around networks are also about influencing. In sending such an email to her 
colleagues, Kelly is specifically articulating aspects of "the actual definitions and 
criteria of acceptable performance" (Oliver, 1991, p.158). She is giving a "heads up" 
about the changed expectations to the other organisations, so that her colleagues 
can pre-consider their responses accordingly.
Kelly was connected to several overlapping but distinct networks. Indeed, the PCC 
had formalised close working connections with a few other organisations in the 
area through establishing a non-trading cooperative. Kelly describes this as having 
occurred specifically in response to experiences she'd had with other organisations 
in the area:
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"The reason why we got together was 'cos the manager from that organisation 
came and visited each of us independently because he wanted to apply for a 
massive multimillion dollar employment grant for the region, but one of the 
performance measures was that he had to have a shop front... they came and 
schmoozed us all with his suit... they came with this spiel, they basically wanted to 
apply for this employment work for the dole scheme... and they had three kind of 
proposals to put to me and they'd done the same speech with my allies, XX, YY and 
ZZ... and what he wanted was he wanted us to sign a document to say we 
supported in principle their application... so, then that was all good, I listened to 
their whole story and at the end / just said 'guys, can I just ask a simple question 
here: why would I wanna support the federal government's work fo r the dole 
scheme? How does social justice f i t  there?' [laughing] Now I can tell you, the look on 
their faces, they absolutely were not prepared for that question..."
"There was this deadly silence... and the manager from this organisation eventually 
said, 'Look, it's happening anyway... and so if  one of your workers did it, you would 
at least do it the social justice way, you know.' Pretty smart..."
"In the end / did sign an agreement in principle... that we would support their 
application..."
I ask: "What do you think ofthat though? That is the justification that a lot of 
people give."
Kelly replies: "Yeah, and in a way, I could say the same thing about one of the 
projects I work on, I'm participating in a top-down government led social policy 
thingy, but it's a vehicle by which I'm helping them empower themselves, y'know, 
you can say that. But it was just that thing of 'do I really believe in this whole work 
for the dole thing and the federal government's approach' you know..."
"Well, the next thing that happened... another organisation... they rang my 
colleague and said, 'we're thinking about applying for this funding' and basically it 
was about a similar type of service to what we provide, but in a neighbouring 
region. They didn't already provide any services in that region, so they needed to 
demonstrate they did or would have a connection with the community in their 
proposal. My colleague's first reaction was 'well, I can't speak fo r all the various 
communities of that region, but I'd be prepared to facilitate a conversation with 
those communities... so you can come and talk to the communities', and they said, 
'OK we'll get back to you.'"
"Well they didn't get back to her, they just wrote the application, and they actually 
did say they had the support of the communities... they applied for the grant 
without our knowledge, they got it."
Seeking to clarify, I ask: "Do you know that that organisation wrote in the 
application that they had the support of the community?"
Kelly replies: "We don't know that, we haven't seen it but we assume that they 
would've had to have done that, to have received the grant. And then, they had the 
hide to ring my colleague up and say 'oh, we got the grant, now, can you put us in 
touch with everyone please?' That's what they said!"
"So do you think it's possible they misinterpreted what your colleague said?"
[Alison]
"What do you mean?" [Kelly]
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"That when they met with your colleague and she said..." [Alison]
"They didn't meet with her" [Kelly],
"Oh, did they just call her?" [Alison]
"Yeah" [Kelly],
"Well, when she said "I can't tell you that I give you our support but I can tell you 
that I can arrange fo r you to meet..." [Alison]
Kelly interrupts me with a correction: "She said 'I can put you in touch with the 
people you need to talk to'... The bottom line is that they needed to talk to the 
communities, and they didn't do that... In other words, another large organisation 
also applied for a large grant, but in this case they didn't approach us to discuss it, 
they just put in the submission to do a program that traditionally is the purview of 
community centres, which they were not."
"So anyway... that pissed us all off that that'd happened, even more so with that 
one, because that type of service is what our type of organisation does, whereas 
we don't all do work for the dole stuff Uke what the other organisation manager 
was asking about... although we've all dabbled in it, and actually, one of the 
organisations does a fa ir bit of it..."
"So after those things happened, about the next week, it was my AGM, the PCC 
AGM. My two colleagues were standing right there, we were having a drink and I 
said 'guys are you pissed off about what happened with these other two 
organisations... you know, are you sick of being taken over? Do you think we should 
get together and talk about this? And so we did, we had a meeting before 
Christmas that year, our AGM was in November and we decided to form a co-op. 
Now, i f  things gets tougher... i f  we have to have a bigger voice we now have 
a formal connection with four other similar organisations... we've cornered 
the market for our type of work in this area so really, now if  government 
wants to talk to a single entity, they can talk to us."
Here, I interpret the response to form a co-operative as a demonstration of both 
"coalition-building", the "strategic use of institutional ties" as well as "specific 
efforts to establish power and dominance" (Oliver, 1991, p.158). Reflecting on the 
full range of advocacy activities engaged in by the PCC, it is difficult to apply Oliver's 
set of predicted relationships between antecedents and responses as a useful 
interpretive device due to the fact that many of these activities are not direct 
responses to specific pressures from government. For example, Kelly described 
forming the co-operative as a response to "being taken over"; however, it was also 
as a proactive measure for " if things get tougher". Despite this, Oliver's framework
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can still provide an interesting lens. After all, the PCC's manipulation activities 
centre strongly on legitimacy, diffusion, uncertainty, interconnectedness and 
seeking to define the institutional norms as consistent with the organisational 
goals.
Considering advocacy at the PCC as a set or group of findings, it further shows the 
PCC as an organisation with a strong sense of its own identity. The PCC's advocacy 
activities focus on strengthening and defending this identity, as well as educating 
others about it. These activities are about defining what is and is not the legitimate 
work of the organisation, as well as the legitimate processes through which the PCC 
and government interact. It is about seeking to define the institutional norms as 
consistent with the organisational goals, and through the selective use of 
interconnectedness, to diffuse these norms as strongly as possible. ! believe 
proactive manipulation activities for the PCC are about preparing for an uncertain 
future in which Kelly expects to need to increasingly defend her professional 
position.
6.4 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter I have explored examples of the range of "resistance" 
strategies employed by the NPOs in this study. This chapter has complemented 
Chapter 5 which explored compliance strategies to put together a thick account of 
the experiences of NPOs as they are involved in the day-to-day process of social 
policy implementation. In doing so I have shown how NPOs make both strategic 
and responsive choices in dealing with their institutional environments, particularly
Page I 200
Chapter 6: Resistance strategies
the government actors. In many ways, these choices are contingent on the range of 
antecedents predicted by Oliver (1991) as important. As a result, I turn in the next 
chapter to a view focused squarely on these antecedents, followed by analysis of 
the range of themes outside the Oliver framework presented in Chapter 8.
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EXPLAINING NPO RESPONSES TO GOVERNMENT PRESSURES 
WITH OLIVER'S ANTECEDENTS
The descriptive side of Oliver's (1991) framework of organisational response to 
institutional pressures has been explored in Chapters 5 and 6. Using narratives of 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation, I have explored 
in depth the nature and experience of NPO response to government expectations. 
In the course of doing so, I have looked briefly at the relationships between these 
responses and the factors or antecedents leading to them. However, in this thesis, I 
aim not only to identify nuances in the types of responses that NPOs make to 
government pressures, but to understand better how responses vary between and 
within different NPOs and circumstances. This highlights the need to systematically 
review and analyse the antecedents in their own right -  which I do now in this 
chapter and the next. In this way, I seek to critically analyse and contribute to the 
predictive capacity of Oliver's framework.
Therefore, this chapter further applies the findings of my research to the Oliver 
framework, looking at the ten predictive antecedents theorised by Oliver to predict 
the choice of tactics. Oliver groups the ten antecedents into pairs, according to the 
why, who, what, how and where (or cause, constituents, context, control and 
context) characteristics of the institutional pressures that influence the tactics 
chosen in response. I discuss each in turn below. In the next chapter, I identify 
additional important contextual, organisational and personal antecedent themes
emerging from the data in this study.
Chapter 7: Explaining NPO responses to government pressures with O liver 's antecedents
7.1 Cause: The influence of legitimacy and economic gain
According to Oliver, an organisation's strategic response to institutional pressures 
will vary depending, in part, on the "cause" of the institutional pressures: "the 
rationale, set of expectations, or intended objectives that underlie external 
pressures for conformity" (p.161). In particular, Oliver identifies two dimensions of 
"cause" that are relevant -  cause that relates to legitimacy and to economic gain. 
Oliver describes the influence of these two aspects of "cause" on the choice of 
more or less resistant tactics with the two hypotheses:
The lower the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from 
conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational 
resistance to institutional pressures...
The lower the degree of economic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity 
to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to 
institutional pressures (pp.160-161).
In other words, if an organisation judges that tactics of less resistance -  
acquiescence and compromise -  will lead to economic or legitimacy gains, then 
they are likely to employ these strategies. If the organisation believes that such 
low-resistance tactics will not lead to economic or legitimacy gains, then it is more 
likely to resist such pressures via avoidance, defiance or manipulation. Legitimacy 
is a key issue for NPO performance in the institutionalised environment of social 
policy implementation. Neo-institutional theorists suggest that behaving in 
accordance with culturally legitimate procedures is as, if not more, important than 
adopting efficient and effective practices, particularly because such practices may 
be difficult to define (March & Olsen, 1989, 2006; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Legitimacy
The role of legitimacy in this study generally operated as predicted by Oliver. In 
circumstances where the leader judged that there would be a high level of 
legitimacy gained from acquiescence, they were indeed likely to follow a less 
resistant path. It was also important in influencing less resistant responses from 
the participants and their organisations. Conversely, in circumstances where the 
leaders judged there to be a decreased level of legitimacy attainable from 
acquiescence, they were less likely to acquiesce. What was interesting about the 
findings here is the way they demonstrated how this mechanism occurred. 
Particularly serving as a reminder of how NPOs can experience multiple sources 
from which legitimacy is derived and defined, and not all these sources agree on 
the inherent legitimacy of any one response. It was therefore up to the leader of 
the organisation to determine whose definition of legitimacy was the most 
important for the organisation and its response.
There were many instances where the same organisational response that might 
elicit a low level of legitimacy from the government would simultaneously elicit a 
high level of legitimacy from the organisation's internal stakeholders and allies. 
These instances became increasingly common features of the more resistant 
narratives. For example, during my narrative of Robwood's EOI negotiation (in 5.3), 
if Robwood had immediately complied with the price reduction requested by the 
department, then it probably would have received a high amount of legitimacy 
from the department. However, immediate compliance with the price requested 
by the department would have led to a low level of legitimacy from its internal
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constituents and probably its allies. Indeed, there were some in the organisation 
who felt that even in the circumstances described, Ronan's agreement to lower the 
price occurred too quickly: "and what does that then say about Robwood?" 
[Manager, Robwood].
In the same way, the narrative in which Eddy defies government's expectation that 
the FAA network will comply with a controversial government initiative (in 6.2), 
gives the impression that the minister is expecting compliance from the providers. 
Therefore, it is natural to assume government would have ascribed high levels of 
legitimacy to the Faith Aid network if only they had acquiesced this instance. 
However, because (in part) Eddy judged that a low level of legitimacy from her 
internal stakeholders and allies would be derived from agreeing to the request, she 
defied it: "I said 'look... we can't do that'... we have resolutions on our books over 
this specific issue... we are bound by our own churches to not carry out your policy, 
that won't be happening'". In the same vein, in the instance where FAA did 
acquiescence (in 5.2), it could be fair to assume that if Eddy and the FAA had 
supported a government initiative that was not "palatable" for the sake of 
increased organisational exposure, then they would have received internal 
criticism. This would have led to FAA experiencing reduced legitimacy, and 
damaged their relationship with the service provider and church network as a 
result.
The definition of legitimate work was occasionally even more fundamental: it was 
not just about whose definition of legitimacy was more important, but what was
within the umbrella of legitimate work for the organisation. For example, in
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Chapter 5, during Robwood's EOI negotiation, Ronan sees the responsibility for 
delivery of quality services as being a legitimate role for Robwood. However, Ronan 
also clearly sees it as a part of the role of government to determine the bigger 
picture of government expenditure.
Hoping to elicit an informative response from Ronan, I make what I guess is a 
potentially controversial statement: I mention how "it's a bind -  that government 
can't afford all the things that Robwood wants to provide", and I suggest that 
"perhaps it's fair enough they ask Robwood to decrease its costs."
Ronan replies "well, that's their problem, it's too risky, you try and take an 
inadequately funded, substandard service proposal to your board to approve, 
they'll say 'no way'. I'd rather that we do the things we do well, than do too many 
things badly."
What was and was not within the scope of legitimate work for the NPO could also 
be seen as a defining feature of what led, for Kelly and the PCC, to an avoidant 
response in one circumstance or to a defiant response in another circumstance. 
Kelly's definition of what was appropriate work for the PCC and herself was a 
crucial driver in her seeking to "give the money away" (in 6.1), because the 
domestic violence work was not part of what she saw as the appropriate work of 
the organisation. While her definition of what was the legitimate role for her 
position -  to work at a higher level, taking on more responsibility (for less hours) -  
led to the position of defiance (in 6.2).
So, as the responses became more resistant, the relationship between legitimacy 
and response is close to, but not quite as Oliver predicts. Based on institutional 
theory, Oliver predicts that organisations will comply with institutional pressures as 
they seek survival. However, this study suggests that sometimes government's 
definition of legitimacy is not the same as the organisation and its allies' own
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definition of legitimacy. Perhaps another way of defining the relationship between 
legitimacy and resistance is that as definitions of legitimacy diverge, organisational 
resistance is likely to increase.
These instances of divergent levels of "legitimacy perceived to be attainable from 
conformity" serve as a reminder that in the fields in which these organisations 
operated, legitimacy is not fixed, and not only socially defined -  but often hotly 
contested. I can only assume that in the instance of Robwood's EOI negotiation 
with government that there were other organisations, peers of Robwood who did 
define the price set by the department as the legitimate price. Or that there were 
organisations who were willing to implement the controversial policy that the Faith 
Aid network refused to implement. Therefore, there is a crucial interpretive step by 
the leader involved as legitimacy is interpreted and subsequently influences 
organisational response. The leader must determine whose definition of legitimacy 
is important. This theme is discussed more in Chapter 8.
It also serves as a reminder that the pressures faced by organisations are rarely uni­
directional. A disadvantage of this research having focused on the response to 
government pressures is that it did not leave scope to understand the counter­
pressures from internal constituents or peers that many of the participants may 
also have been balancing.
Economic gain
Economic gain also featured generally in line with Oliver's predictions -  where NPO 
responses that prevented economic loss and increased the chance of economic gain
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were more likely than unlikely. For example, for Robwood, the dramatically 
reduced returns on their investments set a scene which influenced a number of 
organisational responses. The need to tighten their belts led Stan to review the full 
range of contracts and financial arrangements of the organisation, leading to his 
discovery of, and subsequent response to the peppercorn rent situation (in 6.2). 
Because of Robwood's diminished ability to keep fully funding a program it had 
been funding for a number years, one senior manager was taken "off line" during 
the course of my fieldwork there to lobby for funding for this program. This risk 
that the money was imminently due to "run out" also provided a strong incentive 
driving Kelly and another PCC worker making the effort to travel and visit the 
minister responsible for the funding to lobby for that funding to continue.
The data here suggests that the impact of economic gain could be seen from a 
broader perspective than just the loss or gain of funding. For example, the impact 
of economic gain or loss on Kelly's response to the PBI compliance was greatly 
increased by the impact this tax status had on the organisation's ability to offer its 
staff salary sacrificing, effectively offering them higher salaries. This was identified 
by Kelly as a particularly important organisational resource that enabled the PCC to 
be a particularly competitive employer in an environment where it was very 
difficult to attract and retain staff.
However, as with legitimacy, there were instances where the relationship between 
economic gain and resistance was not as predicted by Oliver. For example, when 
Kelly "gave the money away" -  choosing to lose one government contract and pass
it on to another service provider while hoping to win other contracts in its place. Or
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when Eddy refused to commit the Faith Aid network to complying with a the social 
policy intervention, despite the potential this decision had to lose the network a 
number of contracts and subsequent funding.
These two examples demonstrate the resistance that arose, despite the risk of 
economic loss, when the participants felt especially passionate or convicted about a 
particular issue -  suggesting possibly the over-riding importance of consistency 
between institutional norms and organisational goals (discussed below and again in 
Chapter 9). This finding echoes the findings of Akingbola (2006), who identified 
that "while government funding may be important, it was not the primary factor in 
the strategy of the non-profits" (p.278). Instead, as with the findings here, NPO 
activity was often driven more as a result of internal organisational needs and goals 
than merely by managing the flow of resources in the external environment.
There are, however, other possible explanations for a willingness to endure short­
term economic loss other than the leader's passion for a particular long term 
position or stance. For example, theories in social psychology, which suggest that 
people are "loss averse", distinguish between gain-seeking and loss-avoidance 
behaviour and suggest that people are willing to take greater risks when seeking 
gain than when avoiding loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Selznick (1957) also 
suggests that a characteristic feature of institutionalised or value-infused 
organisations is their willingness to endure short-term losses that do not comply 
with the values embodied by the organisation. Such alternative explanations serve 
as a reminder that, while the theoretical frameworks used by Oliver in informing
her framework provide a well-formed basis of understanding organisational
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behaviour, they do not fu lly  explain it, and it is a fru itfu l exercise to build on the 
explanations.
7.2 Control: The influence of norm diffusion and coercion
The method and extent of control are factors predicted by Oliver (1991) to 
influence an organisation's choice of strategy.
Institutional control describes the means by which pressures are imposed on 
organizations. Two distinct processes by which pressures are exerted include legal 
coercion and voluntary diffusion... [Such as] sanctions for noncompliance with... 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance... [and] the extent to which an institutional 
expectation or practice has already diffused or spread voluntarily through an 
organizational field (p.168).
Oliver predicts the following relationship between coercion and diffusion and 
resistance:
The lower the degree of legal coercion behind institutional norms and 
requirements, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional 
pressures.
The lower the degree of voluntary diffusion of institutional norms, values, or 
practices, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional 
pressures (pp.167-168).
Diffusion
Based on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) Oliver describes the relationship 
between diffusion and resistance as based on the process of mimetic conformity -  
when institutional practices are diffusely and widely accepted and unquestioned, 
then organisations adopt and mimic them w ithout question. There were a range of 
examples in this study supporting this relationship. As described in 5.2, 
acquiescence by im itation was a common experience for the three NPOs, especially
in terms of such unquestioned practices as working w ithin specified governance
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structures and many of the standard practices for running an office and an 
organisation. However, the findings of this study also give several examples 
painting a different picture to this predicted relationship.
For example, the PCC's vigilant adherence to the PBI status was unusual considering 
that none of Kelly's peers had even contemplated putting such a method of self- 
assessment in place. Kelly's own explanation for this unexpected diligence was that 
the PCC had "a little bit of a leadership role in the sector", and this instance enabled 
Kelly to share the self-assessment system they had developed and implemented at 
the PCC with peers from other allied organisations. I believe also that diffusion did 
not matter in this instance simply because the way Kelly interpreted the 
constellation of predictive antecedents. Viewing a few other antecedents in this 
instance as particularly important meant that Kelly made a judgement to dismiss 
the low level of diffusion as unimportant.
A second example of when there was an unexpected relationship between diffusion 
and response echoes the findings of legitimacy, described above in 7.1, in that 
there could be more than one set of "norms, values, or practices" (Oliver, 1991, 
p.168) which were influencing NPO response. In Robwood's EOI negotiation with 
the department (in 5.3), there were two distinct sets of norms, values and practices 
present -  the department's set and the NPO's set. This was demonstrated vividly at 
the peak body meeting on my first day at Robwood and in the way Kaye was joined 
by the CEOs of other similar large organisation in criticising the department in the 
newspaper article. In this case, Robwood's norms existed within a closely shared 
and widely diffused norm- and values-base. However, this base was with its
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organisational allies, and not with government. The two were not similar. 
Therefore the norms that were diffused were not necessarily those which led to 
compliance with the institutional pressures exerted by government, and pulled the 
organisation towards greater resistance.
Coercion
It was possible to see examples in which coercion played the role as predicted -  
where increasing levels of what Oliver (1991) describes, with the relatively value­
laden term, "legal coercion" (p.167) led to decreased levels of resistance. For 
example, Kelly's decision to comply with the PBI status reporting was greatly 
influenced by her knowledge of the ATO capacity to audit organisations at random 
-  a classic example of the influence of legal coercion.
However, the relationship between coercion and resistance was not consistently 
correlated inversely like this. In the narrative about structural changes at Doberon 
(see 6.1), Kelly experienced the "in-the-box" or rigid and inflexible nature of the 
government officer who administers the program as leading to an increase in the 
level of coercion involved. Despite this increased level of coercion, I interpreted 
this as still a narrative of avoidance, involving a relatively high level of resistance. 
Indeed, in her description of the event, Kelly gives the impression that if the 
bureaucrat had been less "in the box" and legalistic in his approach, then she might 
have been inclined to a more compliant or transparent approach. In other words, if 
the PCC was more likely to be able to negotiate alternative ways of meeting the 
service agreement requirements, in accordance with their understanding of
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Doberon's changed needs and "structural issues", then she would have been more 
likely to make a less resistant response. So here the data demonstrates that 
despite an increase in coercion, there is no subsequent decrease in resistance.
Why is it then that in the instance of my narrative of the PCC's PBI status, the 
increased legalistic coercion led to a more compliant response whereas in the 
structural changes at Doberon narrative, the increased legalistic coercion led to a 
response of avoidance? I think perhaps Kelly's interpretation of the imminent 
possibility of such legalistic coercion being strictly monitored was a feature. As 
described in 6.1, Kelly engages in avoidance here partly because she could. The PCC 
was able in this instance to “fly  under the radar". Kelly is also aware that the 
funding for this program will run out soon anyway and does not see any other 
response as being in the best interest of the PCC. Whereas, Kelly's interpretation of 
a peer organisation in a nearby area being audited by the ATO was that she felt 
there was a good chance the PCC might also be audited and that this would have 
serious implications for the ability of the PCC to offer its staff salary sacrificing and 
effectively higher wages. She made judgements in both of these circumstances 
about the relative risk and consequences resulting from the levels of legalistic 
coercion.
In this way my data supports a definition of coercion broader than a purely legalistic 
one. The above examples suggest that it is not merely the presence of legalistic 
coercion which influences response, but the extent to which this coercion is likely 
to be enacted (as interpreted by the organisational leader). There were also
examples in my study where coercion existed not just in a legal form. The FAA
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experienced both economic and legitimacy-related coercion. This can be seen, for 
example, in what I interpreted as FAA's acquiescent narrative about responding to 
the government initiative. In this instance they experienced pressure from 
government to demonstrate their support for a government announcement. 
However, they were not legally or contractually obliged to do so. Instead, this 
coercive pressure was applied in that if they supported government's 
announcement, they believed -  to a certain extent -  that there would then be a 
greater likelihood that government would include them in future discussions.
7.3 Context: The influence of uncertainty and interconnectedness
Oliver describes two ways in which the context influences the decisions an 
organisation makes in responding to institutional pressures: depending on the 
uncertainty of genera! future events and the interconnectedness of people and 
organisations in the field. The way in which these antecedents are predicted by 
Oliver to influence organisational tactics used was:
The lower the level of uncertainty in the organization's environment, the greater 
the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures.
The lower the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment, the 
greater the likelihood or organizational resistance to institutional pressures (p.170).
Uncertainty
Based on the resource dependence and institutional theory arguments that 
organisations will seek to minimise uncertainty, Oliver (1991) suggests that because 
organisations prefer certainty, they will seek to increase it by complying with 
institutional pressures. However, my findings suggest that -  despite difficulties in
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determining the specific presence and role of uncertainty -  while organisations do 
seek out certainty in their actions, it is not necessarily through the pathway of 
acquiescence.
One difficulty in understanding and interpreting the role of uncertainty here was 
identifying simply "uncertainty about what?" All three NPOs experienced high 
levels of uncertainty almost as a constant baseline in their work and relationships 
with government. I found it difficult to understand the impact of these high and 
changing levels of uncertainty. For example, consider again the narrative about the 
PCC's PBI compliance. In this narrative, Kelly's concern about being audited is 
increased significantly because of her knowledge that another organisation nearby 
was audited, although she is completely uncertain of what the outcome of this 
audit was. I have chosen to interpret Kelly's experience here as being one of 
heightened uncertainty, leading to fear that the PCC is at a high risk of being 
audited. However, it is also possible to interpret the opposite: that Kelly's response 
is increased certainty that the PCC will be audited.
Another example is in the instance is that of Robwood in the EOI negotiation in 
Chapter 5. When Kaye was led to believe that another organisation had signed all 
its contracts with the department, this led to a strongly defiant and even 
manipulative response. However, what I find difficult to ascertain is whether Kaye 
interpreted this discovery as increasing or decreasing the level of uncertainty in the 
environment. Did it increase the uncertainty about what was happening for 
Robwood, or did it increase the certainty for Kaye that Robwood was receiving 
inappropriate treatment by government?
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My difficulties in understanding and interpreting uncertainty are not merely 
semantic. It is added to by my finding that both increased and decreased levels of 
uncertainty could lead to an organisational response involving less resistance. For 
example, consider my description of Robwood's contractual compliance system (in 
4.4). This describes an administrative system established to deal with both the 
certainty of reporting requirements and with the uncertainty of idiosyncrasies of 
each department. As is suggested by Oliver, Robwood has clearly sought to 
increase its own level of certainty by developing and refining such a system. 
Robwood's response both to certainty and uncertainty was to work towards 
certainty.
In the same vein, I also found that increased uncertainty could lead to both 
increased and decreased levels of resistance at the same time. For example 
consider FAA's acquiescent response to the government announcement (in 5.2). In 
this circumstance, uncertainty played a role in FAA's response: they had to act 
quickly to respond, because they didn't know what the announcement would be 
until Eddy received the phone call from the minister's adviser the day before. 
Because of this uncertainty combined with the rapid turnaround period in which 
Eddy responded in a media release from FAA, uncertainty did lead to a more 
acquiescent response. This was because she and her Faith Aid network colleagues 
did not have a chance to realise their full critique of the policy measure until after 
they had time to analyse it in more depth. They therefore erred on the side of 
acquiescence with their initial media response, as they wanted to keep their 
relationship with government open. But also in this way, their uncertainty led to a
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more " tempered" response, because Eddy knew that FAA were being "used" by 
government, and didn't want to sign on to something that they'd later have to 
"backflip" about.
So, while uncertainty did appear to play a role in influencing organisational 
response, it was not simply that acquiescence was the key pathway through which 
this occurred. Indeed, the NPOs I observed often sought to increase certainty by 
engaging in proactive manipulation, or lobbying. For example, with the PCC, when 
the parenting support program funding was due to come to an end (in 6.3), Kelly 
sought certainty by lobbying to the minister to appeal for more funding. As my 
fieldwork with Robwood came to an end, a senior manager had been moved from 
her program operational managerial role to focus on lobbying and strategising, 
seeking funding for a program that had previously been entirely funded by 
Robwood. Robwood was seeking certainty for this program's funding via lobbying 
and proactive manipulation in an environment where its financial security was 
becoming increasingly uncertain.
Interconnectedness
Oliver suggests that high levels of interconnectedness facilitate voluntary diffusion 
of norms which leads to a homogenous or isomorphic field where organisations are 
generally more compliant with the institutional norms. The findings of this study, 
again, suggest that sometimes this relationship associating high levels of 
interconnectedness with low levels of resistance is demonstrated, while sometimes 
it is not. For example, in the PBI compliance narrative, Kelly's interconnectedness
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makes her aware of what happened for the other organisation that had been 
"audited" which then leads to her hyper-vigilant acquiescent response. However, 
on other occasions, Kelly's experience was the opposite.
In the PCC's structural changes at Doberon narrative (in 6.1), Kelly describes a 
previous experience with the government worker who manages the contract for 
the program at Doberon. Her previous experience with this government worker 
was one where she had received advice about how to run the program from this 
state-based federal public servant. However, this advice was the opposite to advice 
she had received through a trusted network of providers to whom the PCC was 
closely interconnected. Because Kelly trusted the advice from the network more 
than the advice from the government, she defied government in that circumstance. 
So, in this instance Kelly's interconnectedness with a network which asserted values 
other than government meant she was more inclined to resist the government 
pressures.
As with diffusion (see 7.2), it appears that interconnectedness does play a role in 
the level of organisational response resistance. However, whether 
interconnectedness leads to more or less resistance to government pressures 
depends on whether this interconnectedness is with a set of values and norms that 
are shared by government or not. Such a conclusion is supported by the role of 
interconnectedness in Robwood's EOI negotiation. Here, interconnectedness was a 
strong feature of the narrative, and yet -  again, as described above in diffusion (7.2) 
-  the interconnectedness was shared with other NPOs, and not government.
Therefore, the response involved much greater levels of resistance, limited only,
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ironically enough, by the interconnected interdependence between the NPOs and 
department. When, during the EOI process, the department head came to visit the 
peak's board meeting, the group of organisational representatives present were 
aware that while the meeting might not stay "friendly" it was important to keep 
talking with the department about the EOI process. In this way interconnectedness 
increased resistance, but only to a point where it could continue to be productive.
7.4 Constituents: The influence of multiplicity and dependence
According to Oliver's framework, organisational response is influenced by who is 
exerting the institutional pressures. In particular, Oliver identifies the multiplicity of 
constituent demands and dependence on these constituents as the two 
constituent-related elements influencing the tactical response of an organisation. 
Oliver describes the influence of these two aspects of "constituents" on an 
organisation's choice of tactics with the two hypotheses:
The greater the degree of constituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of 
organizational resistance to institutional pressures.
The lower the degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the 
greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures (p.162).
Multiplicity
Non-profit organisations regularly have multiple stakeholders (Woodward & 
Marshall, 2004). Despite the focus of this study on the experience of non-profits 
relationship with government, it was clear to see that the three organisations in this 
study also regularly dealt with multiple stakeholders and constituent groups (as is 
already highlighted in the multiple sources which define legitimacy, identified in 7.1
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above). For example, there was a multitude of constituents who appeared to have 
some influence on the strategic responses of FAA. These constituents included 
members of their governance group, the church network, the Faith Aid provider 
network, the government, as well as the expectations they placed on themselves to 
be a voice not only for their service users, but for the poor and marginalised at 
large. The constituents who were associated with the PCC were the various 
government departments that provided their funding, their board (management 
committee), the advisory groups of peers and volunteers that they had established 
to steer their work, their peers in general, themselves, the service networks to 
which they belonged, the groups they rented rooms to, their local politicians, and 
the "community" they espoused to serve. The constituents who influenced the 
strategic responses of Robwood included, but were not limited to the various 
government departments they dealt with, the peak they were a part of, their peers, 
politicians/political staffers, the parent organisation and its related structures, and, 
of course, their service users.
So the experience of multiple constituents was common across each field site -  
however these multiple constituents did, of course not always have divergent 
expectations. On the few occasions when Kelly referred to the PCC's management 
committee, she described it as having a relatively unified voice. Vice versa, what 
might have appeared to have been a single constituent may have actually 
incorporated a range of divergent expectations. For example the FAA board, 
despite operating with a consensus decision making model and therefore appearing 
to have a single set of expectations, still may have contained members with a range
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of opinions about the work of the organisation, and therefore is more accurately 
described as a group of multiple constituents. The same could be said for a single 
government department, which could reasonably be expected to be a "single" 
constituent. However, as demonstrated in the introduction to Robwood in (4.4), 
Sophia's complex contract compliance system was required, in part, because of the 
multiple sets of expectations for reporting and payment, even from within the same 
departments. So, while Oliver specifies only the multiplicity of constituents as 
relevant, I would suggest that it is only when these multiple constituents have 
divergent expectations that multiplicity is likely to be associated with resistance. 
The findings here suggest also that measuring high and low numbers of 
constituents is also not necessarily as straightforward as counting organisations, 
groups or people.
Overall, when I look at the data from this research about multiplicity, I find it very 
difficult to see particularly informative incidents where stakeholder expectation 
divergence/multiplicity played a significant and obvious role for the participants. It 
was not a prominent feature of the participants' descriptions of, or reflections on 
their experiences in responding to institutional pressures. It is possible, but hard to 
know for sure if divergence/multiplicity affected whether the organisational 
response was more or less resistant. It is possible to see, however that it affected 
how complicated it was to comply or resist.
For example, in the instance of Robwood's EOI negotiation with the department (in 
5.3), multiplicity/divergence further complicated an already complex process -
possibly contributing to a greater level of resistance. However this finding is
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unclear. Certainly across each of the three field sites there was, at times, 
considerable work done by the participants to bring a common, unified 
organisational voice together -  such as Kelly's board attending her courses on her 
preferred style of practice. Such efforts were possibly done to reduce the chance of 
the stakeholders within the PCC demonstrating multiplicity or divergent views - in 
other words, reducing multiplicity. Whether this then led to a greater propensity 
for resistance is again possible but unclear. So, in summary, unfortunately I do not 
have confidence in the data from this research to make conclusive statements 
about multiplicity. My inability to make conclusive or suggestive statements about 
the effects of multiplicity/divergence on organisational response is possibly due to 
my focus on NPO responses to government, and not other sources of institutional 
pressure.
Dependence
Oliver stresses, in line with the theory of resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1997; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), that dependence (not only for funding or financial 
support but also for example, for public opinion) has a particularly strong effect on 
strategic response. Dependence is closely linked with compliance. Indeed, in this 
study, the narratives of acquiescence (in 5.2) demonstrate the relevance of 
dependence on acquiescence. Both Kelly's response to the PBI and Eddy's response 
to the government announcement was indeed influenced by the dependence that 
both these women believed their organisations had on government -  in one 
instance for a tax status that allowed salary sacrificing to be offered to staff, and for 
a seat at the policy table in the other instance.
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However, a low level of dependence was not necessarily a feature of the narratives 
of greater resistance. For example, again for Kelly and Eddy (in 6.1 and 6.2), their 
dependence on government funding for program funds did not prevent them from 
resisting government pressures. This was despite the sometimes inevitable 
consequence of a reduction in funding as a result. In these instances it appeared to 
be that the role of dependence diminished and these women judged other issues to 
be more important. For example, for Eddy, refusing to implement the controversial 
government initiative (in 6.2) -  despite the potential loss of funding for the Faith 
Aid network providers -  was about the content of this work being unpalatable of 
the faith-based organisations. For Kelly, giving the money away (in 6.1) was also 
about what was unpalatable work for the PCC, just as ''telling off" the government 
officer was also about the unpalatable expectations of the opening hours for the 
PCC.
The role of dependence was most interesting when considered in relation to 
Robwood, and especially to my narrative of their EOI negotiation (in 5.3). In this 
instance, dependence did play a role and was responsible in part for their more, 
rather than less, compliant response in the end. It was at the point where Kaye 
acknowledged that the funding provided the resources for the "backbone" of that 
particular type of service delivery, and without it, Robwood would stop providing 
that type of service altogether. However, digging further into the discussion around 
Robwood's decision to continue negotiating, it is interesting to note that the board 
did not discuss the impact of the loss of funds on the financial viability of the
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organisation. Instead, the decision revolved around continuing to provide a service 
for which the organisation was renowned.
In some ways this then could be interpreted as being about Robwood's dependence 
on the department for legitimacy rather than funding, however, I believe it is 
possible to see from the data that the issue also incorporates more than just 
legitimacy. I believe that the discussion held between Kaye, Ronan and the 
Robwood board, described in 5.3 can be roughly summarised as: if we want to stay 
in the game, then we cannot resist completely. They are dependent on the service 
delivery relationship with government -  in part for legitimacy and in part for 
essential financial support -  but fundamentally to continue to have a voice in the 
design of the system that supports their service users. I discuss this theme further 
in Chapter 9.
7.5 Content: The influence of consistency and constraint
Another pair of factors predicted by Oliver to influence the decisions and strategies 
of organisations as they respond to institutional pressures is about content -  the 
content of the pressures themselves. The content category is about what norms or 
requirements to which the organisation is being pressured to conform. In 
particular, Oliver sees the important features of content as the extent to which 
institutional norms are consistent with the organisation's goals, and how much they 
limit or constrain the organisation's discretion, or cause a "loss of organizational 
freedom... and decision making autonomy" (p.166). Oliver predicts that 
organisations "will be expected to acquiesce more readily to pressures that do not
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constrain substantive organizational decisions, such as resource allocation, product 
or service selection, resource acquisition, or organizational administration (e.g., 
hiring, compensation, promotion)" (p. 166).
Oliver predicts that content, like dependence, is "particularly important in 
predicting the employment of alternative strategies" (p.165) and the relationship 
with resistance is anticipated with the following hypotheses:
The lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or requirements with 
organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to 
institutional pressures.
The greater the degree of discretionary constraints imposed on the organizations 
by institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to 
institutional pressures (p.164).
As predicted by Oliver, my data confirms that, indeed, content was "particularly 
important" and a very strong theme across each of the three NPOs.
Consistency between institutional norms and organisational goals
As demonstrated already throughout a'series of narratives, for the participants in 
this study, having consistency between institutional norms and organisational goals 
was a key ingredient in deciding on organisational response. In many instances, an 
inconsistency between institutional norms and organisational goals directly led to a 
more resistant response, despite other antecedents suggesting that a less resistant 
response might be predicted. For example Eddy and Kelly were both willing to risk 
significant financial loss rather than to engage their organisation (or network of 
organisations) in work where there were irreconcilable differences between the 
institutional norms and organisational goals -  in their avoidance and defiance
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narratives (6.1 and 6.2). In this way, I found the role of consistency to be much as 
Oliver predicted, and suggested in other NPO literature, where a NPO's "primary 
accountability is to 'the cause/ and the expectations of others are important only 
insofar as they align with this important duty" (Brown & Moore, 2001, p.571).
What was interesting to discover about consistency, however, was its role in the 
less resistant responses. Even in the narratives of acquiescence, the consistency 
between organisational goals and institutional pressures was never an exact match. 
For example, the ATO's definition (in 5.2) of an organisation which is eligible for PBI 
status was not precisely in line with the PCC's "indirect" approach to working with 
people. This inexact match was important in Robwood's EOI negotiation, where the 
department's norms about price per unit were initially vastly different to 
Robwood's. In both of these instances, as well as in FAA's "we won't bite you" 
response to the government announcement (in 5.2), one of the important roles of 
consistency is that Kelly, Kaye and Eddy identify a closer match between broader 
organisational goals and the institutional pressures being placed on them. Or, in 
other words, Kelly, Kaye and Eddy were able to identify close consistency between 
overarching organisational goals and the eventual outcome of each episode (which, 
in the less resistant narratives, was one and the same as the institutional 
pressures). Flere, the issue in many ways was about how the leader defined and 
framed the goals of the organisation, and thus the consistency of these goals with 
the institutional pressures.
For example, the deadlock between Robwood and the department is finally solved 
only when Robwood acknowledges its overarching organisational goal to "stay in
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the tent". The institutional pressure is that all the organisations accept the 
department's price per unit, and because of Robwood's overarching goal to remain 
involved in this type of service delivery, they are willing to comply with this 
institutional pressure. For FAA, due to a moderate level of consistency between the 
organisational goals and the institutional pressures in the "we won't bite you" 
narrative, it was possible for FAA's media release to simultaneously be acquiescent 
enough to correspond with institutional pressures while also being "tempered" 
enough to maintain consistency with its organisational goals. Flowever, as Eddy 
acknowledges, "we could've decided not to... but we didn't". The reason FAA 
decides to even commence such an acquiescent response is because this response 
is consistent with the organisation's overarching goals for the organisation to be 
"on the calling list" and for the Faith Aid network to "know it's own mind".
Discretionary constraint
Just as for consistency between institutional pressures and organisational goals, the 
importance of an imposition on discretionary constraint was a powerful influence 
on organisational response. A common feature of all the narratives of resistance 
was the impact of discretionary constraint. Indeed, again as with consistency 
above, the impact of discretionary constraint could over-ride other factors 
suggesting a more compliant response. For example, along with the consistency of 
institutional norms and organisational goals, discretionary constraint influenced 
Kelly giving the money away in my description of the PCC's experience of avoidance 
(6.1). In this instance, Kelly believed that being required to provide a particular 
type of service greatly constrained her ability to engage in the type of professional
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practice to which she was committed. This clearly fed in to the decision to exit that 
type of service from the auspice of the PCC.
For Robwood, a key feature of the way this organisation exercised its discretionary 
constraint involved costs it was willing to incur to bring about what it perceived as 
an increase in service quality. This meant that concern about a drop in the quality 
that would occur if Robwood provided a service only according to the funding 
provided by government fuelled its level of resistance in the EOI negotiation 
process and formed the basis of constraint having such a powerful impact:
"Our position on this is that while we appreciate there may be less funds available 
to the department than would adequately service all children and young people in 
care at the levels we propose -  the solution is not to do many things badly i/s some 
things really well."
Ronan, Robwood
The relationship between constraint and resistance in instances where it over-rode 
other antecedents appeared to be straightforward. As summarised by Eddy: "If we 
accept funding fo r  a service then it's a Faith Aid service". Or, as stated by Kelly: "we 
are her employer and we'll tell her what to do". In other words, if government 
imposed discretionary constraints that meant the organisation was unable to 
exercise its own autonomy, then it was not interested in complying. Yet, when 
described so simply, it is clear to see again, that a pivotal element to this cause-and- 
effect sequence is the way the leader of the organisation defines what the 
organisation does, what it is, and what it tells its workers to do.
As suggested by Oliver, it appeared that the organisations were more willing to 
tolerate constraint in some areas of their operation than others. For example, Kelly
Page I 228
Chapter 7: Explaining NPO responses to government pressures with O liver's antecedents
appeared to be willing to acquiesce with constraints around issues such as 
conducting regular staff performance appraisal reviews (see 4.3) than she was 
about the opening hours of the centre (6.2). Robwood was willing to acquiesce 
about streamlined contractual administration procedures (4.4) more so than it was 
about staffing-client ratios (5.3). These examples suggest perhaps constraint is 
tolerated more when applied to administrative procedures. Such a suggestion also 
raises interesting questions about the point raised above: that the leaders 
ultimately play a role in deciding what aspects of their organisation's work does and 
does not align with the expectations of government.
7.6 Conclusion
In this thesis, Oliver has provided a useful framework for conducting interpretive 
analysis of the mass of qualitative data generated in the course of this study about 
the experiences for the leaders and leadership teams of non-profits in the human 
and community services sector as they respond to pressures from government. 
Oliver's framework is a valuable heuristic tool for systematically interpreting 
individual cases and applying organisational and institutional theories to this small- 
N comparative case study research project. Indeed, this study generally supports 
Oliver's fundamental notion that "organizational choice is limited by a variety of 
external pressures" (Oliver, 1991, p.146).
Through exploring the experiences of NPO leaders in this study, with a focus on the 
"predictive antecedents" that were evident in their narratives of resistance and 
compliance, I have, in this chapter, demonstrated the significant usefulness of
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Oliver's hypotheses in predicting NPO response to government pressures. 
However, through delving deeper into this predictive aspect of Oliver's framework, I 
have also identified circumstances and examples where the framework does not fit. 
With access to such thick and detailed data, it has been helpful to explore possible 
reasons for the instances in which Oliver's predictions do not fit with the 
experiences of the NPO leaders here. Sometimes this ill-fit can be explained simply 
by one antecedent over-riding another and sometimes with a suggestion that 
Oliver's category would benefit from an expanded definition. Sometimes the ill-fit 
between the data here and Oliver's predictions can be explained through a range of 
other factors that appear to be important drivers in explaining the response of 
NPOs to government pressures in the process of social policy implementation. One 
example of these other factors is the way in which the NPO leader framed and 
defined the organisation's norms, goals and practices. It is on these other factors 
that I now focus in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8
BEYOND OLIVER'S EXPLANATIONS OF NPO RESPONSES TO 
GOVERNMENT PRESSURES
8.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters have focused solidly on applying Oliver's (1991) 
framework to the experiences of the participants in this study. The framework 
specifically focuses on the impact of institutional pressures on organisational 
response and does not claim to account for the role of individuals, or even the 
features of the organisation. Thus, considering especially the range of 
organisational, contextual and personal features raised in Chapter 2 as having 
potential impacts on the experience and role of NPOs in social policy 
implementation, it is not surprising to see aspects other than cause, constituents, 
content and control featuring for the participants in this study. Oliver (1991) 
recognises some of these additional factors, but she sees these as part of the 
"scope conditions" and does not include them in her framework:
>x
The scope conditions under which organizations are able to conform are bounded 
by organizational capacity, conflict and awareness. Inadequate organizational 
resources or capacity to meet the requirements for conformity, conflicting 
institutional pressures that make unilateral conformity unachievable, and lack of 
recognition or awareness of institutional expectations limit the ability of 
organisations to conform to institutional requirements. These boundaries on the 
willingness and ability of organizations to conform drive the predictive dimensions 
hypothesized... which determine the likelihood of resistance (p.159).
In bringing forward a range of themes that existed as important to the participants 
in this study I am mindful of Meier's "caustic suggestion" (O'Toole (Jr), 2000, p.268):
that the implementation literature is characterised by "forty-seven variables that
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completely explain five case studies" (Meier, 1999, p.5) and therefore "any policy 
implementation scholar who adds a new variable or a new interaction should be 
required to eliminate two existing variables" (Meier, 1999, p.6). The findings and 
analysis presented in this chapter do not seek or even attempt to provide an 
exhaustive list of the "variables" which appeared to influence NPO action and 
response in this study. Instead, I raise a number of explanatory themes that exist 
alongside Oliver's framework of institutional variables and I explore the way these 
antecedents and actions interact.
I have broadly grouped these themes as relating to the context, the organisation 
and the individual. I briefly describe each in turn. In discussing both the context 
and the organisation using the detailed ethnographic data from this study, I 
demonstrate how the "structural" features are experienced and interpreted in the 
first person by the participants (Rhodes, 2002). The importance of the personal 
experience is also reinforced in the section people matter (see 8.4). Doing so serves 
to build this analysis beyond Oliver, towards the conclusions found in Chapter 9, 
which address the many puzzles raised in Chapters 1 and 2.
Discussing these elements in this way, instead of seeking to add variables to Oliver's 
list, I highlight the missing role of agency in Oliver's structuralist-functionalist and 
somewhat deterministic account of the nexus between institutional pressures and 
NPO behaviour. Through this discussion the learnings from this thesis also move 
closer to their application to the social policy implementation literature. Oliver's 
framework for seeing and understanding the role of structural explanations of NPO
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behaviour and response has been a highly useful tool -  not just for what it has 
already demonstrated but how it has directed my exploration to what findings 
remain unexplained. Oliver has provided the tools for digging deeper into the data, 
which is what I now seek to do.
8.2 Context matters
Oliver's predicted contextual features, uncertainty and interconnectedness, were 
not the only aspects of the context which influenced NPO response in this study. 
There were many other aspects of the environment that played a role in 
determining the organisational response to institutional pressures. It was clear that 
the participants considered aspects of the field or sector when they made their 
responsive decisions. Features of "the field" -  such as the level of competition -  
are recognised elsewhere in the literature as impacting on non-profits choice of 
tactics (Barman, 2002). These aspects included but were not limited to what kind 
of service delivery supply and competition existed (what, who and how were other 
organisations relating to government and where were the service supply gaps), as 
well as analyses of the demand environment (what kind and level of need existed). 
The influence of context also involved the NPOs making the most of opportunistic 
synergies between government and organisational priorities.
Context included other organisations, networks, the media, political cycle and legal 
system. Being part of networks was important in each of the three NPOs. For 
example, Robwood's "parent" organisation intervened when the EOI negotiation 
process appeared to be going nowhere (in 5.3). Receiving information from a
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trusted network of providers greatly influenced Kelly's previous and subsequent 
decision to go against the advice of an "in-the-box" bureaucrat (in 6.1). Strength in 
numbers possibly assisted Eddy's stance of defiance in Chapter 6 (in 6.2). The 
involvement of the minister -  "a minister mokes oil the difference" [Emma, 
Robwood, 5.3] -  could also be important, as it was in the instance where Kelly 
visited the minister aiming to lobby for an extension of funding (in 6.3). The 
presence of an election (during FAA's lobbying in 6.3), and the involvement of 
media (in Stan and the peppercorn rent, 6.2) were all other features of the context 
which emerged in the observations or descriptions of organisational response.
For the participants in this study, context also included the different parts of 
government: the political or administrative arms of government; state and federal 
governments; and the different departments within each level of government. For 
the participants, this was experienced through features of the department or 
government with whom the participants were interacting. For example, in 
Robwood's EOI narrative (in 5.3), the source of government pressure is a 
department in crisis. According to Ronan's introduction to the sector, the 
department has been repeatedly criticised for a number of years and indeed the 
whole sector has been in "dire straits" for some time. This opens the door for Kaye 
to engage in what I see as open and extreme criticism of the department in the two 
page newspaper spread, yet to consider this as a tactic which is nothing out of the 
ordinary and indeed appears to make little difference to the negotiation process.
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In addition to these circumstance-by-circumstance contextual features that 
emerged as important, two pervasive and strong contextual features also arose 
from the data: the role of ambiguity and history.
Ambiguous goals and technologies
As suggested in institutional theory, environments and organisations characterised 
by ambiguous technologies and loosely defined goals influence the way an 
organisation engages with and responds to its environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 2008). Such loose goals and ambiguous technologies certainly played a role 
for the participants in this study. It appeared that, while some of the services in 
which the NPOs in this study were concerned were more prescribed than others, 
that there was often a tangible level of discretion involved in all service delivery. 
Sometimes this was particularly notable.
For example, Kelly notes in Chapter 4 (4.3) "the problem is that the department is 
funding a style of professional practice without realising or understanding what that 
means... you find with this community work type funding, because governments 
don't really understand the work, they make quite broad goals and performance 
measures, and that's sort of good for us... because then we can just sort of mould 
that to what we think are the local needs". In a similar theme, the lack of "exact 
science" [Ronan, in 5.3] in costing Robwood's delivery package is at the crux of the 
prolonged negotiation with government.
One implication of the social policy implementation environment as one in which 
benchmarks and practices are institutionally or socially defined and (at times) hotly
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contested was that a great deal of activity (for both NPO and governments) and 
much of the relationship between the NPOs in this study and governments involved 
defining these benchmarks. The contestability of legitimate operating benchmarks 
meant that the nexus between governments and NPOs became one key "space" in 
which such benchmarks were contended and redefined as they were received and 
enacted by the participants (Benjamin, 2008). For example, such was the case 
when Kelly decided that she needed to work at a level above that for which the PCC 
was funded (in 6.2).
This was an interesting finding also in terms of the distinction between advocacy 
and delivery activities for the NPOs in this study. As seen in Chapter 6, the NPOs all 
engaged in activities that overtly attempted to influence the benchmarks or norms 
of the social policy implementation environment, through lobbying and advocacy. 
However, they also did so by determining and defining the norms and standards of 
practice as they enacted them. This was particularly the case for Robwood and the 
PCC, who were involved in direct service delivery.
History
Another important contextual theme arising from the data was the persistent 
influence of history. By history I mean the history of the relationship between the 
NPO leader and their counterparts in government; the history of the organisation's 
relationship with government; and the history of the organisation's involvement in 
service delivery or lobbying. While this history theme relates also both to 
organisations and individuals (both discussed in more detail below) I have included
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it here as a feature of the context because it was experienced by the participants in 
this study as something which set a broad context for the nexus between the NPOs 
in this study and governments. History formed a backdrop to the nexus between 
NPOs and governments. It was "the dirt... there's always dirt" [Kelly, 4.2],
Just as Noordegraafs (2007) research with policy managers found their language 
was "infused with time" (Rhodes et al., 2007b, p.210), explanations by the 
participants in this study of what was going on seemed impossible without 
reference to the history of what had gone on before. It was sometimes frustrating 
as a researcher seeking to understand the contemporary and current experience of 
the participants, when the participants constantly explained this to me in terms of 
what had previously happened. However, my frustration led to insight as I began to 
understand the pivotal importance of history.
Because of the, at times, relatively intimate nature of my fieldwork, I was able to 
gather a beginning picture of how history was experienced in the day-to-day work 
activities of the participants. Of course, their past experiences relating to 
government influenced their expectations of this relationship in the future, at least 
in part, even when this relationship was not with a specific human, but instead with 
the impersonal face of the department. The following example of such influence is 
a description from my field notes of two of the NPO workers I observed during my 
fieldwork at the PCC.
Two young social workers are completing an online application form for about 
$2,500 worth of funding for a community event. They are frustrated with technical 
glitches in the online form's format which won't allow them to cut and paste from 
their draft word processing document into the online form. They are unable to see 
what they wrote at the beginning of their answer to one question by the time they
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get to the end, because the space for viewing the answer is smaller than the space 
allowed for the answer.
They express annoyance with the way the form asks for them to list "measurable 
outcomes" by which they will judge their event to be a success: their professional 
framework is one which values diffuse, knock-on community benefits, not one 
where they can report on how many children received an immunisation injection or 
other through-put or output based measurements meaningfully. While they 
understand the need to be accountable, "this silly counting stuff is just ridiculous, it 
is not just about the number of people you help, you might do intensive work with 
a small number of people who are leaders in their communities and make a big 
difference to those communities, or you may do superficial and ineffective work 
with hundreds of people that makes no difference -  the measurement is 
misplaced, it is a measuring the wrong thing, not what is really going on or what 
really matters." One worker shares a story of a place she worked in a few years 
ago, where another similar service in her local area at the time typically got the 
most funding -  and was also the one that gave the most "superficial" kind of 
service to the people in the least amount of need -  "but because they had more 
people walking through their doors, they got the most money".
Throughout the process of completing the form, their confidence in this style of 
relationship with government is gradually eroded. In this context, with their 
frustration levels already high, they debate at various stages what kind of 
information they need to include in order to best position their application for 
success -  how many people should they guess will attend the event -  they feel it 
needs to be a realistic number, yet one which will give the event credibility and 
increase its chance of receiving funding. They wonder if or how will the 
department check how many people attend? How much money should they ask 
for? Their responses are influenced, at least in part, by their "faith" in the 
"system".
They weigh up their wording very carefully -  there are particular words they see 
are written in related government documents, which they feel they should include 
in their application, to demonstrate how their project is aligned to the work of the 
department. However, they also feel that some of the wording on the government 
documents is outdated, and using such words is at odds with their professional 
identity.
In the end, after spending much more time on the application than either of them 
had planned, at least two hours, they are uncertain if the request for funding will 
be approved. They submit the form and cross their fingers.
Fieldwork Notes
This example provides just one demonstration o f how the perceived personal 
history o f relationships -  as well as Oliver's defined antecedents -  can influence 
even the simple task of acquiescence. In some ways here, history could be seen as
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a short-cut term for the accumulation of personal biases, which, according to the 
workers in this narrative, can be seen as resulting from previous experience. 
Oliver's antecedents also played a role. The extent to which these workers felt the 
department will police and double-check attendance at the event compared to the 
attendance they propose in the form (what level of coercive control the 
department had and how interconnected was the environment) was important.
While the experience of these two young social workers is firmly grounded in the 
present it is also influenced by their pasts. It is influenced by the here-and-now 
realities of filling in the on-line form with its technical complications, their time 
constraints, their professional practice framework and its associated vernacular and 
their personal bias towards intensive work with a few rather than superficial work 
with many. Their experience and frustration with the form are experienced as 
another layer on top of their growing backlog of cynicism about government 
processes in general. Such layers of history here appear to complicate what should 
otherwise be a simple process of acquiescence. In this instance, the impact of 
history was to introduce greater levels of resistance into the workers' response.
This finding is particularly relevant, considering that relationships with a history 
incorporating low-trust episodes were clear across the board for all participants in 
this study. Eddy acknowledged how "it's very easy to be seduced into 'we're the 
government's best friend'... but when government's selling a policy, they want you 
fo r your support" (5.2). Ronan had a low confidence in the EOI negotiation process 
because of a trail of disconcerting experiences already -  such as the amount of time
taken for the department to provide feedback about the EOI submissions as well as
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an insubstantial, incomplete and incorrect "list" as the primary document 
announcing "successful" submissions. Other research specifically about NPOs 
involved in social policy also notes the importance of history in the relationships 
between NPOs and governments (Bigelow & Stone, 1995; Onyx et al., 2008; 
Ramanath, 2009; Shaw & Allen, 2006). Studies repeatedly reinforce the influence 
of high-trust relationships for collaboration in institutional environments, yet often 
depict a low-trust experience between NPOs and governments.
History is particularly relevant in institutionalised environments such as this one in 
which social policy implementation occurs, with its ambiguous technologies and 
loose goals, because of its influence on precedent. Knowing the importance of 
what has happened in the past sets a standard by which what happens now has a 
relevance not just for now, but into the future. This is seen, for example, again in 
Robwood's EOl narrative (in 5.3), in which some staff are concerned about the 
precedent set by Ronan, who they believe has been too willing, too quickly, to 
reduce the price for which Robwood is willing to provide the service. This finding, 
as with many others in this study, suggests the relationships between governments 
and NPOs involved in the process of social policy implementation are 
institutionalised and not "simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, 
calculating individual actors" (March & Olsen, 2006, p.4).
8.3 Organisations matter -  competence, capacity, identity and goals
As well as features of the context, a range of organisational features played a role in 
influencing organisational response across the three NPOs in this study. As pre-
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empted in Chapter 2, such a finding -  that organisational features play a role in 
determining NPO activity and response -  corresponds with other empirical third 
sector and organisational research (see for example, Akingbola, 2006; Chew, 2006; 
Smith & Lipsky, 1993). The strongest themes to emerge from the data in this study 
were the organisation's capacity, competence, profile and the overarching direction 
in which the organisation was strategically manoeuvring towards or maintaining 
itself.
Capacity and competence
Obviously organisational capacity and competence were important and influential 
in determining the responses of the NPOs in this study. It can be costly and 
complicated to comply with the varying expectations of the different arms of 
government, and particularly resource-intense to proactively lobby government or 
even make funding submissions (Fredericksen & London, 2000; Productivity 
Commission, 2009; Ryan et al., 2008). For example, Robwood had paid Ronan's 
salary for a year out of its own funds while he was "off line", preparing and 
negotiating the EOI submissions.
Analytical competence and organisational memory were two important features of 
organisational capacity. For example, in contexts where benchmarks were 
contestable, Ronan's extensive management experience and intricate modelling 
work, which he had combined to determine the "true" or "real" cost of service 
delivery, formed a cornerstone of Robwood's negotiation with the department. 
Despite Ronan's claims it was not an "exact science" Robwood may well not have
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resisted the price suggested by the department to such an extent if it did not have 
such a well-defined position. The budget night narrative in Chapter 4 (4.2) 
graphically highlights the rapid "real time" in which organisations are often 
required to make their responses to government announcements -  acquiescent or 
otherwise. FAA's access to modellers who, with an intimate knowledge and 
understanding of how to analyse the details of the government announcement in 
Chapter 5 (5.2), were willing to work on weekends enabled it to provide detailed 
feedback and criticism of the announcement within a relevant and acceptable 
timeframe.
Organisational capacity related, in part, to sheer organisational size, strength and 
profile. A clear example of the importance of organisational size and profile can be 
seen in Chapter 6 (6.1), where Kelly and the PCC avoid the scrutiny of government 
partly "because they can” due to the PCC's low profile within this department. 
However, in other circumstances where the PCC did not have such a low profile, 
Kelly opted for different responses. Robwood's size and profile had probably made 
it possible for Kaye to meet with the department head (in 5.3), while the CEOs of 
smaller organisations could only raise their eyebrows and wish for such an 
opportunity. Organisational size was highlighted in Chapter 2 as a feature 
commonly identified in the literature as having an impact on NPO response to 
government pressures (see for example, Smith & Lipsky, 1993).
Capacity was seen to enable the NPOs in this study to do more than what was 
expected of them and fundamentally gave the organisations in this study an 
element of choice in their responses.
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If we only did what the department funded us to do, this would be a very different 
organisation. We use the income from our room rentals income to fund and do 
other things... We are not our government grants. We are here in the community 
for a greater purpose.
Kelly, PCC
I do think it gives you greater flexibility to have money to say 'no'...
Monty, Robwood
Capacity was influential particularly in terms of lobbying or proactive engagement 
with government. Robwood was able to engage in manipulation and lobbying 
activities because its independent revenue funded a significant portion of its social 
policy and research branch. FAA was able to focus a significant majority of its work 
on lobbying because it was funded entirely by the church and provider networks. 
However, an organisation did not need to have millions invested to be able to 
creatively use what capacity it had for its own proactively self-determined ends. 
Kelly made it a priority to take time out of her ordinary position to prepare her 
social policy submission (in 6.3), even though she experienced this as an imposition 
on her weekends. She did this partly because she saw herself as having the 
delegated authority to make the managerial decision that enabled her to take time 
from her ordinary job and partly because she felt personally compelled to prepare 
the submission.
The women at FAA were acutely conscious of the impact of capacity on the work of 
the organisation -  the two were experienced as essentially synonymous. FAA 
actively sought to increase its size and profile as inherent features of its capacity. 
Because of her drive to build capacity and her concern that the current capacity of 
FAA was insufficient to achieve its goals, Eddy spent a large amount of her time
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pursuing FAA's "future funding project". This was a project in which she lobbied 
the provider and church network for an increase of funding to the office to employ 
more staff and increase the office's capacity. Future funding for FAA gave rise to 
passionate debate at FAA's governance committee meeting -  the following is an 
edited excerpt from my notes during this meeting:
The next item for discussion is about the future financing of FAA. Particular 
organisations across the network are thanked for their one-off contributions for 
specific projects. Eddy stresses the importance of formalising these funding 
arrangements -  because at the moment it's often based on the relationships 
between each organisation's CEO and the FAA office, with no contingency plan for 
dealing with the changes brought by staff turnover. Discussion revolves around 
developing a transparent funding formula, so that what each organisation and 
state pays to FAA is fair and equitable. However, it becomes difficult to have 
everyone agree on this formula's implementation. For example there is 
disagreement about what is included in the organisation or state/territory 
turnover, which then forms the basis on which the percentage levy is calculated 
and how to allow scope for flexibility if it's required.
The chair encourages the group to consider the proposed budget, focusing on what 
the network wants FAA to do. The discussion revolves around two budget options, 
prepared by a sub-committee, both of which aim to increase FAA staffing to seven 
people. The committee argue tha t seven staff are required in order fo r FAA to 
work effectively. The counter argument questions how such a decision can be 
made without agreeing first on the costing for it: the scope of the work is 
determined by what we can afford. The discussion becomes circular -  what can be 
afforded is determined, at least in part, by what will be achieved with the funding. 
Eddy summarises: "if the funding is X then the capacity for us to cover stuff is Y. If 
the funding is more, then we can cover more issues. The issue is to decide on how 
much do we believe we need to invest if we wish to have a national presence."
A committee member responds: "What we need to begin with is saying, 'where is 
our ideal position?' and the next job is to say 'how do we get there?' I want to 
develop a vision about where we want to be, but I don't want to be locked in to 
that if we can't raise the funds. I don't want to go back to my organisation with 
them accusing me of bringing too heavy a bill down upon them. Can we have a 
document that says more about linking outcomes to the resourcing, so if we want 
seven people in the office then the outcomes will be X?"
A second committee member contributes: "Are there other ways of achieving 
these outcomes without just handing the money out? If some of our organisations 
have research and development funds, then they can contribute in other ways. 
The quantum of expansion is not incongruent with the pain of funding more money 
to FAA."
Eddy responds: "This is about the church seeing the work of its agencies as being 
within it, and the expansion of its service as part of the expansion of the church.
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It's part of a broader issue about the church in community." However, there is a 
strong objection to this comment from one committee member: "It's more about 
the capacity to resource the work." The CEO of a large organisation states: "Its' not 
actually that much money, $15,000 in a $35m annual budget is not that hard to 
find, it's not that out of the question." The objector replies: "It's never been an 
issue of the amount for us, it's about the equality of the contribution with 
everyone else."
A previously silent committee member speaks up with great passion: "This debate 
is the about the dollars and about the marginal increasing of funding... but let's 
step back from that. Drive around the streets of Canberra, it's filled with lobby 
groups that I assume are all funded by levies of their members. Why should this 
industry and the Faith Church more generally not be looking to make their mark 
and influence government? How you benchmark our level of resourcing with those 
industry associations I have no idea, and I have no idea about the other churches. 
But we should be concerned about the notion that FAA do not have adequate 
resourcing to influence government in the way that great swags of other Australian 
groups do..."
She continues: "The question is about where you put the ambulance, do you put it 
at the top of the cliff or at the door of the hospital? The work of FAA is about 
changing the quality of life for people before they come to your door. The decision 
isn't about whether we increase the staffing by three, it's about will the community 
benefit from that? It's hard to take money out of direct service delivery into 
advocacy work... it is ideal to have a meaty national advocacy office... There are 
issues that are needing debate like equity, but that's not our debate right now. Our 
debate is: do we need to advocate for people in the community who are doing it 
hard? Do we need to increase the funding for FAA? I believe the answer is yes."
The discussion continues, with one committee member pointing out that the 
debate is "not as straightforward as that, our organisations already makes 
significant contributions to a number of advocacy organisations, and we have a 
long history of supporting these advocacy bodies more than we have supported 
FAA since its establishment in the 1990s... And how do we cope with the 
dominance of FAA's work in one particular sector, when there are other issues for 
other service user groups that we want addressed?" Indeed, the organisations 
represented by those around the table are all members of a variety of peaks and 
advocacy groups.
Time is passing, and the Chair is seeking to bring the discussion to an end. Eddy 
makes a concluding remark: "If this is climbing Mt Everest, and we get to Base 
Camp 2 and the weather closes in, and we can't get to the peak, are we happy with 
staying at Base Camp 2?" All in all, there seems to be agreement amongst the 
committee to increase the funding for FAA. However, there is no agreement about 
for what or by how much. The chair refers the issue to further discussion in 
another committee.
Fieldwork Notes
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This narrative is an example of the dynamic and contended definition of FAA as an 
organisation -  what it is supposed to achieve and how it is supposed to achieve it. 
The intertwined nature of organisational capacity and organisational performance 
are highlighted in this circular discussion of funding and outcomes. The difficulties 
in measuring outcomes that demonstrate a "'national presence" exacerbate the 
difficulties in linking performance and capacity -  again reflecting the ambiguous 
goals and technologies raised in 8.2 and demonstrating the institutional nature of 
FAA's context. Despite the ambiguity, however, the link between capacity and 
performance is still strong and organisational capacity and competence are clearly 
an important aspect of determining NPO response.
Organisational values
Underpinning the function and overarching goals of the NPO were its collectively 
shared values. Indeed, the literature suggests that the values base of NPOs is not 
only a key defining ingredient of the sector, but pivotally influences the relationship 
with government (Billis & Glennerster, 1998; Nevile, 2009). This values-based 
aspect of the organisation was very strong across each site, as is highlighted below, 
in Eddy's response to my question about the role of FAA -  "is it a peak for 
providers, users or the church?"
"We don't even... it's even... [pause] / don't know if I con express it... it's an even 
more subtle distinction than that... we are -  and this is my very strong view, and 
that's what I brought to the role -  we are the Faith Church at mission... you 
would've seen in our foundational documents, in our strategic directions... our catch 
cry down the bottom of all of those... says "the vision and values of the Faith Church 
in Australia, the expertise of our service providers and the experience of our service 
users" and it's all those things coming together... I think of it as a three-legged 
stool... and the theological imperative behind all of that is God's preferential option 
fo r the poor... the key thing I think about God's preferential option fo r the poor is 
not that God loves people who are poor or dispossessed or marginalised more than
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someone like me, fo r example, who's very optioned-up, but it's saying that God has 
a preference fo r us acting firs t in favour o f those people, so it's not about concern, 
it's about action, it's an imperative to act, and that's why the Faith Church has a 
very large investment in community services, it comes out of that kind of 
theological space which is captured in one of our foundational documents... / 
absolutely love that, so everyone here knows that 'cos I make everyone here read it 
and tattoo it to the inside of their eyeballs, I reckon it's alive... so in our advocacy 
work I think I would say that we try to do it with our service users, and with the 
people who provide the services, in the light o f the vision and values o f the Faith 
Church... we're all trying to be part of a movement that's actually about social 
transformation."
Eddy, FAA
These values without the faith-based element, were operationalised by Gail:
"This morning when we were talking to Bob Brown, we did say that we're not 
advocating fo r services, we're here about disadvantaged ageing Australians so in 
terms of this new initiative, it  makes it very hard fo r us to offer services in our 
community who are more disadvantaged because this initiative does x, y and z... 
we're very clear, in terms of arguing fo r the well being of the one industry or 
another, that's the peak bodies'... role, we're not there to argue fo r  services as a 
service per se, we're there to argue fo r  a service that's inclusive and that's 
accessible that's quality ... and I always been clear on that and that's another 
reason I feel... very comfortable with FAA because we're quite clear on that."
Gail, FAA
In each of the NPOs in this study, I had the impression that this subscription to a 
values base broadly described as social justice was strongly shared across all 
employees of each organisation. For example, in any conversation with an 
employee of Robwood, it was not unusual for them to casually refer to value-laden 
statements such as "we're a strengths-based organisation". Posters describing 
Robwood's philosophy of practice were on the walls of most offices. At FAA, so in 
tune did their values base appear that sometimes it seemed to me the three 
executive women thought with the one mind. Even Kelly described her board as 
"sold" on her style of professional practice and the underpinning values on which it
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was based (6.1). Not only were the values bases important, but they were deeply 
embedded not just in the leaders, but also across each NPO.
The values base of each organisation could be seen to influence the response of the 
organisations in a variety of ways. For example, values were often accompanied by 
a particular vernacular or set of terms. Kaye and Julie saw the importance of this as 
they prepared "scripts" for describing aspects of Robwood's lobbying work (6.3). At 
times, the terms and words used in this vernacular could come into conflict with 
similar terms and words used by governments. This is demonstrated in the 
narrative about Kelly and the PBI status acquiescence where so much of the 
workshop is about defining the terms of compliance (5.2). Another example from 
the PCC also demonstrates:
Soon after the minister had come to visit the PCC, when all the visitors had left, and 
it was only the PCC staff and management committee people remaining, they were 
reflecting on the conversations that had occurred. Kelly made the comment "don't 
let them take the language and claim it and define it". I had found that an 
interesting comment in the context, because, during the minister's visit Kelly had 
used the terms primary, secondary and tertiary interventions. I immediately made 
assumptions about what these terms meant based on my health professional 
background. However, I soon realised that my interpretation of these terms was 
not the same as Kelly's interpretation of these terms, and that they had a 
completely different meaning in this sector. I wondered how often people used 
the same words but meant completely different things.
Fieldwork Notes.
While it is difficult to see specific or causal links between an issue such as conflicting 
languages and terms with particular organisational responses, it is clear to see how 
they heightened frustration for the participants in this study as they related to 
government. Such frustration is illustrated above (in 8.2) where the two young
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social workers are finding it challenging to mould their language to synchronise 
with government language.
Fundamentally, the influence of the values base could be seen in the way leaders in 
each organisation understood what was the role of government, and of NPOs, and 
how these sectors should work together. As Gail mentions, above:
"My view has always been that we're working for the same problem, you've got 
your tools, so let's take our tools together and see what could be useful..."
Gail, FAA
For example, in Robwood's EOI narrative, Ronan is clear about the differences 
between his and government's roles and responsibilities in the implementation 
journey.
I mention how "it's a bind -  that government can't afford all the things that 
Robwood wants to provide", and 1 suggest that "perhaps it's fair enough they ask 
Robwood to decrease its costs."
Ronan replies "well, that's their problem..."
...[Ronan later goes on to express to the minister's adviser]: "Our position on this is 
that while we appreciate there may be less funds available to the department than 
would adequately service all children and young people in care at the levels we 
propose -  the solution is not to do many things badly vs some things really well."
Ronan, Robwood
Kelly and the PCC were the only organisation of the three in which I spent time, 
who acknowledged openly that a fundamental feature of their values base was that 
it was explicitly critical of government.
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"It's this idea that from a strengths perspective and the professional perspective we 
have, we're almost anti-government funding, and anti-external resources, it's about 
the community doing it for themselves. And so it feels quite counter... to my 
approach to always be cap-in-handing."
Kelly, PCC
Values such as these clearly have an impact on organisational responses and 
actions. It would seem intuitive to simply link critical values with a resistant 
approach, and perhaps, to a certain extent this could be true. However, to do so 
does not acknowledge the subtleties and nuance of the relationship, after all, each 
NPO demonstrated a range of responses to government pressures. Doing so also 
neglects the capacity of qualitative, ethnographic, ''deep" analysis to produce 
findings which reveal and illuminate processes, rather than just produce lengthy 
lists of potential variables for quantitative testing. Therefore, while I acknowledge 
this finding as important, it is not the position at which my analysis stops and rests. 
Instead, findings such as the importance of values feed the final cumulative analysis 
presented in Chapter 9.
Overarching organisational goals and values
Throughout Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the importance of the organisation's overarching 
goal has been reiterated time and time again. FAA's overarching goal of "access" 
greatly influenced their organisational response of acquiescence in the narrative 
described in Chapter 5 (5.2). Again, goals " about exposure" influenced the way FAA 
organised and conducted their activities as they lobbied government during their 
parliamentary forum (see 6.3). Robwood's overarching goal to "stay in the tent" 
was the key to its ongoing engagement and compromise in the EOI narrative (see
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5.3). In the PCC's Structural Changes at Doberon narrative (in 6.1), for example, an 
implicit overarching organisational goal was to wind-down the program in Doberon 
because of the changed demographic need. This possibly feeds Kelly's response of 
avoidance, when in other circumstances she agitated strongly for continuation of 
funding where need was ongoing (see 6.3 manipulation, the visit to the minister).
In part, I believe this finding, that overarching goals are important, is attributable to 
the nature of Oliver's framework. While Oliver describes acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation as "strategic responses", I 
would suggest instead that these are processes or tactics by which the NPOs in this 
study worked towards higher-level strategic responses. For example, acquiescence 
was a process or tactic by which FAA met its overarching goal for access in response 
to a government announcement (see 5.2). Compromise was a process or tactic by 
which Robwood met its overarching goal to "stay in the tent” during their EOl 
negotiation (see 5.3). Avoidance through exit was a process or tactic by which the 
PCC met its overarching goal to address its interpretation of community need (see 
6.1). Defiance was the process or tactic used by both FAA and the PCC to maintain 
organisational integrity and conduct their work in a way they felt was palatable and 
appropriate (in 6.2). Indeed, the strength of the overarching goal often pulled the 
NPOs response far from where Oliver's predictions suggested it might have been.
8.4 People matter -  the persona! aspect
Just as features of the context and organisation mattered in influencing the NPO 
responses in this study, so too did the people involved. Oliver identifies
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constituents as an important antecedent in explaining organisational response, 
however the experiences of the participants in this study suggest that many more 
aspects of the constituents were important than just multiplicity and dependence. 
Indeed, an aspect of constituents captured in my research, but not highlighted in 
Oliver's framework, is the personal aspect of constituent -  people mattered to the 
participants in this study, both the people in government and the NPO. This is not a 
surprising finding for an ethnographic study, in which people are the focus. 
However, what is interesting is how people were important in determining the 
actions and responses of the NPOs in this study.
The people in government
As has been found elsewhere (Baulderstone, 2008; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Rhodes, 
2002), the responses of the participants in this study were affected by their dealings 
with the people in government with whom they dealt on a day-to-day basis -  by 
how they experienced government in the personal relationships with government 
workers and representatives. Aspects of importance to the experiences of the 
participants in this study included who was the departmental contact officer, at 
what level in the department were they, what was their shared history with the 
NPO leader and what was their level of competence? For example, Ronan found 
the EOI negotiation particularly frustrating because he kept on dealing with people 
in the department who in his opinion, firstly, were too low in rank to have any real 
delegated authority and, secondly, had no experience in running a service. This 
experience undermined his trust in the negotiation process and raised his agitation,
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leading to a greater inclination to resist. In this way, the "who" factor is the 
personal experience of history described above (in 8.2).
Undermined trust from damaged personal experiences with government workers 
who are not aware of what service delivery is like "on the ground" is a theme 
reflected also in the following comments from Eddy and Gail:
"They had impeccable modellers doing fabulous financial modelling and it was all 
fantastic, but they were not connecting with what was actually happening in the 
delivery, or fo r the recipients of services on the ground."
Eddy, FAA
"You'd see policies come out that were going to address parents support needs for 
children with disabilities over the internet -  well, we didn't even have the internet in 
some towns, not broad band, not big enough to pick up the pages they would put 
up. They'd spend millions of dollars putting up a glossy page, not realising that this 
wasn't going to be able to be picked up by people who didn't have broad band, who 
couldn't afford it or were in a rural town, so I think there is a genuine non­
understanding of what life in parts of Australia, be it geographical, income level, 
race, gender, ethnicity, whatever, I think there is a genuine non-understanding."
Gail, FAA
Another good example of the influence of the "who" factor was Kelly's experience 
with the "new world order"  departmental officer in Chapter 4 (see 4.3). This 
narrative demonstrates the impact of the new departmental officer's changed 
approach on Kelly's relationship with government. Kelly's preparation for the 
meeting was in accordance with her understanding of unspoken norms and rules of 
acquiescence. Yet, unbeknownst to Kelly, these rules had changed with the 
commencement of this “ dot-the-i, cross-the-t sort o f person". For example, without 
being told, Kelly was supposed to have ensured that there was a board member 
present at the accountability meeting. While Kelly was sceptical if the new regime
of thoroughness would last, "given in the past they've said they'll do things and they
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don't do them", she was clear to note that “ I've got to get to know this new player 
and give them what they want".
Here, Kelly's desire to acquiesce had not changed, however the process by which 
she acquiesced had. In doing so, Kelly also acknowledged that acquiescence with 
departmental processes can be as much about complying with the requests of the 
individual officer as they are about complying with any specific legalistic 
requirement. While Kelly's experience in that particular instance remained one of 
acquiescence, considering her experiences with other "in-the-box" bureaucrats 
were part of resistant narratives in Chapter 6 (in 6.1 and 6.2). I wonder if, or under 
what conditions, an "in-the-box" bureaucrat stops featuring in narratives of 
acquiescence and starts playing a role in narratives of resistance.
The importance of the people in government was a theme with echoes throughout 
each case -  reinforcing that after all, bureaucrats "are people too" (Lea, 2008). For 
Kaye at Robwood, she had high hopes when the head of one department changed 
and she was no longer dealing solely with "dried out little bureaucrats" whom she 
had known for decades. The change of a minister with whom the women at FAA 
had been dealing extensively was experienced as a blow to the office as they 
contemplated the hard work involved in establishing personal relationships with 
this minister and the minister's staff. Clearly the constituents aren't blank-faced 
institutional players, but real life workers with an impact -  to some degree at least 
-  on the participant and their organisation's choice of tactics.
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While the importance of this personal experience of "who" is clear, it is less clear 
how it influences the choice of tactics for the organisation. For example, as 
mentioned above for Kelly, her experience with a rule-bound bureaucrat was part 
of a narrative of acquiescence, while another experience with a similar bureaucrat 
directly contributed to a response of avoidance (see 6.1) and another still led to 
defiance (see 6.2). The new department head did not change Robwood's eventual 
need to compromise on their suggested price per unit, whereas the perceived lack 
of competence in departmental staff led to frustration and bouts of resistance 
along the way. So, perhaps this factor did not change the eventual tactic used. 
Nevertheless, it was experienced as important by the participants in this study. Its 
role and importance highlight the perceived role of agency in the involvement of 
NPOs in social policy implementation.
The NPO leaders
The NPO leaders in this study demonstrated that they often take a proactive stance 
in their engagement with government actors. They are not always the passive 
recipients or conduits of government-designed policy. They have shown here how 
they make active and tactical choices, even in terms of deciding whether and how 
to respond as they manage their relationships with governments. For example, the 
seemingly straightforward and passive compliance or acquiescence tactics were 
shown to be potentially far more active, complex and dynamic processes.
My observations of the three NPO leaders also show how, of their own accord, they 
initiate activity relating to the implementation journey. Leaders played a role in
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deciding which norm-set their organisation would adhere to, crucially so in 
instances where this was ambiguous and not self-evident. Even more 
fundamentally than decisions about how to act, this study has also demonstrated 
the space for NPO decisions about whether or not to act. This is not to say leaders 
and their NPOs in this study were completely free agents. I also observed 
numerous instances in which NPO leaders took their clues from others, such as 
their governance boards or their own management teams.
Still, much of the day-to-day decision making about NPO actions and responses to 
government pressures for the NPOs in this study did appear to be largely at the 
discretion and judgement of the leader. It was up to the leader to be responsible 
for interpreting the circumstances to which they were leading an organisational 
response. The constellation of environmental, organisational and individual forces 
did not necessarily trigger a formulaic and automatic response pattern for the NPO. 
Instead, just as the street level bureaucrat exercises discretion in applying the rules 
of social policy implementation (Hupe & Hill, 2007; Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003), the leaders in this study actively interpreted each circumstance, 
by determining if, to what extent, and which issues were deemed to be relevant in 
any one circumstance.
For example, the leader made the judgement call that an inconsistency between 
organisational goals and institutional norms would over-ride the importance of 
economic gain, or when the low level of norm-diffusion would not stop a response 
of acquiesce. It was the decision making and circumstance interpreting that formed
a core aspect of how  the leaders in this study made a difference in determining
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NPO behaviour and involvement in social policy implementation. Other aspects 
informing this process were the leader's capacity, competence, style and values.
Capacity and competence
As with the findings above, capacity  and skill of the ind iv idua l, not just the 
organisation, were also important:
"I fee l like I have to be a lawyer and a tax officer, have a business degree."
Kelly, PCC
A central feature of skill for the participants in this study was the ability to 
intimately understand government processes, in order to shape NPO actions and 
responses that were informed by this knowledge. This is seen in Kelly's simple 
statement " I've  g o t to  ge t to  know  th is new  p laye r and give them  w h a t they w a n t"  
(4.3). It underpinned the "intelligence" sharing at Robwood's monthly advocacy 
meeting (6.3) and Kaye's instruction to "find the hollow men (or women)" -  those 
people within the machinery of government who were in positions of influence. It 
was a crucial skill for the women at FAA, all of whom had put a lot of effort -  over 
the span of their careers as well as on a day-to-day level -  into understanding 
government processes:
"I can be more effective in terms o f working in partnership w ith people in 
government. 'Cos I understand... better what they need to achieve at the end o f the 
day... we need some more bridges between the government and non-government 
sectors which I think is more people working between each one... M y view has 
always been that we're working fo r  the same problem, you've got your tools, so 
let's take our tools together and see what could be useful... the community sector 
fa lls down because it  doesn't understand the machinery o f government 
sometimes... the community services are much more flexible, much more fluid, 
much less authoritarian, so before I went in to the public sector I m ight not 
understand that talking to you i f  you're a level six or an ELI m ight piss o ff 
somebody else, y'know, you jus t don't have that sense, it's a cultural difference..."
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"I mode a conscious choice to apply fo r government... I wanted to see how the 
mechanisms of government worked... with a view that I would always come back to 
the community sector and that would be very valuable information for me to have, 
for the community sector, but also for government to have... that people out in the 
community sector have that understanding, 'cos I found when I understand what 
the public servants have to do, I'm able, much more able to be much more tolerant 
than some of my colleagues are, and to understand what kind of advice they need 
to give their ministers so that I can feed into that, much better than I could before."
Gail, FAA
Kelly also saw the importance of understanding government processes, which fed 
her approach to preparing the social policy submission. However, having never 
worked "in government", her knowledge was limited, as demonstrated in her 
surprise at hearing how early submissions for consideration in the following year's 
budget needed to be made and how the merit of her submission would be 
compared with other government priorities like education, agriculture, roads and 
health.
Understanding how government operated was not just important for organisations 
wanting to lobby, but even just to acquiesce.
"I had an experience recently where we did not win some tenders that we thought 
we were guaranteed to win. I was discussing this with a consultant we've brought 
in to help write some tenders that are coming up, and we talked about it and she 
said something... very interesting, I said 7 don't understand how I could lose that 
tender -  I particularly don't understand how I lost the tender and this other 
organisation won it, given they've never worked... in this area and they don't have 
any runs on the board blah, blah, blah. And we know we can write good tenders, 
'cos we've never worked in this other area, yet... we won that. And / had some 
feedback from government which was really annoying which was 'we knew you had 
the experience blah, blah, blah, but you didn't tell us how you would do this 
particular part of service delivery precisely enough...' Now our organisation brought 
this style of service delivery to the country 25 years ago... we are a leader in this 
style of service delivery. Of course we'd do this aspect of it, we just didn't write it in 
a way that government could see it completely plainly -  we made unstated 
assumptions."
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"So I told that experience... and she said... very strange things are happening at the 
state and federal level in government, and I forget how she described it, but I call it 
the Ernst and Young-isation of tenders. So, so worried are they about probity, they 
have a tick-a-box approach, and so because our tender did not specifically and 
explicitly address every feature of service delivery they expected... even though 
they loved our experience and innovation, we didn't actually structure it around 
those things expected by government..."
"So now, it's much more 'and then we will do this and then we'll do that...' and so 
on. So even if  we don't win this upcoming tender, / think that was a huge lesson. 
Our upcoming tender is a stunning tender... but I think it's very precise... Yeah, so 
I'm selling my soul a bit."
Monty, Robwood
This experience reflects the acute importance of interpreting what the institutional 
pressures are if you want to comply with them. It suggests there are spaces in 
which ambiguous technologies and goals can be contested, and other spaces where 
perhaps they cannot. Perhaps one of the reasons it is important for the NPO leader 
to be familiar with the ways of government is to know the difference. After all, 
merely understanding how government operated was not a guarantee of 
compliance. More than half of Robwood's senior executives had high level 
experience working in government, and yet I saw no evidence that this then made 
them more inclined to acquiesce. Indeed, for Ronan, his high level of skill in costing 
a holistic and high quality service and his intimate knowledge of government 
processes did not lead him to a path of greater compliance. So, again, while the 
data in this study suggests that the leader's competence influences NPO behaviour, 
it is not initially straightforward to see how.
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The leader's style
An important pervasive explanatory theme to rise from the data was the 
significance of the leader's style. Certainly, while leadership is still only an 
emerging sub-set of third sector research, as acknowledged in Chapter 2, it is a rich 
and distinct field of literature in its own right. It is tempting here to apply any one 
of multiple theories of leadership to the experience of the leaders in this study and 
use them as an explanation for NPO action here. However, I am reluctant to do so 
for two key reasons. Firstly, because while I have observed the participants in this 
study, leaders in their organisations, I did not actively pursue comprehensive data 
collection during fieldwork on the "ingredients" of leadership, such as leader 
beliefs, motivations, reactions to stress, backgrounds or their relationships with 
followers (Hermann, 1986, p.187). Instead, by observing the NPO leaders in their 
day-to-day work, I have discovered the importance of their leadership as a crucial 
way in which agency flows through what is otherwise a contingent grid of structural 
explanations.
Secondly, as pointed out above (in 8.3), this finding of the importance of leader 
behaviour and style itself feeds further analysis presented in Chapter 9, rather than 
being a final conclusion in itself. It is therefore remiss to not to acknowledge the 
importance of leadership as it does play a pivotal role in demonstrating the role of 
agency, pointing to the way the participants in this study understood and 
interpreted their circumstances. Despite the lack of comprehensive data collection 
specifically about elements and aspects of leadership itself, I did make extensive
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observations of each leader's behaviour which are certainly useful to describe and 
discuss here (Hermann, 1986).
As described in Chapter 4, each leader in this study had a different style of 
operating. The leaders themselves certainly believed their style brought a 
trademark approach to the organisation.
"PCC has always played a little bit of a leadership role in the sector, dunno why, but 
it always has, even before me... the coordinator there before me, we're cut from 
the same cloth, we’re both a bit go-getterish type people."
Kelly, PCC
"This is my very strong view, and that's what I brought to the role..."
Eddy, Faith Aid
"Kaye is a very smart operator, politically and strategically. She loves to play at 
that high level... she talks about how you've just got to carefully choose the battles 
you can win and forget about the ones you know you can't win."
Ronan, Robwood
It is tempting to draw a simple link between leadership style and organisational 
response -  that leaders with assertive styles were more inclined to resist 
government than leaders with non-confrontational styles -  after all, this may be 
true. Kelly and the PCC's general attitude towards government did appear to 
incline the organisation towards resistance. It seemed that her attitude naturally 
disposed her to leading the PCC to not blindly accept advice or direction from 
government and to establish a baseline in which the organisation was inclined to 
see legitimacy as much more important than economic gain. However, this was 
only in some aspects of its work. Eddy's leadership style, involving her devotion to 
her faith base and " what we believe it  is to be human" clearly heightened the
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importance for her and FAA of the consistency between organisational goals and 
institutional norms (in 6.2). Her ambition for the Faith Church to have a strong 
voice and a "national presence" in the Australian social policy debate also drew her 
to goals which focused on increasing the profile and access of the organisation to 
government.
Ronan's leadership style and personality led him to interpret certain processes as 
fixed that others saw as fluid, such as was seen in his astonishment at being offered 
the opportunity to negotiate an EOI that was not on the list. The impact of leader 
style is illustrated neatly in the Robwood experience, where it was possible to see 
similarities and differences in different leaders' styles within the one organisation. 
Consider the EOI negotiation narrative in Chapter 5 (5.3). The difference between 
Ronan and Kaye's leadership style is particularly apparent when Kaye drafts a letter 
to the department with wording that Ronan feels is a bit too "assertive". Here, 
Ronan's cautious and pragmatic leadership style balances out Kaye's defiant and 
confrontational style.
Having the unexpected opportunity at Robwood to briefly observe and talk with 
Monty, the acting CEO, filling in for Kaye while she was on holidays, demonstrated 
some particularly enlightening features of the role of leadership, suggesting there is 
more to the relationship between leadership style and organisational outcomes.
"We think we run a particular program better than anyone in Australia, possibly in 
the world... but that's not... what our conversation with government is like... We 
don't say 'we know best so we'll dictate what we will do'. I think too that... I don't 
have a get-out-of-jail card like Robwood's financial reserves, so, in the end, I've got 
to make something work. Whereas when Robwood knows their program is better, 
they might be able to underpin the funding that they have with some of their own
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money... I do think it gives you greater flexibility to have money to say 'no'... Instead 
I do lots of 'yes, ands...' and I'm more sneaky [laughs]/'
"I go to government and I work out what they want to do, and then I might come 
back and say 'and this is how we're going to do it...' So, what I think is important 
when working the government, you try to help them shape the keyhole rather than 
find the key. So... you try to solve their problem and then you tell them 'and this is 
the way to best way to solve it'. Then they might come back and say oh, we want 
this and this, so you go, 'ok well I can do that, what if  we do that other thing as 
well', and that's when the relationship and the negotiation starts."
Monty, Robwood
Here, it is tempting to draw a straightforward link between Monty's "sneaky" style 
and the organisational response of compromise. However, this quotation is 
particularly useful to see how Monty compares his style with what he sees as the 
typical modus operandi at Robwood. Monty is clearly very confident in the 
organisation's capacity and competence, however his confidence does not translate 
into an attitude of "we know best" when negotiating social policy implementation 
with government. This is partly because, "in the end, I've got to make something 
work". In other words, Monty's leadership is contingent on the capacity and 
resources of his part of the NPO. These contingent limitations drive Monty to 
seeking compromise. However he also chooses to respond to these circumstances 
by setting a goal about "shaping the keyhole", the parameters of social policy 
implementation. In this way, the role of his leadership was also important in 
determining what were the overarching goals of the organisation and how it will 
respond to its circumstances. Leader behaviour was the manifestation of agency, 
as leaders interpreted their circumstances and responses.
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8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a range of findings outside the Oliver framework that 
were important in determining and influencing the responses of the NPOs in this 
study to the pressures from government. Through using the Oliver framework as a 
heuristic to assist in data analysis a range of additional themes arose. It has been 
useful in this chapter to explore these themes, revealing otherwise buried layers of 
explanation and developing an ever-deepening understanding of the role of the 
NPOs in the process of social policy implementation. These themes are brought 
together and applied next in Chapter 9. It is also important to note that there were 
themes raised in the literature and discussed in Chapter 2 that did not appear to 
play a pervasive role in the experiences of the participants in this study. Two 
themes particularly of note include the role of the board or governance committee 
and the type of work that was being conducted.
Across each field site, each NPO's board, governance or management committee 
was involved in overseeing the work of the NPO, was made aware of the 
relationships between the NPO and government by the participants, and was 
occasionally or peripherally involved in the NPO's relationship with government. 
Sometimes this board involvement was as a strategic buffer between the NPO and 
government. For example, during the EOI negotiation (in 5.3), when Kaye sent her 
ultimatum letter to the department, she requested that if the department no 
longer wished Robwood to be a service provider in that field, it should write to the 
chair of the board stating so. The role of the governance committee in determining 
the work of FAA was also described above (in 8.3). Kelly acknowledges the
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importance of the board being "sold" on her style of practice when engaging in 
resistant tactics (in 6.1). However, while the role of the governance committee was 
an important background feature at each field site, I did not perceive or interpret it 
as being a central theme in the participants' experiences of managing their 
relationships with government.
The type of work being conducted -  delivery or advocacy, or work with different 
target groups (children, people with disabilities, people who are ageing) -  also did 
not arise as a particularly pertinent issue in terms of the content of the work. 
However, it did arise in terms of the condition of the sector and the issue of 
ambiguous goals and technologies (both already discussed). For example, as 
described above in "context matters" (8.2), the desperate and conflict-ridden 
nature of the sector in which Robwood operated led to practices and responses 
that might have been interpreted as more extreme or adversarial in other sectors. 
The type of work also made a difference in terms of the "exact science" and socially 
defined nature of the delivery benchmarks and expectations. As described in 
Chapter 5 (5.3) during Robwood's EOI negotiation, I pondered the extent to which 
such a negotiation might have been different if the "price per unit" of service 
delivery was more rigidly set.
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that to explain the responses 
of non-profits in the human and community services sector to government 
pressures it is important to look not just at characteristics of those pressures or to 
seek explanations though structural factors. These reflections speak to what I
believe is an over-reliance on structural explanations to predict and explain the
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relationships between governments and non-profits more generally in the 
literature. The findings of this study support claims that "to understand or explain 
any action, the analyst must take into account not only the objective conditions, 
but the actor's subjective interpretation of them" (Scott, 2008, p.57). In this way, 
the findings of this research suggest that within certain limitations, NPOs "seem to 
be managing their environment rather than allowing it to dictate what their 
strategic choices should be" (Akingbola, 2006, p.278). Chapter 9 seeks to explore 
further a pivotal theme around which the NPOs in this study sought to manage 
their environment -  that they were not just a tool of government.
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CHAPTER 9
NOT JUST A TOOL: THE AGENCY AND AUTONOMY OF NPOs 
IN SOCIAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
9.1 Introduction
Exploring, in depth, the day-to-day experiences of three NPOs involved in the 
process of social policy implementation, in response to the question "how do NPO 
leaders understand and manage their relationships with governments in the 
process of social policy implementation?" has illuminated a range of insights into 
the nexus between governments and NPOs. This final chapter consolidates the 
empirical findings of this study and initiates discussion about the implications of 
these findings. I highlight the diverse ways in which NPOs and their leaders 
experience the social policy implementation relationship with governments. I 
briefly revisit each field site, demonstrating the key finding of this thesis -  that it is 
theoretically informative to view the NPOs involved in this study from the 
Selznickian (1957) perspective of organisations as institutions (values-infused 
organisations) -  or aspiring to be institutions. I describe the important role of the 
leaders in operationalising the values-infused aspect of the NPO on its function, 
involvement with social policy implementation and its responses to the relationship 
with government. Theoretical and normative implications are briefly explored. I
also initiate discussions about practice and research implications.
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9.2 The actors
From its outset, this research has been driven by an "itch" to investigate the nexus 
between NPOs and governments involved in the process of social policy 
implementation. I have held a conviction that this nexus holds critical, yet under­
explored, pieces to the puzzle of social policy development and implementation. It 
is therefore not unsurprising that a key finding of this study has been that the nexus 
does, indeed, prove itself as an interesting space in the implementation process. 
While the nexus between NPOs and governments is a blind spot for much of the 
implementation literature, some research (especially in the third sector field) 
acknowledges or hints at the creativity found in this space, between the state and 
non-state actors (Benjamin, 2008; Ebrahim, 2002; Provan et al., 2004). This study 
has provided valuable detailed insight into what con and sometimes does occur in 
this space and reinforces the need not oniy for objectivist research that focuses on 
structural explanations, but also subjectivist, actor-centred accounts.
In this study, I have conducted ethnographic research that focuses on individual 
leaders of three NPOs. It is again, therefore, not surprising that this empirical work 
strongly suggests the pivotal role of agency in the involvement of NPOs in social 
policy implementation. Again, however, it is a useful contribution to both the third 
sector and implementation literature which tends to focus on aggregate 
explanations of the relationship, by uncovering how NPO leaders experience and 
understand their relationship with government in a variety of ways. It is their 
mental constructions of the relationship and its exigencies and norms that plays a 
crucial role in shaping the behaviours vis a vis government actors. It is also the way
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in which NPO leaders are both influenced by, as well as seek to influence their 
circumstances, that the role of agency has been seen in the findings of this 
research. It is impossible to consider the NPOs as holistic organisational actors, as 
Oliver and much of the third sector literature do, without drilling down to how the 
people within the NPO lead the work.
For example, combining the importance of the nexus between government and 
NPOs with the importance of agency in this process has been seen in a variety of 
experiences described in Chapters 4 to 8. Receiving implementation instruction 
from governments, departments and departmental officers -  what might be 
assumed as a predictable, consistent and clear experience -  has been shown to be, 
from time to time and from the perspective of the participants in this study, 
ambiguous, contestable and full of change. Acquiescence can be about seeking to 
comply as much with the written and official expectations of the department as it is 
about meeting the needs of specific personalities within the department. Standard 
operating procedures sometimes appear irrelevant or inappropriate, and the 
experience of government processes for the participants in this study may involve 
unexpected and unanticipated pathways.
As mentioned in Chapter 8, the NPO leaders in this study played a key role in 
determining NPO involvement in social policy implementation. They did this by 
interpreting the NPO's circumstances and response options, and in the process by 
making judgments about which (if any) norms should be activated and how 
important they were. An important aspect of this was in deciding the norms to
which their organisation would adhere. Just as is described in the institutional
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theory literature (Boin & Christensen, 2008; March & Olsen, 2006; Scott, 2008), in a 
world of contested legitimacy, the leader played an important role in determining 
what the NPO's version of legitimate practices would be. This manifest in myriad 
ways -  some of which fall into the traditional understanding of NPO policy 
development through lobbying and advocacy, and some in less obvious ways, such 
as determining the meaning of compliance and resistance in the day-to-day work of 
the NPO.
9.3 The processes
While the findings (that the role of agency and the nexus between NPOs and 
governments are important) are not surprising considering the methods and 
approach of the research underpinning this thesis, the pivotal unique finding of this 
thesis is how these features are important. An essential observation from this 
study concerns the extent to which the leader viewed their NPO not as an 
instrument of government social policy or a conduit of government intents, but 
instead as (or aspiring to be) an organisation infused with value, an institution. It 
was through this lens that the leader made decisions about the role and response 
of the NPO.
As described in Chapter 2, Selznick distinguishes between organisations which are 
"an expendable tool" and those which are "infuse[d] with value beyond the 
technical requirements of the task at hand" (Selznick, 1957, p.17), defining the 
latter as institutions. The following two contrasting views provide a clear example 
of how applying the logics of the organisation as an institution versus the
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organisation as an instrum ent im ply d iffe ren t behavioural imperatives fo r NPO 
leaders.
"So the lesson fo r me out o f all o f this is that's where you have to have your vision 
of what you want your work to do... these organisations that you come across 
where they just keep changing depending on what the funding is that's coming up. 
I think that's such a mistake. It's the principle based stuff. You stick with your 
values. You stick with your principles. You stick with what you believe you should 
be doing. And you find funding... I mean there is funding out there... you find  
funding that meets those objectives first... funding where the aims are broad 
enough that you could put your kind of stamp on it, which is really very good... You 
don't willy nilly change tact and go wherever to chase the next funding dollar. And 
I've seen so many organisations do that, and in the end they lose who they are and 
they wake up one day and they realise 'what are we? We're just a service centre; 
we're just a service centre that roils out a million programs.' They've lost their, i 
dunno, reason to be there..."
Kelly, PCC
Now consider the second view:
"I think that by necessity we have become quite compliant and systemised and 
structured and organised, even though our service delivery on the ground is still 
innovative and contemporary and creative..."
"The tide heads only one way. Everything is heading towards more compliance, the 
downside is it will tend to favour the large organisations, and it will tend to be 
dominated by compliance instead of outcomes... We are in the business of 
delivering a service. We are not a grassroots organisation that is here fo r the 
benefit o f our community, although we think that we create great benefit to our 
local community by delivering services on behalf o f whoever is funding it..."
"There are a lot of community organisations that take fo r granted the fact that they 
get funded. They believe it is a right... they believe they have a right to exist. But 
we have never adopted that... All the funding we have had has been "deliver an 
outcome or lose it"... everything we have could be gone in three years. Versus 
another type of organisation, who says we have been here fo r 100 years and we 
will be here fo r another 100 years... Whereas fo r us... we know that if  we don't 
deliver those outcomes fo r those target groups fo r that client, that funding will be 
gone."
Stuart, leader o f a non-profit community service organisation 
located in a neighbouring region to the PCC
Page I 271
Chapter 9: Not just a tool: The agency and autonomy oJNPOs in social policy implementation
Both of these two quotations above are essentially about organisational funding. 
As suggested by organisation theory, they both acknowledge one "critical 
organizational function [as]... the management of dependencies" (Froelich, 1999, 
p.248). Here, Kelly and Stuart both are describing their approach to managing 
financial dependencies. Yet, it is remarkable how different these approaches are.
Kelly and Stuart are both confident in their organisation as a provider of high 
quality community services. However, Stuart himself contrasts his and his NPO's 
approach as framed by a deep assumption that his organisation could be "gone in 
three years". For Kelly, as though embedded as an unshakeable cognitive norm, 
such a concept appears virtually unthinkable (Scott, 2008). For Kelly, the PCC is an 
organisation which is infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the 
task. For Stuart, his organisation is an expendable tool, whose comparative 
advantage is in its efficient and effective supply of target population outcomes for 
its client purchaser-funders. It is a "mechanistic instrument designed to achieve 
specified goals" (Scott, 2008, p.21). Both the PCC and Stuart's organisation perform 
relatively similar functions, but from very different perspectives and with 
potentially profoundly different implications.
In my fieldwork, the preferred self-identification of the NPO leaders I observed was 
with the institutional as opposed to the instrumental perspective. The participants 
in this study fundamentally did not see themselves or their organisations as tools of 
government even though they did see their relationship with government as 
indelibly and appropriately intertwined. Their belief in their NPOs as institutions
was evident in the way they described their organisation, in the way they
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conducted their work, in the way they understood their relationship with 
government and in the way they acted and responded to this relationship with 
government. The following three quotations are pithy examples of how this belief 
was displayed.
"We ore not our government grants. We are here in the community fo r a purpose."
Kelly, PCC
"I'm just thinking about, about identity, and values... And you see, I think when you 
are a big agency like us, and we do kick against the prick with government funding, 
but we also comply with what government funding requires of us, for example, 
with this one part of our organisation, it's really strongly controlled by government, 
with the whole branding issue and so on, and we are actually able to say, "that's 
OK, that's the government contract, that's what we're doing" and so we don't have 
to kick against that contract, because we've got enough going fo r us in other places 
to balance it out. But if  that was all we had, and every program was rigid like that, 
who would we be? We would be the sum of a set o f diverse and contradictory 
government programs."
Kaye, Robwood
"I reckon everything comes back to your identity, right, so you come back and you 
say, "we are the church at mission, we are partnering with the state"... So you can 
think, Minister, and you can think, Departmental Secretary, and bureaucrats, you 
can think that you're our life blood but all you give us is money. You don't give us an 
imperative to do what we do. You don't give us embeddedness in and commitment 
to our communities. You don't give us thousands of volunteers who work with us 
because they share our vision o f transformed lives and communities. You need to 
realise you're not merely purchasing the human services we provide, as you would 
buy goods at a supermarket, you're investing in us to provide these services, in the 
communities that we are a part of. You are partnering with us..."
Eddy, FAA
I believe the NPO leaders in this study understood and responded to their 
relationships with government as existing or aspiring institutions -  in the 
Selznickian (1957) use o f the term, a value-infused organisation. This is 
demonstrated in a range of ways at each site. Common examples already discussed 
in Chapter 8 were the way the NPOs engaged with the ambiguous context and the
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importance of the history of the relationship between government and the NPO, 
the NPO's overarching goal and the importance of organisational values.
The finding that the NPOs in this study saw themselves as institutions with an 
identity beyond that of a tool of government is similar to the findings of Frumkin 
and Andre-Clark (2000). In their work, these authors distinguished between for- 
profit welfare-to-work providers with slogans such as "Helping Government Serve 
the People" and faith based NPOs who are "driven by commitments to justice and 
charity" (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000, p.151). While this study and others like it 
have made the link between values and the involvement of NPOs in social policy 
implementation, the links made are typically focused on empirically proving the 
relative worth of NPOs, rather than investigating explanatory links through theory. 
The findings of this study are unique in the way in which these findings are analysed 
with reference to Selznick (1957) and institutional theory. However, before 
investigating the implications of this claim I will first demonstrate examples of the 
way this belief was manifest in each of the NPOs in this study.
Robwood
As a large, established provider of services for nearly 100 years, Robwood was, in 
many ways, a textbook example of an institutionalised organisation in this study 
(Boin, 2001; Selznick, 1957). It had a well-recognised branded organisational 
identity, with a distinct set of values and tag-lines. Within the organisation there 
was a strong sense of belonging, cohesion and organisational identity amongst the 
staff.
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The importance of being an institution was an obvious feature of Robwood's 
relationship with and response to government. The notion of being an institution 
underpinned tactics in which Robwood sought to exert power in the EOI 
negotiation process (in 5.3). It was demonstrated as Kaye wrote to the department 
head, citing Robwood's longevity in the sector. Repeated reference to the idea that 
"no one would be happy to see Robwood exit the field" -  in other words that the 
organisation was not an expendable tool -  was made by Robwood staff and board 
members throughout the process of negotiation. However, being an institution 
also underpinned reasons Robwood decided to ultimately compromise its per unit 
price -  to "stay in the tent", which became the key driving force behind the 
eventual outcome of the negotiation. The same driving force fed both initial 
resistance and eventual compromise.But being an institution and having an 
institutionalised connection to the field of service delivery meant more to Robwood 
than just staying connected to the field of service delivery. It influenced why 
Robwood wanted to stay connected. This was because it saw itself as playing a 
critical role in shaping implementation in this field.
"While it's tempting to walk away from the department... we don't want to walk 
away, it's been part of the agency for a long time and we're good at it, and if  we're 
not in it then we can't influence it and that's part of our commitment to getting a 
system that works for our clients."
Kaye, Robwood
As an institution, Robwood believed it had a legitimate voice and input into the 
design and delivery of implementation. It has its own agenda of pursuing social 
justice.
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"Robwood really made its asset base from which you could start generating its own 
income to start doing things in the community from the 1980s and 90s. So that was 
a fantastic windfall fo r an organisation that wanted to be proactive and innovative 
and do things in areas where it thought it could have the greatest impact, you 
know, and social justice, based on analysis and all that sort of stuff
Ronan, Robwood
Its status as an institution was the driving force behind the work of its policy 
branch. Robwood committed significant funding and resources to this type of work 
as it sought to have a prominent policy voice. In this way the effects of being a 
value-infused organisation had implications for the way in which Robwood engaged 
with social policy implementation -  not just as a provider, but as an influencer.
The belief that Robwood was an institution also had less obvious, but more 
fundamental impacts on, for example, their EOI negotiation experience. An 
important back-story to the EOI narrative was the context of "a strategic decision 
we'd made a couple of years ago to stop co-funding things that were, in our 
opinion, programs which government should be fully funding" [Ronan]. This then 
established a set of parameters, which, I believe, subsequently defined how the EOI 
negotiation occurred. These parameters meant, for example, that when Ronan met 
with the two middle managers, looking to cut back staff working in this particular 
program (in 5.3), the problem and its solutions were defined according to these 
established parameters. Here, the problem was that the government had not 
provided enough funding, and therefore the NPO response to this problem was that 
Robwood must seek increased funding or cut services in order to fit with the 
funding provided by government.
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The problem in this instance was not that Robwood was experiencing diminished 
returns on its investments and thus was no longer financially able to "prop up" 
government-funded programs. The problem was also not that Robwood had an 
organisational policy to pay its staff above-award wages, or to provide its executive 
with expensive cars, as a strategy to attract and retain high quality staff delivering 
high quality services. The problem was defined as inadequate funding from 
government, and the response was therefore to resist this inadequate funding by 
establishing a benchmark for adequate funding and to go about a negotiation 
process which sought this. In this way, Robwood's influence on the process of 
social policy implementation was far broader and more pervasive than just via their 
policy and lobbying activities. It permeated the fundamental assumptions 
informing their work and relationship with government.
Robwood sought to influence not just the content of implementation but also its 
relationship with government in process of social policy implementation. During an 
interview with Kaye, I referred to a newsletter opinion piece she had written some 
years before which I had dug up while researching her background. In this opinion 
piece, she refers to the relationship between NPOs and governments as a "game". 
In the interview, I asked her what this "game" was about. The following is her 
response:
"It's a gome about influence, I think, more than anything else. The context now -  
and this is, I think, a relatively new phenomenon -  you've now got NGOs, including 
for profit providers who are not interested in advocacy at all, and don't see their 
role as advocacy at all and are very comfortable with the concept of just having a 
contract with government in the same way that a property developer might or 
something like that. But that's not the traditional role of NGOs... So the game is 
about changing the nature of the relationship... changing the process of contracting 
so that the relationship is about more than just purchasing services. The game is
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about maturing the nature of the relationship because my view of what the 
relationship should be doesn't match what government thinks the relationship is. / 
want a say in the policy debate. I want to be at the decision making table. As a 
representative of the third sector, the industry and the service users. We want to 
mediate the relationship via the contracting relationship. If the government thinks 
that the relationship is only about the contract, then the contract is the thing you 
manipulate."
Kaye, Robwood
In these ways and more, being a value-infused organisation vitally affected the way 
that Robwood operated and engaged in the process of social policy 
implementation.
The PCC
Despite its modest size and history, my research led me to believe the PCC also 
operated as an institution in the Selznickian sense. Certainly its leader, Kelly talked 
about the PCC as an institution in terms of its reputation, the way it had a 
"leadership role" and the way "the community know we're there for them". 
Indeed, Kelly believes that the PCC's status as a community centre automatically 
lends it a great deal of institutionalised legitimacy.
"There are more than 100 community centres in this state... and although they 
mainly do work that's not valued by government, everyone knows what the benefits 
of a community centre are... I could say the same thing if  I were a disability service... 
there is no doubt that these kinds of services have a place and governments would 
be stupid to back away from funding them... So don't let a big fa t bureaucrat sitting 
in your state capital tell you what is quality... you're the expert for your 
organisation..."
Kelly, PCC.
As is illustrated candidly in this quotation, Kelly's belief in the PCC's status as an 
institution also influenced her approach to leading it and its relationship with 
government.
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Kelly's passion for preparing the social policy submission was driven by her 
commitment to the work of NPOs such as the PCC, a passion I believe at least partly 
derived from her unquestioning belief in the status and importance of the PCC and 
organisations like it. As described in Chapter 6, the key messages of this submission 
defend and promote the style of work engaged in by community centres. Niche 
professional practice defence was an important theme in much of Kelly's work. This 
then also led to Kelly's resistance when she felt she was being pressured to work in 
ways that did not correspond with this style of practice -  such as in 6.1 when she 
gave the money "away" and in 6.2 when she defied the government worker.
And yet Kelly and the PCC also acquiesced. The overall narrative of the PCC is not 
one solely defined by resistance. The curious episode of the PBI self-assessment is 
an example of the PCC's acquiescence, as is, in part, the narrative of complying with 
the annual accountability-reporting meeting in Chapter 4 (4.3). Considering the 
organisation as an institution does not automatically determine an organisational 
response of recalcitrance. It is interesting to make the anecdotal observation that 
this narrative of acquiescence occurred in a realm of the PCC's work which Kelly 
interprets as being highly regulative (concerning its tax status), rather than the 
ambiguous normative aspects of community work of the functions associated with 
the cognitively assumed relevance and importance of community centres in 
general.
While my narrative about this episode demonstrates that, even in the midst of what 
might otherwise be seen as a highly prescriptive procedure, there is still room for
interpretation and subjectivity as the process of acquiescence is dynamically
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defined, it is still experienced by Kelly as a highly regulative procedure. It is also, 
perhaps coincidentally or perhaps not, one in which Oliver's constellation of 
antecedents closely predicts the outcomes. Obviously it is inappropriate to draw 
conclusions about the strength of Oliver's predictions in highly regulated 
institutional environments, rather than ambiguous normative or contested 
cognitive institutional environments, still, the finding that institutional theory is 
useful for understanding the relationship between NPOs and governments makes 
many suggestions and has many implications for future research, as described later 
in this chapter.
FAA
Features of FAA's experience suggested to me that it was an organisation in the 
process of developing itself as an indispensible, taken-for-granted, well-established 
and embedded institution. Based on the perspectives, work and prioritisation of 
the leadership team, FAA appeared to have varying levels of buy-in and legitimacy 
from within the church, provider and government networks. For example, while 
FAA had managed to get itself on the "calling list" about a particular type of policy 
announcement, it had not reached a point where it felt it was being listened to by 
government in the early and important stages of policy framing. While it received 
substantial support from the church and provider network, this support was 
dependent on deals brokered by Eddy. She, and her two senior executives 
identified closely with the organisation, and aligned their values with the values of 
the organisation and each other. She understood the work of FAA, and of the
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network of providers, as being more than just "what we do", instead she 
considered it to be "who we are" (6.2).
It was clear to see that Eddy aspired for FAA to be considered an embedded and 
value-infused institution. She wanted it to have a "'national presence". I believe 
Eddy desired for FAA to have its own identity, advocating for the poor and 
marginalised, above and beyond the representative needs of just its church and 
provider network funders. I also believe Eddy wanted FAA's identity to be more 
than an efficient conduit of information and instruction from government or an 
effective representative providing legitimacy and buy-in to government 
announcements. I believe Eddy wanted FAA be grounded in the church and 
network, and embedded in government -  but a tool of neither. Flowever, just as 
"institutionalization is a process" (Selznick, 1957, p.16), FAA, at the time of my 
fieldwork there, was not yet fully meeting these aspirations.
And so, as suggested by Boin and Christensen (2008), the role of leadership and a 
great deal of Eddy's work focused on building the status of FAA to that of an 
indispensible institution. FAA was aligning itself to be indispensible to government 
-  moving it from being on the "calling list" to being on the "speed dial" [Gail]. Eddy 
did this through concerted efforts at relationship building with government, 
through demonstrating that the organisation was not focused solely on resisting 
government but was interested in "solutions" and policy issues. FAA's overarching 
goals were often about building future "access", and it was only when the content 
of government policy initiatives became totally untenable that it was resisted.
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9.4 Context -  implications
Theoretical implications
There are a range of theoretical implications from the findings here for the 
implementation theory explored in Chapter 2. The finding here of the significance 
of an NPO involved in social policy implementation as not just o tool, suggests an 
expanded role for institutional theory in understanding the involvement of NPOs in 
social policy implementation. While elements of institutional theory can be found 
in both implementation and third sector research, especially those aspects of 
institutional theory raised by authors such as March and Olsen (March & Olsen, 
1984, 1989, 2006) or Meyer and Rowan (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), an expanded 
application of institutional theory incorporating particular the Selznickian (1957) 
perspective on institutions could be particularly informative. Also a more detailed 
analysis of social policy implementation considering the influence of Scott's (2008) 
three pillars of institutions and implications of the socially defined benchmarks of 
neo-institutionally described environments could be helpful.
Particularly, however, In looking at the nexus between governments and NPOs 
involved in social policy, I believe I have found an organisational equivalent to the 
street level bureaucrat paradigm (Lipsky, 1980). Just as the street level bureaucrat 
is not a faceless cog at the bottom of a service delivery hierarchy (Hupe & Hill, 
2007), so too the NPOs described here are not faceless links in the service delivery 
chain. The street level bureaucrat paradigm explains the experience of the 
autonomous individual at the front line of service delivery and is understood 
through bottom up research (Hill & Hupe, 2009). I believe that the role and
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engagement of NPOs in social policy implementation (at the nexus between the 
NPO and government) can be explained and explored through an expanded use of 
institutional theory -  incorporating particularly a stronger focus on neo­
institutionalism, the institutionalised organisation, and the role of institutional 
leaders or entrepreneurs -  and investigated from a "middle-out" perspective. This 
finding reinforces the notion that "policy implementation may quite legitimately be 
seen as an adaptive process" (Hill & Hupe, 2003, p.472).
This suggests also an important finding for third sector research -  particularly that 
which is concerned about the democratic implications of NPOs involved in social 
policy implementation. Traditionally, NPOs are seen as important players involved 
in social policy implementation because of the inherently democratic features such 
as their elected boards of governance and because of the "buffer" role they play 
between governments and citizens (De Tocqueville, 1994/1850). It is seen as the 
healthy result of a pluralistic society for the extended polity to consist of a range of 
actors with a range of perspectives (Casey & Dalton, 2006). While I cannot 
comment on the extent to which NPOs represent either the service users or the 
community at large, the research presented in this thesis suggests that in addition 
to this debate, there are also democratic implications of the involvement of NPOs in 
social policy implementation based on the way social policy is received, interpreted 
and enacted at an organisational level.
The third sector literature does recognise the inherent importance of "values" for 
NPOs (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000). However, all too often these values are seen
from a particular perspective in which they form the comparative advantage for an
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organisational type that otherwise may not be focused on efficiency or 
effectiveness. Based on the findings of this research, I challenge this assumption 
and suggest instead that values are not important because they compensate for 
failings in other areas. Instead it is because they embody a normative position 
which challenges the assumption that government always knows best and that the 
ideal participation in social policy implementation for NPOs is either as an advocate 
or a provider. Rather, through implementation, policy is interpreted as it is 
enacted, not just at the front line, but at an organisational level.
Normative implications
The findings of this research -  that there are NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation who engage in this process as institutions, rather than as tools of 
government -  clearly begs the normative question: is it a bad idea for institutions to 
deliver government social policy? Is it desirable fo r the organisations delivering 
government social policy to be tools? Is resistance bad and is acquiescence good? 
Just as the top-down and bottom-up debates had irreconcilable differences about 
the relative value of the opinions of those at the top and bottom of the policy 
hierarchy (Hupe & Hill, 2007; Linder & Peters, 1987), so too these normative 
questions are challenging here.
I believe the answer to these questions is that it depends. Involving 
institutionalised organisations in the process of social policy implementation will 
inevitably have desirable and undesirable consequences, just as involving 
organisations which are tools will also have desirable and undesirable
Page I 284
Chapter 9: Not just a tool: The agency and autonomy ofNPOs in social policy implementation
consequences. Judging the relative merit of involving non-profit institutions in the 
process of social policy implementation cannot be determined in sweeping 
statements but must be judged on a more case-by-case basis.
Perhaps it is that negative features of involving non-profit institutions in the process 
of social policy implementation are alleviated somewhat by the assumption that 
these organisations are not driven by survival and profit-maximising behaviours 
(Billis & Glennerster, 1998; Hansmann, 1980). Instead it is generally accepted that 
NPOs are driven by people with a certain view on social policy and extensive 
experience usually in providing a range of services and supports for people who are 
marginalised and vulnerable (Nevile, 2009). Indeed, "many NFPs [not-for-profits] 
add value to the community through both the delivery of services and the nature of 
their production processes" (Productivity Commission, 2009, p.xxix). These 
organisations also can exist within a range of accountability contexts, both 
horizontally and vertically: "alternative forms of accountability exist. These can be 
seen as more or less appropriate in different settings... [therefore] judgements on 
what looks appropriate are essentially political judgements (Hupe & Hill, 2007, 
p.295).
Surely, social policy implementation "providers" do have a legitimate voice in the 
policy process because of their technical and content expertise. As providers and 
professionals, the participants I observed all had passionate, synthesised, reflexive, 
value-added perspectives on the experience and delivery of social policy. 
Obviously, the issue of "provider capture" is important when considering NPO
involvement in social policy implementation (Linder & Peters, 1987). However, this
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research has shown that NPO involvement in social policy is not restricted to a 
dichotomous role of either implementation or lobbying. Instead, through the use 
of agency and the perspective of their organisations as more than tools of 
government, NPOs are involved in social policy implementation as they seek to 
enact it.
9.5 Practice and research implications
Research implications
Identifying the importance of Selznick's institutionalism -  or of organisations as 
institutions -  as a finding emerging from the data rather than as a framework 
applied from the outset of the research opens numerous doors for further 
exploration. During the process of data analysis, the experience as a researcher of 
discovering the importance of an expanded understanding of institutional theory 
was simultaneously liberating and frustrating in that I wished (albeit very briefly) for 
an opportunity to begin my entire research project again from scratch with a 
comprehensive focus from the outset on leadership in emerging and established 
institutions. Obviously, the use of Oliver was critical for interpreting the data in a 
way that spoke with some relevance and appropriateness to the predominance of 
organisational and institutional theory underpinning the third sector and 
implementation literature. However, reviewing the data through a more developed 
institutional perspective could also have yielded rich findings.
Consider, for example, Kelly's deeply set opinion of the role and function of the PCC 
and community centres in general (described above in 9.2). Data such as this
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suggests that rich analysis awaits the patient researcher who further investigates 
the role of institutional leadership for NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation. Further exploration, applying institutional theory constructs such 
as the process of developing and embedding logics of appropriateness (March & 
Olsen, 1984, 1989, 2006), and, as previously mentioned, Scott's (2008) three pillars 
(regulative, normative and cognitive) of institutions could prove satisfying and 
theoretically enriching. As mentioned above, my findings in relation to FAA suggest 
exploration of Boin and Christensen's (2008) phase model of institutionalisation 
could also provide deeper explanation for the role of NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation.
This research has also highlighted the important role of leaders. I have hinted, in 
Chapter 8, at the significance of academic perspectives on leadership for the role of 
NPO leaders. However, again, discovering this theme as one emerging from the 
data -  rather than it being a theme identified from the outset as a specific research 
focus -  has also raised more questions than it has answered. I suggest in Chapter 2 
the emerging, but as yet under-developed, application of leadership to explain the 
involvement of NPOs in social policy implementation, summarising that leadership 
tends to be more a finding than a framework for investigation. Unfortunately, the 
research in this thesis replicates such an approach. Thus, this study builds the case 
for a more developed leadership-focused study of NPO behaviour in the process of 
social policy implementation. It also supports further research into the role of 
leaders or "entrepreneurs" (Lowndes, 2005) in institutional development and 
change. Combining leadership and institutional theory approaches would also prove
Page I 287
Chapter 9: Not just a tool: The agency and autonomy oJNPOs in social policy implementation
theoretically and practically informative. Such a combination could explore further 
the key finding here of how leaders "frame" the work of their organisations and 
provide insights to themes such as bounded rationality (Simon, 1955).
The importance of looking to the nexus between governments and "third party 
providers" from the perspectives of the providers themselves is also highlighted. 
Observing the role of NPOs both at the front and back end of social policy 
development and implementation has demonstrated that despite involvement in 
different "phases" of social policy, common themes emerge for the NPOs. Looking 
at the day-to-day experiences of NPOs has also provided a useful contrast to the 
typical experience of exploration and analysis based on specific episodes, critical 
events or specific government decisions.
While this research has underlined the importance of organisations as institutions 
in explaining the role of NPOs in the process of social policy, it has also suggested, 
in Chapter 8, that there are NPOs who engage in the process of social policy 
implementation as tools, and that, at times NPOs who consider themselves as 
institutions, or aspire to become institutions also behave as tools of government. It 
would be a fascinating research endeavour to further explore these types of NPOs, 
or NPOs in these circumstances, their organisational development and change over 
time, and the themes feeding their trajectory as tools -  and particularly on the role 
of leadership in this organisational journey.
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Practice implications
What, if any, are the implications of this research for the design of government- 
NPO relations in the process of social policy implementation? Essentially, one key 
practice implication fo r governments is that it pays to know what makes NPOs tick. 
This suggestion is made repeatedly in the networks and governance literature, in 
recognition of the horizontally power shared world in which social policy 
implementation often occurs (Hupe & Hill, 2007; Rhodes, 1997). Such a suggestion 
is reinforced also by the recent preliminary findings of the Australian Government 
Productivity Commission (2009). Here, I make this suggestion again particularly 
with reference to the insight of this thesis that an institutional perspective may be 
useful in understanding the function and response of NPOs involved in social policy 
implementation.
Both the world of academia and practice lose an important element to 
understanding the process of social policy implementation when divorcing policy 
development from implementation and delivery -  not only because “few policies 
are implemented fully formed" (Mulgan & Lee, 2001, p.7). In the vein of Lipsky's 
findings recognising that the work of street-level bureaucrats “effectively become 
the public policies they carry out" (Lipsky, 1980, p.xii), this study has shown that at 
an organisational level, the way that NPOs engage with the process of social policy 
implementation also influences the way polices are carried out. Despite the claims 
of some NPOs that they are apolitical (Casey & Dalton, 2006), this study has found 
examples where the involvement of NPOs in the process of social policy
Page I 289
Chapter 9: Not just a tool: The agency and autonomy of NPOs in social policy implementation
implementation involves policy interpretation in the process of delivery, suggesting 
an inherently political experience for NPOs (Hupe & Hill, 2007).
Recognising that ''policy formation and implementation occur continuously and 
simultaneously and are always influencing each other" (Klijn, 2002, p.162), Klijn 
makes a number of helpful suggestions about the role of the public sector in the 
modern "hollow" state. For example, Klijn (2002) encourages a move away from a 
restrictive "phase" model of policy development and implementation, with a 
"preoccupation with control" (p.162) and "finding one optimal solution" to 
"problems... [that] tend to change over time" (p.161). Instead, Klijn recommends 
government actors focus on facilitating processes which explore options and guide 
learning.
The involvement of NPOs in social policy implementation has implications for 
accountability of public funds (Mulgan, 2005, 2006). The debate about 
accountability of non-government actors in the process of social policy 
implementation is vast and illuminating and cannot be fully summarised here. My 
research concurs with other findings suggesting that an appropriate accountability 
response to the findings presented here would not be to instigate greater controls 
and limits of these organisations in an effort to suppress deviation and increase 
standardised practice (Hupe & Hill, 2007). My research would suggest that some 
consequences of doing so would decrease the trust in relationships between 
governments and NPOs, complicating and problematising social policy 
implementation processes. This is especially so for NPOs who see themselves as
institutions and are staffed and led by people who believe that it is professionally
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irresponsible not to inform the process of social policy implementation as they 
enact it. They have a duty to do so. Surely the role of government here is to create 
policy development and implementation systems which enhance and ensure the 
voices of providers and service users are well balanced.
Australia is in the process of developing a national "compact" to frame the 
Australian Government's relationship with third sector organisations (Australian 
Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009), 
Australia's non-profit sector is receiving increasing levels of attention. Such an 
approach has been introduced in the UK, Canada and by some of the Australian 
state and territory governments with mixed results (Barraket, 2006; Casey & 
Dalton, 2006; Lyons & Passey, 2006). Key features of these approaches include that 
they affirm the independence of the third sector organisations, supporting their 
right to pursue their own goals and comment on government policy. Developing a 
compact in a context of collaborative governance models, and also now co- 
production (Alford, 1998), provides an opportunity for re-inventing the relationship 
between NPOs and governments in Australia (Melville & Perkins, 2003). This 
process, its outcome and follow-up may provide opportunities for governments and 
NPOs to work together to formally agree upon and articulate a standpoint on NPO 
involvement in the process of social policy development and implementation.
9.6 Conclusion
This thesis has sought to contribute to the academic discussion of the involvement 
of NPOs in the process of social policy implementation. By focusing my empirical
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questions and methods on the nexus between NPOs and governments I have 
uncovered new insights into this process. Analysing these insights through a 
particular theoretical framework (Oliver, 1991), I have confirmed its utility, but also 
sought to further develop and apply it. In doing so, I interpret the structural 
explanations of Oliver not just as the sole true explanation for NPO engagement in 
social policy implementation, but as a lens through which to explore and discover 
other explanations. Two other explanations -  significant in their pervasiveness -  
which have emerged from the data in this study have been the role of leaders and 
organisational identity as not just a tool. When brought together, these two 
explanations strongly suggest the usefulness specific aspects of institutional theory 
as a complementary explanatory framework for understanding the role of NPOs in 
social policy implementation.
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Appendix 1: Example of an agreement with NPO field site
Principles of Participant Observation and “Fieldwork”
Agreement between [Faith Aid Australia] and 
Alison Procter, PhD Candidate at the Australian National University (ANU)
Purpose
This document aims to outline the principles and pragmatics of Alison 
Procter’s fieldwork-relationship with [Faith Aid Australia], and although it 
does not represent an ultimate or complete contract for this relationship it 
forms the basis from which this relationship will be negotiated as required. 
This document is best read in conjunction with Alison’s submission to the 
ANU Ethics Committee, the broader Australian Research Council (ARC) 
project’s approved submission to the ANU Ethics Committee, and the 
ARC/ANU contract with Alison which details information such as intellectual 
property and are referred to throughout this document.
Background
As a part of a larger ARC project, Alison Procter is completing a research 
project to fulfil the requirements of her PhD at the ANU. This research 
project currently has the title Nonprofit-Government Service Delivery 
Relations: “In order to work with us they need to know how we work” and 
aims to investigate the question “how do people in nonprofit human service 
organisations understand and engage in the service delivery relationship(s) 
with government(s)?”. This three year project, running from 2006-2009, 
involves (1) a review of the literature (2) period of “fieldwork”, incorporating 
observations, interviews and agency document review in one or more 
nonprofit service delivery organisations, and (3) “write up” of a thesis.
Appendices
The larger ARC research project into which this PhD project fits, Improving 
decision-making in government service delivery using third party providers, 
aims to investigate how relationships between government and providers are 
managed and can be improved. This project involves a team of more than 
five researchers, and is funded and governed in a partnership arrangement 
with the ANU, the Australian Government Departments of Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA), Employment and 
Workplace Relations (DEWR), Finance and Administration (DOFA), Veterans 
Affairs (DVA), and the Victorian Department of Human Services.
Pragmatics
During the period of fieldwork, which will run for three to six months starting 
no later than March 2007, Alison will endeavour to:
• Be present at [Faith Aid Australia] approximately three days per week 
depending on university commitments; conducting herself at all times in a 
professional, amenable and transparent manner; observing the 
functioning of the office; discussing the work of the office with the [Faith 
Aid Australia] staff and volunteers; reviewing written agency information; 
and answering any questions about the nature of her research.
• Update [Faith Aid Australians position papers -  to become familiar to the 
work of the organisation and to contribute to the organisation -  and any 
other negotiated work.
• Make presentations to [Faith Aid Australia] about the findings of the 
project, inviting and incorporating [Faith Aid Australians verbal and 
written feedback into the final written thesis.
And [Faith Aid Australia] will endeavour to:
• Provide Alison with desk space, a PC and access to the internet.
• Invite Alison to relevant and appropriate meetings (including board 
meetings) and events considered relevant to the work of [Faith Aid 
Australia].
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• Provide Alison with opportunities to interview and have discussions with 
[Faith Aid Australia] staff and board members and to review agency 
documents.
• Introduce Alison to stakeholders where suitable.
If [Faith Aid Australia] have any concerns about the progression of the 
fieldwork that cannot be resolved through discussions with Alison, then 
points of contact for them are outlined in the ANU ethics committee 
submission and include Alison’s PhD supervisor, Paul ‘t Hart, the principle 
investigators of the ARC project, John Wanna and Claire Donovan, or the 
ANU Ethics Officer.
Principles
Confidentiality and Trust
Alison will at all times conduct herself in a professional and trustworthy 
manner with integrity and respect for the people and work of [Faith Aid 
Australia],
The information gathered during fieldwork -  including documents reviewed, 
interviews or informal discussions, and observations made -  will remain 
strictly confidential at all times and will only be discussed as necessary with 
Alison’s thesis supervisor, Prof. Paul ‘t Hart at the ANU, as a part of her 
academic supervision. Data stored will be de-identified if specifically 
nominated by the participants -  otherwise, throughout the project, data will 
be coded and stored securely. The thesis and any subsequent publications 
will incorporate only de-identified descriptions of the work and processes of 
[Faith Aid Australia] unless participants have a strong wish to be identified, in 
which case this is also negotiable.
Intellectual Property and Publications
Part of the methods used for this research will be that participants are invited 
to read and prepare a written response to the findings described and 
analysed in the thesis, which will be included in the final thesis (due for 
submission in 2009). There may also be other publications -  for example a 
book chapter or journal articles -  stemming from this research. The
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intellectual property of the thesis and subsequent publications will be 
retained by Alison Procter, with acknowledgement to the “anonymous” 
contributions made by participants.
ANU Ethics
The project will at all times comply with the ethical standards illustrated in 
Alison's January 2007 submission to the ANU Ethics Committee and the 
overall ARC project’s ethics approval. Both these ethics submissions are 
based on the Australian Government’s “National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans” (1999) which outlines the basis of 
all research involving humans as being guided by the values and ethical 
principles of integrity, respect, beneficence, and justice. These standards 
include guidelines for consent, data storage, recruitment of participants, 
payment, confidentiality, the benefits and risks of fieldwork and the voluntary 
nature of participation.
Signed in agreement by:
[Key Participants] Alison Procter
[Faith Aid Australia] Australian National University
Date: Date
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Appendix 2: Three examples of how I visually represented narrative episodes
AVOID DEFY MANIPULATEACQU'zSCE COMPROMISE
Less (Resistance to Institutional Pressures) More
FAA: Responding to Government (based on Oliver, 1991)
Consistency of 
institutional norms 
with organisation 
goals
Voluntary diffusion 
of pressures 
Environmental 
interconnected­
ness 
Level of
dependency on 
stakeholders 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Potential for 
economic gain 
Potential for 
legitimacy gain 
Legal enforcement 
of pressures 
Constraint on 
discretion/ 
autonomy 
Number of 
stakeholders
COMPROMISE AVOIDACQUIESCE DF/Y MANIPULATE
7 (w self)
(Resistance to Institutional Pressures)
NCC: “ I told him off" (based on Oliver, 1991)
Consistency of 
institutional norms 
with organisation 
goals
Voluntary diffusion 
of pressures 
Environmental 
interconnected­
ness 
Level of 
dependency on 
stakeholders 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Potential for 
economic gain 
Potential for 
legitimacy gain 
Legal enforcement 
of pressures 
Constraint on 
discretion/ 
autonomy 
Number of 
stakeholders
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DEFY MANIPULATEACQUIESCE AVOID
Robwood: Common A udit S tatem ent (based on Oliver, 1991)
Consistency of 
institutional norms 
with organisation 
goals
Voluntary diffusion 
of pressures 
Environmental 
interconnected­
ness 
Level of
dependency on 
stakeholders 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Potential for 
economic gain 
Potential for 
legitimacy gain 
Legal enforcement 
of pressures 
Constraint on 
discretion/ 
autonomy 
Number of 
stakeholders
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Appendix 3: Participants' comments
These are the comments made by the participants in this study after reading the 
narratives in which they feature. I have excluded the at times lengthy and detailed 
discussions about appropriate levels of de-identification.
Reading it made me feel so proud to be part of Faith Aid.
Eddy, FAA
Wow. I am tired just remembering all that I was involved in...
I'm happy with how you've interpreted all the bits and pieces.
In summary, it feels like we are always on the back foo t with Govt; trying to 
work them out; trying to second-guess them; schmoozing with them; hiding 
from them; begging them; reporting to them using stupid instruments; all in 
the name of trying to help the community and build a better world. The one 
thing we don't seem to be with them - is in PARTNERSHIP - not a real one 
anyway.
Kelly, PCC
Hi Alison, some comments in the text but otherwise it seems to me to be on 
the money. My job sounds more interesting when you write about it...
Julie, Robwood
Hi Alison, started reading this morning and couldn't put it down... It is really 
well written, insightful and thoughtful and I can't wait to read the whole 
shebang! It is classic reading...
[Fieldwork Coordinator], Robwood
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